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 ‘The Ministry of Education, Science and Culture is working on a creative nation, and recognizes 
the importance of creative development in education’  
Creative thinking has been indicated as ‘the premier 21st century skill’, and not without 
reason. In our current knowledge society, continuous innovation is critical, and information bases 
rapidly change and grow. Consequently, flexibility and the ability to think out of the box, to think 
divergently (or to generate and test multiple problem solutions instead of a single one) and to gain 
insight, are valued more than ever before.  
These statements underscore the importance of creative thinking in our society and point 
toward the particular relevance of creativity development. They also raise important questions, 
including ‘What does creative thinking mean? Does the ability to think creatively develop across 
childhood and adolescence, and how? Which neural mechanisms are involved during creative 
performance and, how (if possible) can creativity be improved?’ Research on creative thinking 
development in adolescence to adulthood is severely lacking, yet this age group deserves close 
examination, as they are our future thought leaders.  
From studies in related research fields, there is evidence that adolescence is a time period 
for crucial development of cognitive abilities (Casey, Jones, & Hare, 2008; Steinberg, 2005), and 
adolescents’ brain demonstrates marked changes in structure and function (Luna, et al., 2010; 
Giedd and Rapoport, 2010; Shaw et al., 2008). This thesis therefore, focuses on this age group and 
transition period in order to address the above questions.   
To study the mechanisms underlying creative thinking development, the research in this 
thesis combines behavioral measures with brain activation, as measured with functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI), across domains and ages, in both single test and longitudinal training 
designs. This allowed me to examine both age- and experience-related effects on creative thinking 
performance during functional brain development. Before describing the performed research and 
consequent results in Chapters 2 to 6, this chapter will provide an introduction to the theory of 
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Chapter 1    General introduction 
creative thinking, including the theoretical framework that has been incorporated to understand the 
processes underlying creative thinking. Subsequently, relevant prior research on the neural 
correlates of creative thinking is discussed. A short introduction of the adolescent period is then 
given, followed by an overview of prior research on creative thinking training. The introduction 
chapter finishes by providing the main goal of the thesis and a short overview of the upcoming 
chapters. 
What is creative thinking?  
Creativity is commonly referred to as the ability to generate ideas, insights and solutions 
that are both original and feasible (e.g. Amabile, 1996; Sternberg & Lubart, 1996). As such, 
creative outcomes should be new and uncommon, yet also potentially useful and relevant; original 
but infeasible ideas are commonly strange whereas ideas that are feasible but not original are 
mundane, and in a sense, boring. Creativity is believed to be one of humans’ most important and 
complex behaviors. For example, creative insights solve daily problems, (e.g., use a broom to 
obtain a toy from under the couch); are requisite for scientific breakthroughs; and creative 
strategizing allows one to win competitions (De Dreu & Nijstad, 2008).  To understand creative 
performance, the present dissertation builds upon the creative cognition approach which identifies 
creative success as inherent to normal human cognitive functioning (Ward, Smith, & Finke, 1999), 
and emphasizes the dependency on fundamental cognitive functions, such as working memory and 
executive control (Nijstad, De Dreu, Rietzschel, & Baas, 2010; Sowden, Pringle & Gabora, 2014). 
Accordingly, the development of creative capacities are considered to be related to the 
development of supporting cognitive functions, and, concurrently, creativity training success is 
considered to be depended on the trainability of its supporting functions.  
Although the exact processes supporting creative outcomes are still under debate, it has 
become common to describe creative thinking through so called dual-process models of creative 
thinking. In cognitive and social psychology, dual-process models generally include two ways of 
achieving one’s goal:  1) through fast, implicit and associative processing; and 2) through 
deliberate, effortful and logical processing (Chaiken & Trope, 1999). In the field of creative 
cognition, dual-process models commonly imply that both types of processing are involved to 
establish creative solutions that are both imaginative and useful.  
A specific type of dual processing model, The Dual Pathway to Creativity Model (Baas, 
De Dreu & Nijstad, 2008; De Dreu, Baas, & Nijstad, 2008; Nijstad et al, 2010; Rietzschel, De 
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Dreu, & Nijstad, 2007), describes creative outputs as the result of 1) cognitive flexibility, and 2) 
cognitive persistence. According to the model, cognitive flexibility enables accessibility to 
multiple and broad cognitive categories; flexible switching between these categories; and a global 
processing style or broad focus. Cognitive persistence, on the other hand, is associated with 
focused and systematic effort, in-depth exploration of a relatively small number of cognitive 
categories, and a local processing style or narrow focus (De Dreu et al., 2008; 2012). Indeed, a 
vast body of research has shown that creative performance can be achieved through both a flexible 
and divergent way of thinking (e.g., Duncker, 1945; Oppenheimer, 2008; Simonton, 1997; 
Winkielman, Schwarz, Fazendeiro, & Reber, 2003), as well as a persistent and systematic way of 
thinking (Dietrich, 2004; Dietrich & Kanso, 2010; Finke, 1996; Rietzschel, Nijstad, & Stroebe, 
2007; Sagiv, Arieli, Goldenberg, & Goldschmidt, 2009; Simonton, 1997). It is commonly 
assumed, as with other dual-process models, that creative outcomes are the product of both 
processing types, with different contribution ratios and, dependency on the type of task as well as 
individual functioning.  
To date, creativity research has mainly focused on two types of cognitive functions that 
represent creative potential: divergent thinking and insight. Divergent thinking is the most 
commonly tested function in creativity research, and is considered an important component of the 
creative process as it captures one’s capacity to create novelty (Torrance, 1966). Divergent 
thinking tasks require the generation of multiple solutions to an open-ended problem (Guilford, 
1967) and have been shown to have significant predictive value for creative success (Kim, 2008). 
Divergent thinking can be measured in different domains. In this thesis, I studied the Alternate 
Uses Task (AUT) to test divergent thinking in the verbal domain, and the Creativity Ability Test 
(CAT) and the Matchstick Problem Task (MPT) to test divergent thinking in the visuo-spatial 
domain. The AUT requires individuals to think of as many unusual uses for a common object, for 
example, for a brick. The CAT and MPT involve pre-described rules that participants must adhere 
to when instructed to find as many solutions as possible. The CAT consists of squares including 
figures. Participants are asked to compose triads of squares based on the properties (e.g., number, 
position) of the figures included. The MPT involves an arrangement of matches that must be 
reorganized to make other pre-described patterns by removing a number of matchsticks. To solve 
these kinds of problems (CAT & MPT), one is required to overcome mental fixation. In case of 
the CAT, mental fixation is created due to one’s own (prior) solution. In case of the MPT, fixation 
is the result of initially presented formation of matchsticks. 
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Creative performance in divergent thinking tasks is commonly expressed in terms of 
fluency, flexibility and originality (Guilford, 1967; Torrance, 1966). Fluency refers to the number 
of ideas, insights, problem solutions, or products that are generated. Larger numbers of ideas are 
associated with better creative performance under the assumption that quantity breeds quality. 
Flexibility refers to the generation of different conceptual categories or themes of ideas, and as 
such, requires overcoming mental fixedness; in case of the AUT brick, ‘building’ and ‘weight’ 
would be two different solution categories - the more different the categories, the more flexible a 
person is. The third measure of creative performance, originality, refers to the uniqueness or 
infrequency of solutions and ideas. The originality of an idea or solution is generally expressed in 
terms of a) ‘uniqueness’ which corresponds to a certain score assigned by an experienced scorer 
(or set of) , or b) ‘infrequency’ as calculated by taking into account the number of appearances of 
a certain solution across the total of solutions generated by the entire pool of participants. Fluency 
and originality may be correlated (under the assumption of ‘quantity breeds quality’; Diehl & 
Stroebe, 1987), but it is not necessary, since one might generate a large number of solutions or 
ideas without uniqueness or originality (see De Dreu et al., 2008; Förster, Friedman, & Liberman, 
2004). Fluency and flexibility are commonly related, at least to a certain degree; generating ideas 
or solutions in various categories will be associated with more ideas/solutions overall (Nijstad, 
Stroebe, & Lodewijkx, 2002). Flexibility may also be correlated to originality as larger numbers 
of conceptual categories increase the chance that uncommon categories are used and, 
consequently, relatively uncommon solutions are generated (Rietzschel et al., 2007). It should be 
noted that flexibility is not only a measure of creative performance, but refers to a cognitive 
process where it includes the ability to break set and use flat associative hierarchies of concepts 
(see above; The Dual Pathway to Creativity Model; Baas et al., 2008; De Dreu et al., 2008; 
Nijstad et al., 2010; Rietzschel et al., 2007). 
Insight tasks, in contrast to divergent thinking tasks, have a demonstrable correct solution. 
This type of task generally requires establishing associations among previously unrelated or 
weakly related information, and mentally restructuring the problem space (Förster et al., 2004; 
Smith & Kounios, 1996). Insight solutions differ from non-insight solutions in that 1) solvers 
experience their solutions as sudden and have an ‘aha!’ experience; 2) prior to producing an 
insight, solution solvers sometimes come to a an impasse, a state of high uncertainty as to how to 
proceed; and 3) solvers usually cannot report the processing that led them to the solution. 
Common to divergent thinking tasks, insight tasks also have the pretension to measure creative 
potential; both types of tasks are associated with creative ability, but address different aspects of 
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the creative process. Commonly used tasks used in the present thesis include the Gestalt 
Completion Task (GCT; Eckstrom et al., 1976), the Snowy Picture Task (SPT; Eckstrom et al., 
1976) and the Remote Associates Task (RAT; Mednick, 1962). The first two tasks (GCT & SPT) 
capture insight ability in the visual domain whereas RAT focuses on insight ability in the verbal 
domain. The GCT consists of fragmented pictures and requires one to imaginatively complete 
them. In the SPT, participants are presented with a series of images of familiar objects hidden 
within visual noise. Participants need to disregard misleading interpretations that are rendered by 
the context to identify the objects. The RAT consists of triads of words and requires one to find a 
fourth, related word. As such, these insight tasks involve unifying complex or remotely associated 
information to find a single optimum solution that is retrieved from memory. To gain insight into 
the development of the complex construct of creative cognition, the current thesis includes a broad 
set of tasks capturing insight and divergent thinking in the verbal and visual domain. 
Neural correlates of creativity 
Neuroimaging is a useful method for gaining insight in the processes underlying creative 
success. In the current thesis, I have used fMRI for studying creative thinking in the visuospatial 
(Chapter 3) and verbal domain (Chapters 4 & 6). fMRI is a method that utilizes the Blood 
Oxygenation Level Dependent (BOLD) signal and examines which brain regions are activated 
during task performance. In recent years, several researchers have investigated creative cognition 
using lesion studies and neuroimaging techniques, including fMRI. Results are, however, not yet 
conclusive about the neural underpinnings of this complex construct (Arden, Chavez, Grazioplene, 
&Jung 2010; Dietrich & Kanso, 2010), and differences between study outcomes are likely related 
to the various designs capturing different aspects of creative thinking. Despite this, there is 
consensus that the (lateral parts of) the prefrontal cortex (PFC) plays a role in creative success. 
This brain region is generally associated with cognitive control functioning and coordinating 
lower level (associative) brain regions (e.g., Miller & Cohen, 2001), and is involved in both 
insight and divergent thinking tasks (see e.g., Arden et al., 2010; Dietrich & Kanso, 2010).  
Matchstick Problem Tasks (MPT; Guilford, 1967) have previously been used to shed light 
on the processes underlying creative problem solving. Using MPT and related tasks, 
neuropsychological and brain imaging studies revealed the involvement of the lateral PFC in 
creative problem solving. For example, comparison of healthy controls to patients with lesions in 
different brain regions showed that patients with (right) frontal lesions were impaired in solving 
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creative problems. Performances were most significantly impaired when strategy switches was 
required, indicating a role for lateral PFC regions particular in flexibility. Accordingly, an fMRI 
study in healthy adults demonstrated increased activation in bilateral ventral and dorsal PFC while 
solving matchstick problems, compared to brain activity while verifying a given solution to a 
matchstick problem (Goel & Vartanian, 2005). Furthermore, activation in the right dorsolateral 
PFC (DLPFC) correlated with the percentage of traced solutions, indicating that this region 
contributes to exploratory success. 
The AUT and adapted versions of this verbal divergent thinking task are also commonly 
applied to gain insight into the underpinnings of creative cognition. Although there are differences 
between outcomes for these tasks, a relatively consistent finding is the involvement of (left) 
temporo-parietal regions, including the angular gyrus (AG) and the supramarginal gyrus (SMG) 
(Arden et al., 2010; Dietrich & Kanso, 2010). For example, Fink et al. (2009, 2010) compared 
brain activations for generating alternative uses (AU) with activations for retrieving ordinary 
characteristics (OC) to capture brain regions involved in creative idea generation Their results 
revealed increased activity in left angular gyrus (AG) and supramarginal gyrus (SMG). Other 
researchers utilizing (verbal) divergent thinking paradigms relatively consistently found 
activations of the PFC (e.g., Abraham et al., 2012; Carlsson, Wendt, & Risberg, 2000; Chavez-
Eakle et al., 2007; Folley & Park, 2005; Howard-Jones, et al., 2005; Mashal, Faust, Hendler, & 
Jung-Beeman, 2007). Notably, a substantial part of these studies revealed positive relations 
between PFC activations and creative performances (e.g., Carlsson et al., 2000; Chavez et al., 
2004; Chavez-Eakle et al., 2007; Gibson, Folley, & Park, 2009). Together, these findings indicate 
that temporo-parietal regions are involved in divergent thinking processes in general, whereas the 
ability to recruit PFC successfully might be discriminative for creative capacities. In the current 
thesis we applied adapted versions of the MPT (Chapter 3) and AUT (Chapter 4) while scanning 
to examine how creative thinking develops from adolescence to adulthood. 
Adolescence 
As described above, we focus on creative thinking in adolescence. The particular interest 
for in this period between childhood and adulthood is related to the characteristics of this period. 
The onset of adolescence is determined by biological processes as it is characterized by the start of 
pubertal maturation. The onset typically takes place between 9 and 12 years of age (usually 1 to 2 
years later in boys than in girls). The end of adolescence is less explicitly determined as it is partly 
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culturally defined. Adolescence typically extends into the early 20s when major physical changes 
have occured and individual independence in society attained (Crone en Dahl, 2012; Lerner & 
Steinberg, 2004).  
Adolescence is a developmental stage characterized by transformations toward life 
independency, a period in which individuals come to terms with themselves and their 
environment. Successful development toward mature adult functioning is associated with 
creativity and related functions such as exploration and cognitive flexibility. Indeed explorative 
behavior is essential to develop one’s identity, and adolescence has a natural time of learning and 
adjustment and requires flexibility in thought and action. Hence, adolescence is expected to 
involve important changes in creative capacities.  
Research on creative thinking development throughout adolescence is scarce. Prior 
research mainly focused on divergent thinking in elementary grades, and only few have 
investigated development beyond age 12. These studies indicate that performances improve with 
age from childhood throughout adolescence (e.g., Runco and Bahleda, 1986; Lau and Cheung, 
2010), but that performance slumps may occur at different stages in adolescence (Claxton, Pannels 
& Roads, 2005; Lau and Cheung, 2010). Studies including comparisons between adolescents and 
adults are also lacking. In one study where early adolescents were compared to adults on divergent 
thinking fluency and flexibility, no age effects were observed (Wu et al., 2005). The question of 
how creativity develops between late childhood and adulthood for the broader domain of creativity 
still remains.  
Adolescence is also a time period with crucial development of many cognitive abilities 
(see e.g., Casey et al., 2008; Steinberg, 2005), especially of PFC functioning-related abilities 
including working memory and cognitive control. Since these functions are assumed to be related 
to creative cognition, an interesting question addressed in this thesis is how adolescent-specific 
changes in PFC functioning relate to creative success.  
 Previous studies demonstrate that adolescent brains are capable of changing, both 
structurally and functionally (Luna, et al., 2010; Giedd and Rapoport, 2010; Shaw et al., 2008). 
Early studies of post-mortem brain tissue reported that the PFC displays great changes well into 
the adolescent period and are revealed by marked reorganizations of synapses in this region 
(Huttenlocher, 1979). It is well known, today, that PFC regions are upon the last to mature. 
Additionally, large-scale longitudinal brain imaging studies identified significant changes during 
adolescence in gray matter volume. More specifically, these studies revealed that lateral PFC 
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matures throughout adolescence, following an inverted U-shaped pattern with a peak in early 
adolescence (Gogtay et al., 2004); they also demonstrated varying developmental trajectories of 
gray matter for different regions within the PFC (Gogtay & Thompson, 2010).  Moreover, 
functional neuroimaging studies indicate age-related changes of PFC activations for several 
cognitive functions including working memory, interference control and task-switching (for a 
review, see Bunge and Wright, 2007).  
There is, however, inconsistency among reports of age-related changes in developmental 
trajectories. Functional neuroimaging studies have reported different developmental trajectories 
showing that prefrontal cortex is both more activated (e.g., Adleman et al., 2002; Crone et al., 
2006c), and less activated with increasing age (e.g., Durston, et al., 2006; Morton et al., 2009). 
Age-related increases are commonly interpreted as an increase of the ability to recruit referred 
brain regions, whereas age-related decreases are often interpreted as increasing efficiency of 
referred brain regions. Intriguingly, some studies reported a specific peak in lateral PFC activation 
in middle adolescents (e.g., Crone, et al., 2006a; Dumontheil, et al., 2010). These studies, 
therefore, appear to challenge the above-mentioned relative simplistic maturational interpretations.  
Adolescence is also associated with elevated levels of dopamine in the PFC (see Casey 
etal., 2008; Spear, 2000). These elevated levels have been shown to induce broadened attention 
toward externally presented stimuli and explorative behavior (Grey, Buhusi & Scmajuk, 1997). 
Taken together, PFC function during this transitional phase may not only be associated with 
limitations in cognitive control-related functions, but may also be tuned specifically toward 
exploration and adaptive flexibility (Crone & Dahl, 2012; Dahl, 2008; Johnsson & Willbrecht, 
2012). Since both cognitive control and explorative behavior have been associated with creative 
success, the current thesis aims to gain insight into adolescent PFC functioning during different 
aspects of creative cognition, including creative problem solving and verbal divergent thinking. 
Creative thinking training 
To extend investigations into the development of creative ideation, this thesis includes 
creative thinking training effects on adolescents’ performances and brain functions utilizing 
simple practice paradigms. Various studies have already demonstrated the effectiveness of training 
paradigms in improving creativity in both adults (Glover, 1980; Bott et al., 2014; Kienitz et al., 
2014) and children (Torrance, 1972; Cliatt et al., 1980). However, relatively little is known about 
how malleable creative thinking is in adolescence. Training studies in other higher cognitive skills 
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include working memory (Klingberg, 2010; Jolles et al., 2012), executive control (Karbach and 
Kray, 2009; Zinke et al., 2012), relational reasoning (Dumontheil et al., 2010), and algebraic 
equation solving (Qin et al., 2004), and emphasize the training susceptibility regarding 
performance and brain function during adolescence. In the current thesis we aim to gain insight 
into the malleability of the adolescent brain with regard to the development of creative thinking 
skills.  
Numerous studies have examined creative thinking training effects on the behavioral level, 
yet relatively little research has focused on neuronal level. One AUT training study using EEG 
showed higher synchronization in frontal alpha activity after two weeks of AUT training (Fink et 
al., 2006), but it is not yet known how this relates to neural activation changes in the different 
brain regions involved in divergent thinking. A more commonly used approach to enhance 
creative performance in neuroimaging research involves cognitive stimulation by providing 
(moderately) creative ideas. Several studies have found this approach to be effective and training 
has been associated with functional changes of the (left) temporo-parietal, including the left MTG 
and PFC regions. An important question addressed in the current thesis concerns how activity in 
these regions changes through creative thinking training in adolescence. This will allow us to have 
a better understanding of how training-related changes in adolescents take place.  
The current thesis 
The main goal of this thesis is to gain insight into the development of creative thinking 
across adolescence and into adulthood. To this end, we utilized a range of creativity tasks, both 
with and without an fMRI scanner, and before and after training paradigms. This approach 
allowed me to examine 1) the differential developmental trajectories of various aspects of creative 
thinking; 2) the development of related neural processes; and 3) the potential toward creative 
thinking in adolescence.  
In Chapter 2, I examined developmental trajectories of creative cognition across 
development. To this end, participants in four age groups (12-13 yrs, 14-15 yrs, 15-16 yrs, and 25-
30 yrs) were subjected to a battery of tasks including the SPT, GCT and RAT to examine insight 
performance in the visual and verbal domains, and the CAT and the AUT to examine divergent 
thinking performance in the visuo-spatial and verbal domains, respectively. 
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The second empirical study, described in Chapter 3, examined behavioral and neural 
differences for creative problem solving in middle-adolescents (15-17 yrs) and adults (25-30 yrs). 
Performances and neural activations were measured while performing a matchstick problem Task 
(MPT) in the fMRI scanner. In addition, performances for the CAT were obtained outside the 
scanner and related to neural activations during the MPT.  Chapter 4 examined the neural 
correlates of divergent thinking in adults (25-30 yrs) and adolescents (15-17 yrs). To this end, 
participants generated alternative uses (AU) or ordinary characteristics (OC) for common objects 
while brain activity was assessed using fMRI. Chapter 5 focused on whether performance could 
be improved by practicing alternative uses generation. The effectiveness of creative ideation 
training was examined in adolescents (13-16 yrs) and adults (23-30 yrs) measuring creative 
ideation performances on two versions of the AUT. Participants followed one of three training 
types, each comprising eight 20-minute sessions within 2 weeks time: 1) alternative uses 
generation (experimental condition); 2) object characteristic naming (control condition); or 3) 
rule-switching (control condition).  
In Chapter 6, we tested the benefits of training creativity in adolescents. To this end, 
behavior and neural activity in 15-16-year-old adolescents performing an AUT task in the scanner 
were compared before and after two weeks of divergent thinking training, and we compared this to 
AUT activity in an active control group who performed a task-switching training program. 
Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes the main results of the empirical studies presented in this thesis. 
Here, implications of the results are discussed and suggestions for future research are presented. 
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CHAPTER 2 
The development of creative cognition across adolescence: distinct 
trajectories for insight and divergent thinking 
 
This chapter is published as: Kleibeuker, S. W., De Dreu, C. K.W. & Crone, E. A. (2013). 
The development of creative cognition across adolescence: distinct trajectories for insight and 
divergent thinking. Developmental Science, 16(1), 2-12. 
Abstract 
We examined developmental trajectories of creative cognition across adolescence. 
Participants (N = 98), divided into four age groups (12/13 years, 15/16 years, 18/19 years, and 25-
30 years), were subjected to a battery of tasks gauging creative insight (visual; verbal) and 
divergent thinking (verbal; visuo-spatial). The two older age groups outperformed the two 
younger age groups on insight tasks. The 25-30-year olds outperformed the two youngest age 
groups on the originality measure of verbal divergent thinking. No age-group differences were 
observed for verbal divergent thinking fluency and flexibility. On divergent thinking in the visuo-
spatial domain, however, only 15/16-year-olds outperformed 12/13-year-olds; a model with peak 
performance for 15/16-year-olds showed the best fit. The results for the different creativity 
processes are discussed in relation to cognitive and related neurobiological models. We conclude 
that middle adolescence is a period of not only immaturities but also of creative potentials in the 
visuo-spatial domain, possibly related to developing control functions and explorative behavior.  
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Introduction 
Creativity is considered a cornerstone of human society. Creativity is defined as the ability 
to generate ideas and problem solutions that are both novel and appropriate (Amabile, 1996; 
Sternberg & Lubart, 1996), and is a prerequisite for human survival and prosperity (Runco, 2004). 
For example, creative insights solve daily problems (Runco, 2004), artistic creativity promotes 
mate attraction (Griskevicius, Cialdini, & Kenrick, 2006; Miller, 2000), and creative strategizing 
allows one to win competition and conflicts (De Dreu & Nijstad, 2008). These and related insights 
suggest that creativity provides fitness and functionality, in that individuals with creative ability 
have higher probability of surviving and prospering than those lacking creative abilities.  
Across human development, adolescence is an age period characterized by transformations 
toward life independency (Collins, Gleason, & Sesma, 1997; Hill & Holmbeck, 1986), and is a 
crucial phase for the development of many cognitive abilities (see e.g., Casey, Jones, & Hare, 
2008; Steinberg, 2005). It has been argued that creative problem solving abilities are necessary 
and important skills facilitating the advancement toward mature adult functioning (Jaquish & 
Ripple, 1980). Hence, adolescence is expected to involve important changes in creative abilities. 
The aim of the current study was therefore to examine creative abilities across this transitional age 
period measuring two cognitive functions that represent creative potential: insight and divergent 
thinking.  
Creative insight and divergent thinking 
Insight tasks are commonly used to understand performance in creative problem solving 
situations (e.g., De Dreu, Baas, & Nijstad, 2008; Friedman & Förster, 2001; Harkins, 2006; 
Kounios & Beeman, 2009). Insight tasks typically require establishing associations among 
previously unrelated or weakly related information, and mental restructuring the problem space; 
processes which have a central role in creative cognition (Förster, Friedman, Liberman, 2004; 
Smith & Kounios, 1996). There is widespread agreement that insight solutions differ from non-
insight solutions in that: 1) solvers experience their solutions as sudden and obviously correct; 2) 
prior to producing an insight solution solvers sometimes come to an impasse, no longer 
progressing toward a solution; 3) solvers usually cannot report the processing that enables them to 
overcome an impasse and reach a solution.  
The second type of task, divergent thinking, is commonly used to verify creative potential 
and captures the extent to which individuals create novelty (Torrance, 1966). Divergent thinking 
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tasks generally require participants to generate multiple solutions to an open ended problem 
(Guilford, 1967). The rationale behind these tasks is that creative success is assumed to be related 
to; a) one’s ability to generate many responses (fluency), under the assumption that quantity 
breeds quality; b) the ability to generate responses in many different conceptual categories 
(flexibility); and c) the ability to generate unusual or infrequently generated responses (originality) 
(Guilford, 1950, 1967).  Insight and divergent thinking are both associated with the ability to be 
creative, yet represent different aspects of the creative process. 
It is important to distinguish divergent thinking from convergent thinking, as both have 
been associated with creative cognition (Cropley, 2006; Guilford 1950, 1967; DeYoung et al., 
2008). As summarized above, divergent thinking refers to the ability to generate multiple 
associations to an idea in a random, unorganized way (Baas, De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2008; Friedman 
& Förster, 2000; Isen & Daubman, 1984; Martindale, Hines, Mitchell, & Covello, 1984). 
Convergent thinking, however, refers to an analytical and evaluative thinking mode, associated 
with discovering relations among information, and represents the capacity to quickly focus on the 
one best solution to a problem (Guilford, 1967; Gaborra, 2010; Runco, 2004). Consequently, 
convergent thinking has previously been related to cognitive control functioning and general 
intelligence (De Haan, 2009; Runco, 2004). 
Prior research on creativity development mainly focused on divergent thinking but most 
authors documented divergent thinking only in elementary grades, and few have investigated 
development beyond age 12. For example Claxton, Pannels, and Rhoads (2005) performed a 
longitudinal study on figural divergent thinking, examining participant from 4th, 6th and 9th grade. 
Few age differences were apparent, although they observed a slump in originality for 6th graders. 
Jacquish and Ripple applied a verbal task in which participants had to respond to presented 
sounds. Comparisons between pre-adolescents (Mage = 10.8 years) and adolescents (Mage = 16.4 
years) showed increased fluency and flexibility for the adolescents, but no changes in originality. 
Runco and Bachleda (1987) used a different and extensive set of divergent thinking tasks across 
5th to 8th graders. Performance on the measures of verbal divergent thinking changed as a linear 
function of age. Lau and Cheung (2010) applied a similar set of tests to 4th to 9th graders, but 
showed that changes may be non-linear. They observed increased performances from 4th to 5th 
grade, a decrease to 7th graders, and then an increase in divergent thinking in 9th graders. Studies 
including comparisons between adolescents and adults are scarce. In one study, where participants 
had to come up with unusual uses for a common object, comparing 6th graders with university 
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tasks generally require participants to generate multiple solutions to an open ended problem 
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students revealed no age related changes for verbal divergent thinking (Wu, Cheng, Ip, McBride-
Chang, 2010). This set of findings indicates that developmental changes differ between study 
methods, even within one type of creative cognition task such as divergent thinking. Moreover, 
this review of findings sets out the lack of research on development of creativity throughout the 
period of adolescence. In all, it leads to the question how creativity develops between late 
childhood, adolescence and adulthood for the broader domain of creativity, assessing divergent 
thinking and creative insight within the same individuals. The broader assessment in the same 
individuals is needed to unravel whether there are different developmental patterns for different 
aspects of creative cognition, and to understand how these aspects are related. To our knowledge 
the current study is the first to assess both insight and divergent thinking capacities from 
adolescence to adulthood. 
The current study 
A set of creativity tasks was administered to early (12/13 years), middle (15/16 years) and 
late adolescents (18/19 years) as well as adults (25-30 years). The battery included three creative 
insight tasks: the Gestalt Completion Test (GCT; De Dreu, Baas & Nijstad, 2008; Eckstrom, 
French, Harman, & Demen, 1976), the Snowy Picture Test (SPT; Baas, De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2011; 
Friedman & Förster, 2000, 2001; Eckstrom et al., 1976) and the Remote Associates Test (RAT; 
Mednick 1962), and two tasks gauging divergent thinking: the Alternate Uses Test (AUT; 
Torrance, 1966) and the Creative Ability Test ( CAT, Van Dam & Van Wesel, 2006).  
The three insight tasks all tap into insight but for different domains; visual or verbal. The 
GCT consists of fragments of pictures, the SPT consists of pictures blurred through complex 
patterns of visual noise, and the RAT consists of triads of words and requires participants to find a 
fourth related word. All insight tasks involve restructuring and unifying complex or remotely 
associated information to find a single optimum solution that is retrieved from memory. As such, 
these tasks require divergent but also convergent thinking (Guilford, 1950) as well as general 
knowledge, for which we expected to find age related increases. 
The two divergent thinking tasks also focused on different domains, verbal and visuo- 
spatial. The Alternate Uses Test (AUT, Torrance, 1966) requires participants to specify as many 
original uses for a well-known object (e.g., brick) as they can; these are assessed in terms of 
fluency, flexibility and originality. Based on prior research using similar tests (Wu et al, 2010), we 
did not expect performance differences between the younger and older age groups. The second 
test, the CAT, is a visuo-spatial task in which participants are instructed to find as many matching 
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figures as possible according prespecified rules. To find correct solutions to the CAT, relations 
among objects have to be retrieved based on corresponding features. The CAT requires some 
degree of convergent thinking as participants need to incorporate provided rules. It shows some 
similarities with relational reasoning tasks and tasks that test for frontal lobe functioning in terms 
of cognitive flexibility, e.g., the Wisconcin Card-Sorting Test (WCST; Myake et al., 2000). The 
nature of the CAT is, however, divergent rather than convergent, as rules are not provided about 
where solutions might be found or what solutions might look like. As such, the task differs from 
relational reasoning and cognitive flexibility tasks. We expected performance increases across the 
younger age groups, but we did not expect this task to be related to insight tasks.  
Methods 
Participants 
Ninety-eight participants were divided into four age groups: 25 12/13-year-olds (M = 
13.10 years, SD = .47, 13 male), 30 15/16-year-olds (M = 16.07 years, SD = .48, 13 male), 25 
18/19-year-olds (M = 19.12 years, SD = .50, eight male), and 18 25-30-year-olds (M = 27.03, SD 
= 1.81, eight male). Gender distributions did not significantly differ across age groups (χ2 (3, N = 
98) = 2.13, p = .55). Participants were recruited from local schools (early and middle adolescents), 
from Leiden University (late adolescents and adults), and through local advertisements. All 
participants provided informed consent. In the case of minors, consent was also obtained from 
primary caregivers. To screen for behavioral problems participants from all age groups filled out 
the self-report version of the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ; Goodman, 1997). 
Total scores for the two youngest age groups fell in the non-clinical range. No standard scores 
were available for ages >18 years, but scores from the older age groups did not differ significantly 
from the younger age groups. Depending on age and testing location, participants received a fixed 
payment, course credits, or a present.  
Cognitive and behavioral assessment 
Creativity has been associated with intelligence (Furnham & Bachtiar, 2008; Batey, 
Furnham, & Safiullina, 2010), working memory (De Dreu, Nijstad, Baas, Wolsink & Roskes, in 
press; Oberauer, Sü, Wilhelm & Wittmann, 2008; Vandervert, Schimpf & Hesheng, 2007), and 
verbal fluency (Gilhooly, Fioratou, Anthony & Wynn, 2007). To control for age-effects  related to 
these concepts, standard scores were obtained from the WISC or WAIS subtests Similarities 
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(verbal IQ) and Digit Span (DS; working memory)(Wechsler, 1991, 1997), and the Groninger 
Intelligence Test subtest Verbal Fluency (VF) (GIT; Luteijn & van der Ploeg, 1983). Eighty-four 
participants completed the Similarities subtest, 82 participants completed DS subtest, and 87 
participants completed the VF subtest. One-way ANOVAs performed on these three measures 
revealed no significant age group effects (Similarities: F(3,83) = 1.08, p =.36; DS: F(3,81) = 1.83, 
p = .15; VF: F(3,86) = .750, p = .53). This renders alternative explanations for age-related 
differences in terms of verbal intelligence, working memory or verbal fluency unlikely. 
Materials 
Insight tasks 
Three insight tasks were included: the Gestalt Completion Test, the Snowy Picture Test and 
the Remote Associates Test. Both the Gestalt Completion Test (GCT, Eckstrom et al., 1976) and 
the Snowy Picture Test (SPT, Eckstrom et al., 1976) measure visual insight (Förster et al., 2004; 
Eckstrom et al., 1976). In the GCT, participants view a series of fragmented pictures of familiar 
objects and indicate what they see. Successful identification of the objects requires processing 
relations among elements and integrating the fragments into a coherent ‘Gestalt’. This process of 
restructuring a stimulus set is commonly considered a basic process of creative cognition 
(Schooler & Melcher, 1995).  In the current study, we used a computerized version comprising 10 
fragmented pictures (De Dreu, Baas, & Nijstad, 2008). The test items were preceded by two 
examples. Participants could type their answers or skip the question. By clicking a button the 
participants proceeded to the next picture. Response time was not restricted. Responses were 
coded as correct or incorrect (including skipped items).   
In the SPT participants are presented with a series of images of familiar objects hidden 
within visual noise. To identify the hidden objects participants need to disregard misleading 
interpretations rendered by the context. The computerized version, used in this study, contained 
the first 12 pictures from the original SPT set (Baas, De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2011). Test items were 
presented in random order and were preceded by two examples. Answers could be typed during an 
unlimited response time, and responses were coded as correct or incorrect (including skipped 
items). The next picture was presented upon a button click. 
The Remote Associates Test (RAT; Mednick, 1962) is a measure of verbal insight. 
Participants are presented with three words (e.g., envy, golf, beans) and are instructed to generate 
the one word that relates to all of these three words (i.e., green). To come up with the correct 
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solution, participants need to identify relations among the three stimulus words. These relations 
are generally not the most obvious. In the current study, we used a computerized version of the 
RAT comprising 30 triads of Dutch words (De Dreu et al., 2011; Baas et al., 2011). Test items 
were presented in a random order, preceded by two example items. Participants were instructed to 
type their answers or skip if no solution was found and click a button to go to the next item. The 
response time was unlimited. Responses were coded as correct or incorrect (including skipped 
items). 
Divergent thinking tasks 
To gauge divergent thinking, we used the Alternate Uses Test (AUT, Guilford, 1967), and 
the Creative Ability Test (CAT, Van Dam & Van Wesel, 2006). The AUT measures divergent 
thinking in the verbal domain in terms of fluency, flexibility, and originality. Participants are given 
the name of an object and asked to generate as many alternative uses for the object as possible. In 
the current computerized version, participants were instructed to generate alternative uses for a 
brick (e.g., Baas et al., 2011; Friedman & Forster, 2001). Solutions can be unusual but must be 
appropriate. Answers could be typed for a fixed length of 4 minutes. Participants were instructed 
to press ENTER after each answer typed to submit the answer. Concurrently, the response field 
was cleared and the next answer could be given. Fluency scores were computed by counting the 
number of correct solutions provided. Originality was determined as follows. For each solution, 
frequency of occurrence across the total of solutions (provided by all participants) was 
determined. Since frequency distributions were positively skewed, frequency scores were log-
transformed before averages were computed (similar effects were found with non-log-transformed 
frequency scores). Then, average frequency scores were computed for each participant. Flexibility 
was measured by the number of solution-categories. A trained rater assigned each solution to one 
of 35 solution-categories (e.g., building aspect; load; toy). Then, the number of applied solution-
categories was counted for each participant individually. 
The CAT measures fluency and originality of divergent thinking in the visuo-spatial 
domain. The test problem consists of nine squares including figures. Participants are asked to 
compose triads of squares based on the properties (e.g., number, position) of the figures included. 
These squares must be similar concerning a particular figure property (or properties) and therefore 
differ from the other six squares. Fluency sores were computed by counting participants’ number 
of correct answers. Originality was computed by summing the uniqueness scores (1 = ‘common’ 
to 5 = ‘very unique’) of correct answers. Uniqueness scores were based on occurrence of solutions 
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solution, participants need to identify relations among the three stimulus words. These relations 
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These squares must be similar concerning a particular figure property (or properties) and therefore 
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in previous validity studies (Van Dam & Van Wesel, 2006). Higher scores corresponded to lower 
frequency of occurrence. Participants were instructed to write down as many triads as they could. 
Response time was limited to 10 minutes. Prior to the test, participants were presented with an 
example emphasizing the variety of possible solutions (Van Wesel, 2006). 
Procedure 
Participants were invited to participate in a study about general problem solving. They 
were tested individually either in a classroom or in a separate room at Leiden University. Test 
administration was divided into three parts: 1) computerized versions of the GCT, SPT, RAT and 
AUT, for which participants were seated in front of a 15 inch laptop; 2) Similarities, DS and VF, 
which were administered orally; and 3) a paper and pencil version of the CAT. Duration of the 
three test parts was approximately 30, 15 and 15 minutes respectively including instructions. 
Participants were encouraged to ask for help if any ambiguity concerning a test remained after 
reading the instructions.  In between tasks participants were given a break, and upon completion 
of the entire experiment, participants were debriefed and received their compensation. 
Due to practical limitations, only 89 of the total of 98 participants completed all the 
computerized test (N12/13 yrs = 25; N15/16 yrs = 23; N18/19 yrs = 25; N25-30 yrs = 16), and 95 participants 
completed the CAT (N12/13 yrs = 24; N15/16 yrs = 30; N18/19 yrs = 20; N25-30 yrs = 17).  
Results  
First, we tested for age differences on insight and divergent thinking measures using 
analyses of variance (ANOVAs) with age as between-subjects factor. Significance thresholds were 
set to p < .05. All significant effects survived Greenhouse–Geisser correction. For all ANOVAs, 
Levene's test of homogeneity of variances was applied. Tukey HSD tests when variances were 
homogeneous, or Games–Howell tests when variances were non-homogeneous, were applied for 
post hoc analysis of between-group comparisons. Means and standard deviations of insight and 
divergent thinking measures are presented in Table 2-1. In addition, we conducted Principal 
Component Analyses (PCA) and correlations among task performances to identify relations 
between the different types of creativity measures. 
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Table 2-1. Means and standard deviations for performance parameter for insight and divergent thinking tasks by age 
group 














Insight                         
Visual GCTa 5.36 1.87   5.65 1.43   6.92 1.04   7.44 1.36 
    SPTa 5.89 1.83   6.00 2.20   7.56 2.04   7.82 1.74 
Verbal RATa 7.32 3.24   9.57 3.26   12.44 3.49   13.06 2.95 
Original Ideation                         
verbal AUTfluencya 10.76 5.72   9.70 4.88   11.12 5.92   10.13 4.59 
    AUTflexibilitya 6.80 3.08   5.96 2.44   7.36 2.69   7.19 3.06 
    AUToriginalitya 0.85 0.13   0.87 0.19   0.81 0.12   0.73 0.10 
Visuo-spatial CATfluencyb 7.17 3.19   9.17 2.39   8.35 2.29   8.28 2.22 
    CAToriginalityb 10.58 6.79   13.53 5.26   11.48 4.71   12.22 4.80 
Note. a 12/13 yrs, n=25; 15/16 yrs, n=23; 18/19 yrs, n=25; 25-30 yrs, n=16; b 12/13 yrs, n=24; 15/16 yrs, n=30; 18/19 yrs, n=20; 25-
30 yrs, n=17; GCT = Gestalt Completion Test; SPT = Snowy Picture Test; RAT = Remote Association Test; AUT = Alternate 




Performances for the insight tests were examined in terms of accuracy (quantified as the 
number of correct solutions).   
Visual insight: GCT and SPT  
Participants’ number of correct insights performances were submitted to a multivariate 
ANOVA with age group (12/13 yrs, 15/16 yrs, 18/19 yrs, 25-30 yrs) as between-subject variable. 
A multivariate main effect of age group (F(6,170) = 5.36; p < .001; pη2 = .25) was found. 
Univariate ANOVAs were used to further examine the data. Both tasks revealed univariate main 
effects of age group. On the GCT, F(3,85) = 9.58; p<.001; pη2 = .25, post hoc Games-Howell 
comparisons (Levene’s test F(3,85) = 3.17;  p = .03) showed that participants from the two older 
age groups out-performed participants from the two younger age groups (12/13 yrs < 18/19 yrs, p 
= .001; 15/16 yrs < 18/19 yrs, p = .002; 12/13 yrs < 25-30 yrs, p = .004 and 15/16 yrs < 25-30 yrs, 
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Performances for the insight tests were examined in terms of accuracy (quantified as the 
number of correct solutions).   
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age groups out-performed participants from the two younger age groups (12/13 yrs < 18/19 yrs, p 
= .001; 15/16 yrs < 18/19 yrs, p = .002; 12/13 yrs < 25-30 yrs, p = .004 and 15/16 yrs < 25-30 yrs, 
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p = .006; see Figure 2-1a). The univariate ANOVA for the SPT also resulted in a main effect of 
age, (F(3,85) =5.80; p=.002; pη2 =.16), and again, the age group effect was driven by significant 
differences between participants of the two younger age groups on the one hand and participants 
from the two older age groups on the other hand; better performance was achieved by older 
participants. Post hoc Tukey HSD (Levene’s test: p >.5) revealed significant effects for contrasts 
12/13 yrs < 18/19 yrs, p = .02; 15/16 yrs < 18/19 yrs, p = .04; 12/13 yrs < 25-30 yrs, p = .02; and 
15/16 yrs < 25-30 yrs, p = .04, see Figure 2-1b. 
Verbal insight:  RAT   
Performance scores were entered into an ANOVA with age group (12/13 yrs, 15/16 yrs, 
18/19 yrs, and 25-30 yrs) as between-subjects variable. Performance differed across age groups 
F(3,85) = 14.68; p < .001; pη2 = .34. Tukey HSD post hoc analysis (Levene’s test: p > .5) showed 
that accuracy for participants from the two older age groups was significantly better compared to 
participants from the two younger age groups; 12/13 yrs < 18/19 yrs, p < .001; 15/16 yrs < 18/19 
yrs, p = .016; 12/13 yrs < 25-30 yrs, p <.001 and 15/16 yrs < 25-30 yrs, p = .008, see Figure 2-1c.  
In all, the developmental trajectories of the creative insight tasks seemed to follow 
stepwise rather than linear or curvilinear patterns, generally observed for development of 
cognitive control (e.g., Huizenga et al., 2006). Post hoc model analyses using linear regression 
analyses confirmed that SPT and GCT results fitted stepwise patterns (contrast:  -1, -1, 1, 1; for 
12/13 yrs, 15/16 yrs, 18/19 yrs, 25-30 yrs age groups) better than linear (modeling results as a 
linear function of age) or curvilinear models (modeling results as log-transformed or quadratic 
functions of age), SPT: F(1, 87) = 16.56, R = .37, p < .001; GCT: F(1, 87) = 27.15, R = .49, p < 
.001. RAT results revealed best fit with the log-transformed curvilinear model: F(1, 87) = 39.30, R 
= .56, p < .001. 
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Figure 2-1. Insight performances 
Mean ± 1 standard error (SEM) of the number of correct solutions for each group for the Gestalt Completion Test (a), 
Snowy Picture Test (b), and Remote Association Test (c). 
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Performance was measured in terms of fluency, flexibility and originality. Univariate 
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25-30 yrs) as between subject variable showed no age group differences (p > .05). A univariate 
ANOVA on originality, represented by the mean frequency of solutions, yielded a significant age 
group effect (F (3,85) = 3.79, p = .01; pη2 = .12). Post hoc Tukey HSD analyses (Levene’s test: p 
> .5) showed that the two younger age groups had higher frequency scores (i.e., were less original) 
compared to the oldest age group (12/13 yrs < 25-30 yrs, p = .03 and 15/16 yrs < 25-30 yrs, p 
=.02). The 18/19 yrs group took an intermediate position and did not significantly differ from the 
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other three groups. Accordingly, age group related changes of AUT originality, displayed in 
Figure 2-2, were best described by a linear model, F(1, 87) = 11.37 , R = .34, p = .001.  
Response times (time between entering consecutive solutions) showed large intra-subject 
variability, rendering it unlikely that participants typing speed, rather than the time for generating 
correct solutions was the main factor responsible for the observed inter-subject differences. 
 
Figure 2-2. Verbal Divergent Thinking originality 
Mean ± 1 standard error (SEM) of average log-transformed frequencies of ideas generated in the Alternate Uses Test 
for each age group. 
 
Visuo-spatial divergent thinking: CAT  
Performance was measured in terms of fluency and originality. Univariate ANOVAs with 
age group (12/13 yrs, 15/16 yrs, 18/19 yrs, 25-30 yrs) as between subject variable resulted in 
significant age group effects for fluency (F(3,91) = 2.71, p < 0.05; pη2 = .08) but not for 
originality (F(3,91) = 1.39, p = .25; pη2 = .04). Post hoc Tukey HSD analyses (Levene’s test of 
equality:  p > .5) showed that 15/16 years olds gave significantly more correct answers than 12/13 
yrs olds (p = .03) . The two adult groups did not significantly differ from each other or from the 
two younger age groups (all p’s >.05). As such, the results, presented in Figure 2-3, showed a 
complex pattern that did not fit significantly with linear, stepwise, or curvilinear models. 
Alternative model analyses regarding peak performance for middle adolescents (contrast: -1 3 -1 -
1 ; for 12/13 yrs, 15/16 yrs, 18/9 yrs, and 25-30 yrs respectively) revealed significant fit (F(3,91) = 
5.01, p = .028). 
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Figure 2-3. Visuo-Spatial Divergent Thinking fluency 
Mean ± 1 standard error (SEM) of the number of correct solutions on the Creative Ability Test for each age group. 
 
Principal Component Analyses 
Principal Component analyses were performed on GCT, SPT and RAT performances, 
AUT fluency, AUT flexibility, AUT originality, CAT fluency and CAT originality scores (N12/13 
yrs = 25; N15/16 yrs = 23; N18/19 yrs = 25; N25-30 yrs = 16) followed by Varimax Rotations. This approach 
was chosen to maximize the distinctions among aspects. The threshold for retained Eigenvalues 
was set to at 1.0 and only variables with loadings of at least .5 are interpreted as significant. The 
analysis revealed three factors, which accounted for 70% of the common variance. Table 2-2 
shows that these factors reflect the trichotomy of developmental patterns observed with previous 
analyses. The first factor loaded with performances on the insight tasks and, marginally 
significantly, with AUT originality. The second factor loaded with AUT fluency, and AUT 
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Table 2-2. Varimax rotated exporatory factor model 
  Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
GCT .77   .08   -.01 
 SPT .68   -.13   -.06 
 RAT .76   -.10   -.01 
 AUTfluency -.03   .94   -.00 
 AUTflexibility .03   .93   .03 
 AUToriginality -.49   -.26   -.10 
 CATfluency .04   -.01   .96 
 CAToriginality -.04   .04   .97   
Note. N = 86; GCT = Gestalt Completion Test; SPT = Snowy Picture Test; RAT 
= Remote Association Test; AUT = Alternate Uses Test; CAT = Creative Ability 
Test. Loadings ≥.50 are in given in boldface. 
 
Correlations 
Bivariate correlations: Table 2-3 shows the correlations between creative task 
performances over all participants. As predicted, significant correlations are observed between 
measures of insight, between measures of verbal divergent thinking, and between measures of 
visuo-spatial divergent thinking. Additional correlations are observed between AU originality and 
insight performance, but only the correlation with GCT was statistically significant. Correlations 
between AU originality and SPT and RAT respectively were only marginally significant. Notice 
that AU originality scores are based on frequency scores, so that negative correlations indicate 
positive relations between originality and insight. In all, these correlations are in congruence with 
the extracted factors in the PCA.  
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Table 2-3. Bivariate correlations for performance parameters for Insight and Divergent Thinking tasks 
 
Insight Divergent Thinking 









GCT .320 * .453 **  .064   .078   -.275 * -.002   -.003   
SPT     .334 ** -.073   -.056   -.201   .019 
 
-.099   
RAT         -.115   .001   -.183   .063   -.072   
AUTfluency             .791 ** -.152   -.002   .041   
AUTflexibility                 .142   .044   .046   
AUToriginality                     -.014   -.105   
CATfluency                         .870 ** 
Note. N = 89 except for following correlations: Insight-CPT (N = 86); AUT-CPT (N = 86); CPT-CPT (N = 95). GCT = Gestalt Completion Test; 
SPT = Snowy Picture Test; RAT = Remote Association Test; AUT = Alternate Uses Test; CAT = Creative Ability Test. *p < .01, two-tailed; **p ≤ 
.001, two-tailed. 
 
Partial correlations: Only correlations between GCT and RAT (r = .24, p = .026), AU 
fluency and AU flexibility (r = .79, p < .001), and CAT fluency and CAT originality (r = .87, p < 
.001) remained significant after controlling for age group means. The disappearances and strong 
decreases of correlations between insight and divergent thinking after correction for age group 
effects indicate that the initial bivariate correlations between these constructs are likely driven by 
developmental differences.  
Discussion 
The aim of this study was to augment understanding of the development of creativity 
across adolescence. Using a range of creativity tests, we found distinct developmental patterns 
indicating that: 1) creative insight and the qualitative measure of verbal divergent thinking, 
originality, continue to develop into late adolescence; 2) the two quantitative measures of verbal 
divergent thinking, fluency and flexibility, reach adult level early in adolescence and; 3) visuo-
spatial divergent thinking shows a non-linear developmental pattern with best performance at age 
15-16. This trichotomy was supported by factor reduction and correlation analyses. In all, these 
data support the distinctiveness of creativity aspects. Mechanisms that may underlie these 
trajectories are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
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Creative insight  
Creative insight showed increased performance with age continuing into late adolescence 
on both visual and verbal problems. Our results therefore indicate that the ability to successfully 
restructure and unify complex or remotely associated information is not fully developed until late 
adolescence.  
A first factor that might have contributed to these developmental differences is the 
increasing amount of knowledge and experience gained with increasing age; both forms of insight 
require retrieval of stored knowledge and associations. Second, age related increases might be 
related to development of cognition control functioning. Creative insight performance has been 
shown to benefit from deliberate, focused, and structured exploration of cognitive categories or 
perspectives (De Dreu, Nijstad, & Baas, 2008; Finke, 1996; Schooler, Ohlsson, & Brooks, 1993; 
Simonton, 1999) and incremental search processes (Boden, 1998; Newell & Simon, 1972). In 
addition, neuroimaging studies indicate the importance of the prefrontal cortex for successful 
creative insight (Kounios et al., 2006; Razumnikova, 2007). It is now well documented that 
cognitive control functions, and associated prefrontal cortex areas, develop across childhood and 
adolescence (see e.g., Casey, Jones, & Hare, 2008; Crone, 2009). Specifically, cognitive control 
functions such as working memory, inhibition, monitoring, and mental switching, show protracted 
developmental trajectories throughout adolescence (Huizinga et al., 2006; Luna, Garver, Urban, 
Lazar & Sweeny, 2004). Accordingly, immature cognitive control functioning for the two 
youngest age groups in our study likely explains, at least to some degree, the observed age related 
differences.  
Visual Insight 
The developmental pattern for visual insight was best described by a model that tested for 
a performance-step between middle and late adolescence, rather than a linear age change. Non-
linear developmental patterns with relative poor performance in middle adolescence are not 
uncommon in literature on visual cognition. For example, Uhlhaas and colleagues (2009) found 
sudden interruptions in Gestalt perception development during adolescence. Neurophysiologic 
measures indicate that these developmental interruptions are related to reorganizations of 
functional neural networks, which is compatible with functional and structural non-linear 
trajectories of cortical networks during this period as seen in imaging studies (Ashtari et al., 2007; 
Gogtay et al., 2004; Luna, 2010). Accordingly, we might expect functional changes toward more 
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adult-like coordination of visual information processing to induce developmental stagnation of 
visual insight performance, as observed in our study.   
Verbal divergent thinking 
For verbal divergent thinking we found different developmental patterns for the three 
divergent thinking measures. Fluency and flexibility performances did not change throughout the 
age range. These results are in congruence with previous findings on verbal ideation for 6th graders 
and university students (Wu et al., 2010) and indicate that the capacity to generate numerous ideas 
from different categories is already fully developed in early adolescence. For the third measure of 
ideation, originality, which was not reported separately in the Wu et al (2010) study, marked 
increases were found after middle adolescence. Thus, although adolescents as young as 12 years 
old are able to produce adult-level numbers of solutions, the quality of solutions still develops.  
Common to insight development, a first factor that might (partially) account for the 
developmental changes in originality performance concerns knowledge and experiences 
(Weisberg, 1999). Individual lifestyles of adults and late adolescents generally involve larger 
inter-individual variance of experiences and knowledge compared to younger groups. 
Consequently, older age-groups might create relatively infrequent associations and ideas. A 
second possible explanation for the age group differences concerns developmental changes in 
other cognitive processes. Successful creative thinking is associated with flexible coordination 
between analytic and associative processing (Christoff, Gordon & Smith, 2009a, 2009b; 
Martindale, 1999; Martindale & Hasenflus, 1978). Both associative and analytic processing is 
believed to lead to numerous ideas (De Dreu et al., 2012, Nijstad et al., 2010). However, the 
quality of generated ideas seems related to the coordination between them (e.g. Martindale, 1999), 
an ability that is associated with functioning of late developing prefrontal brain regions (Kerns, 
2006; Kerns et al., 2004).  Thus, for early and middle adolescents the ability to successfully shift 
between the two types of processing might not be fully developed (Smolucha & Smolucha, 1986; 
see also Runco, 2007). To test these hypotheses on the combined influence of associative, and 
analytical of processing, future research might relate creative thinking across age groups to 
activation in prefrontal cortex (e.g. see Fink et al., 2009). 
Visuo-spatial divergent thinking  
The participants’ performance on the CAT showed marked increases from early to middle 
adolescence, whereas early adolescents’ performance did not differ from late adolescents’ or 
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analytical of processing, future research might relate creative thinking across age groups to 
activation in prefrontal cortex (e.g. see Fink et al., 2009). 
Visuo-spatial divergent thinking  
The participants’ performance on the CAT showed marked increases from early to middle 
adolescence, whereas early adolescents’ performance did not differ from late adolescents’ or 
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adults’. These results suggest an advantage for middle adolescents on this aspect of creativity. It 
should be noted that the middle adolescents did not differ significantly from the older age groups 
in performance, but the model which tested for a middle adolescent peak provided significant fit.  
 Success on this type of task is relatively independent of knowledge but requires shifting 
between representations of visual information provided, applying a set of rules, and monitoring 
behavior; cognitive functions that are still developing during young adolescence (Huizinga et al., 
2006). It seems logical that the above-mentioned factors relate to the increase for middle 
compared to early adolescents. However, as mentioned, the youngest group did not differ 
significantly from the oldest two age groups, suggesting a relative advantage for the middle 
adolescents. The divergent character of the task introduces benefits for widely focused exploration 
of the externally presented information. Both animal and human studies indicate that explorative 
behavior is characteristic for adolescents (Dahl, 2011; Johnson & Wilbrecht, 2011), and that this 
behavior is likely associated with increased levels of dopamine in prefrontal cortex during this age 
period (see Casey et al, 2008; Spear, 2000). For middle adolescents, the required cognitive control 
functions are expected to be sufficiently developed. Combining these prerequisites with broadened 
attention toward externally presented stimuli (e.g.,Gray, Buhusi & Schmajuk, 1997), provides an 
explanation for the observed developmental pattern with advantages for middle adolescents. This 
hypothesis needs to be tested more elaborately in future research.  
To summarize, several cognitive and related neurobiological aspects are likely to 
contribute to the distinct developmental patterns for insight and divergent thinking, including 
knowledge and experience, coordination between information processes, reorganizations of 
functional networks, and widely focused explorative behavior during adolescence. There are, 
however, some limitations of the current study that should be taken into account when drawing 
conclusions about developmental changes; a) the current study included a relatively small sample 
size (n=19 to n=30 per age group) and therefore future studies should replicate results to validate 
our findings; b) the study design was cross-sectional rather than longitudinal, which limits the 
reliability of the revealed age differences; c) the gaps between age groups may hide short-term 
changes in performance; and d) because of practical limitations, there were some differences were 
present between the younger and older participants in test administration (see Methods section). 
However, a lack of significant age group differences with regard to norm scores on measures of 
general cognitive abilities render it unlikely that the observed developmental patterns were merely 
the consequence of cohort effects. Thus, we believe the current study provides meaningful insights 
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into the creative abilities and constraints across adolescent development and provides interesting 
hypotheses that need to be tested in future research. 
Conclusions  
To our knowledge the current study is the first to examine the development of diverse 
aspects of creativity across adolescent development. The findings demonstrated distinct 
developmental trajectories with marked discrepancies between divergent thinking and creative 
insight. These results could be related to age-related differences of knowledge and experiences 
only to some degree, and are likely related to the protracted development of cognitive control 
functioning and the relatively wide and explorative focusing style characteristic for middle 
adolescents. Similar conclusions have been suggested by animal research showing that adolescent 
mice show relatively greater flexibility for learning than more mature mice (Johnson & Wilbrecht, 
2011). We hypothesize that these developmental changes are related to reorganizations of 
functional networks, which is in line with the developmental theory of interactive specialization 
(Johnson, 2011). 
In future studies, it will be of interest to relate creative thinking to activation in the 
prefrontal cortex, to examine the combined influence of associative, automatic, and analytical, 
deliberate types of processing (e.g. see Fink et al., 2009). As individuals enter adolescence, this 
confronts them with multiple possibilities for learning and adaptation, possibly guided by 
increased capacity for widely focused processing, giving them opportunities for exploration. In 
sum, the current results indicate that adolescent development is not only a time of immaturity but 
also of flexibility and potential for creativity.   
Acknowledgements 
This research was supported by a grant from NOW (open competition program; grant no. 
400-08-023) awarded to E.A. Crone. We thank Dietsje Jolles and Claire Stevenson for their 
helpful comments on a prior version of this article. 
34 35
Chapter 2    Creative cognition across adolescence 
adults’. These results suggest an advantage for middle adolescents on this aspect of creativity. It 
should be noted that the middle adolescents did not differ significantly from the older age groups 
in performance, but the model which tested for a middle adolescent peak provided significant fit.  
 Success on this type of task is relatively independent of knowledge but requires shifting 
between representations of visual information provided, applying a set of rules, and monitoring 
behavior; cognitive functions that are still developing during young adolescence (Huizinga et al., 
2006). It seems logical that the above-mentioned factors relate to the increase for middle 
compared to early adolescents. However, as mentioned, the youngest group did not differ 
significantly from the oldest two age groups, suggesting a relative advantage for the middle 
adolescents. The divergent character of the task introduces benefits for widely focused exploration 
of the externally presented information. Both animal and human studies indicate that explorative 
behavior is characteristic for adolescents (Dahl, 2011; Johnson & Wilbrecht, 2011), and that this 
behavior is likely associated with increased levels of dopamine in prefrontal cortex during this age 
period (see Casey et al, 2008; Spear, 2000). For middle adolescents, the required cognitive control 
functions are expected to be sufficiently developed. Combining these prerequisites with broadened 
attention toward externally presented stimuli (e.g.,Gray, Buhusi & Schmajuk, 1997), provides an 
explanation for the observed developmental pattern with advantages for middle adolescents. This 
hypothesis needs to be tested more elaborately in future research.  
To summarize, several cognitive and related neurobiological aspects are likely to 
contribute to the distinct developmental patterns for insight and divergent thinking, including 
knowledge and experience, coordination between information processes, reorganizations of 
functional networks, and widely focused explorative behavior during adolescence. There are, 
however, some limitations of the current study that should be taken into account when drawing 
conclusions about developmental changes; a) the current study included a relatively small sample 
size (n=19 to n=30 per age group) and therefore future studies should replicate results to validate 
our findings; b) the study design was cross-sectional rather than longitudinal, which limits the 
reliability of the revealed age differences; c) the gaps between age groups may hide short-term 
changes in performance; and d) because of practical limitations, there were some differences were 
present between the younger and older participants in test administration (see Methods section). 
However, a lack of significant age group differences with regard to norm scores on measures of 
general cognitive abilities render it unlikely that the observed developmental patterns were merely 
the consequence of cohort effects. Thus, we believe the current study provides meaningful insights 
  Chapter 2    Creative cognition across adolescence 
into the creative abilities and constraints across adolescent development and provides interesting 
hypotheses that need to be tested in future research. 
Conclusions  
To our knowledge the current study is the first to examine the development of diverse 
aspects of creativity across adolescent development. The findings demonstrated distinct 
developmental trajectories with marked discrepancies between divergent thinking and creative 
insight. These results could be related to age-related differences of knowledge and experiences 
only to some degree, and are likely related to the protracted development of cognitive control 
functioning and the relatively wide and explorative focusing style characteristic for middle 
adolescents. Similar conclusions have been suggested by animal research showing that adolescent 
mice show relatively greater flexibility for learning than more mature mice (Johnson & Wilbrecht, 
2011). We hypothesize that these developmental changes are related to reorganizations of 
functional networks, which is in line with the developmental theory of interactive specialization 
(Johnson, 2011). 
In future studies, it will be of interest to relate creative thinking to activation in the 
prefrontal cortex, to examine the combined influence of associative, automatic, and analytical, 
deliberate types of processing (e.g. see Fink et al., 2009). As individuals enter adolescence, this 
confronts them with multiple possibilities for learning and adaptation, possibly guided by 
increased capacity for widely focused processing, giving them opportunities for exploration. In 
sum, the current results indicate that adolescent development is not only a time of immaturity but 
also of flexibility and potential for creativity.   
Acknowledgements 
This research was supported by a grant from NOW (open competition program; grant no. 
400-08-023) awarded to E.A. Crone. We thank Dietsje Jolles and Claire Stevenson for their 
helpful comments on a prior version of this article. 
35




Prefrontal cortex involvement in creative problem solving in middle 
adolescence and adulthood 
This chapter is published as Kleibeuker, S. W., Koolschijn, P. C. M. P., Jolles, D. D., 
Schel, M. A., De Dreu, C. K. W., & Crone, E. A. (2013). Prefrontal cortex involvement in creative 
problem solving in middle adolescence and adulthood. Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience, 5, 
197–206. 
Abstract 
Creative cognition, defined as the generation of new yet appropriate ideas and solutions, 
serves important adaptive purposes. Here, we tested whether and how middle adolescence, 
characterized by transformations toward life independency and individuality, is a more profitable 
phase than adulthood for creative cognition. Behavioral and neural differences for creative 
problem solving in adolescents (15-17years) and adults (25-30 years) were measured while 
performing a matchstick problem task (MPT) in the scanner and the creative ability test (CAT), a 
visuo-spatial divergent thinking task, outside the scanner. Overall performances were comparable, 
although MPT performance indicated an advantage for adolescents in creative problem solving. In 
addition, adolescents showed more activation in lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) (ventral and 
dorsal) during creative problem solving compared to adults. These areas correlated with 
performances on the MPT and the CAT performance. We discuss that extended PFC activation in 
adolescence is important for exploration and aids in creative cognition.   
37




Prefrontal cortex involvement in creative problem solving in middle 
adolescence and adulthood 
This chapter is published as Kleibeuker, S. W., Koolschijn, P. C. M. P., Jolles, D. D., 
Schel, M. A., De Dreu, C. K. W., & Crone, E. A. (2013). Prefrontal cortex involvement in creative 
problem solving in middle adolescence and adulthood. Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience, 5, 
197–206. 
Abstract 
Creative cognition, defined as the generation of new yet appropriate ideas and solutions, 
serves important adaptive purposes. Here, we tested whether and how middle adolescence, 
characterized by transformations toward life independency and individuality, is a more profitable 
phase than adulthood for creative cognition. Behavioral and neural differences for creative 
problem solving in adolescents (15-17years) and adults (25-30 years) were measured while 
performing a matchstick problem task (MPT) in the scanner and the creative ability test (CAT), a 
visuo-spatial divergent thinking task, outside the scanner. Overall performances were comparable, 
although MPT performance indicated an advantage for adolescents in creative problem solving. In 
addition, adolescents showed more activation in lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) (ventral and 
dorsal) during creative problem solving compared to adults. These areas correlated with 
performances on the MPT and the CAT performance. We discuss that extended PFC activation in 
adolescence is important for exploration and aids in creative cognition.   
37
Chapter 3    Prefrontal cortex involvement in creative problem solving 
Introduction 
The human capacity for creative problem solving is of unparalleled quality. Defined as the 
generation of new yet appropriate ideas, insights, and solutions (Sternberg & Lubart, 1996), 
creative cognition has been critical throughout human evolution and serves important adaptive 
purposes (Runco, 2004). It is well known that adolescence is a period characterized by 
transformations toward life independency and individuality (Collins et al., 1997), and a crucial 
phase for the development of many cognitive abilities (e.g., Casey et al., 2008; Steinberg, 2005). 
Yet, relatively little is known about whether and how this age period is important for creative 
cognition. It has been argued that creative problem solving abilities are important skills facilitating 
the advancement toward mature adult functioning; a transformational trajectory that requires 
adaptive skills (e.g., Jaquish & Ripple, 1980). Hence, adolescence is expected to be an age period 
of enhanced creative abilities (Kleibeuker, De Dreu & Crone, 2013).  
Creative problem solving typically requires divergent thinking (generating ideas by 
exploring many possible solutions), and flexibility in terms of restructuring and manipulating 
problem information. Consider, for example, the matchstick problem (Guilford, 1967) where a 
spatial composition including several matchsticks has to be restructured so as to form a new pre-
described composition. Using these and related tasks, neuropsychological and brain imaging 
studies uncovered the importance of the lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) in creative problem 
solving. Miller and Tipett (1996) compared healthy controls to patients with lesions in different 
brain regions, and found that patients with (right) frontal lesions showed impaired creative 
problem solving. Performances were most significantly impaired when flexibility in terms of 
strategy switches was required. Another study, in healthy adults, showed increased activation in 
bilateral ventral and dorsal prefrontal cortex when solving matchstick problems compared to 
verifying a given solution to a matchstick problem (Goel and Vartanian, 2005). Furthermore, 
activation in the right dorsolateral PFC (DLPFC) correlated with the percentage of traced 
solutions, indicating that this region contributes to exploratory success.   
Whereas the role of the prefrontal cortex in the development of creative problem solving is 
largely unexplored, large scale longitudinal brain imaging studies showed profound changes 
during adolescence: gray matter volume in lateral PFC matures throughout adolescence, following 
an inverted U-shaped pattern with a peak in early adolescence (Gogtay et al., 2004). In addition, 
functional brain-imaging studies have reported different developmental trajectories showing that 
prefrontal cortex is both more activated (e.g., Adleman et al., 2002; Crone et al., 2006c), and less 
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activated with increasing age (e.g., Durston, et al., 2006; Morton et al., 2009). These age-related 
changes are sometimes interpreted as an increase of the ability to recruit referred brain regions, 
and other times as increasing efficiency of referred brain regions. Intriguingly, some studies 
reported a middle adolescent specific peak in activation in lateral prefrontal cortex (e.g., Crone, et 
al., 2006a; Dumontheil, et al., 2010) and thereby challenge the abovementioned relative simplistic 
maturational interpretations. An alternative possibility is that prefrontal cortex function during this 
transitional phase may be tuned specifically toward exploration and adaptive flexibility (Crone & 
Dahl, 2012; Dahl, 2008; Johnsson & Willbrecht, 2012), which in turn may be specifically 
beneficial for creative problem solving. Recent behavioral research on creative cognition, 
including early-, middle-, and late-adolescents and young adults revealed a peak for visuo-spatial 
divergent thinking for middle-adolescents (Kleibeuker et al., 2012).  These results provide initial 
support for an alternative maturational view, indicating increased exploratory success for middle-
adolescents compared to younger and older age groups.  
Here we tested the alternative maturational possibility by examining (i) how creative 
problem solving performance develops from adolescence to adulthood, and (ii) how adolescent 
specific changes in PFC functioning relate to creative problem solving.  
We tested middle adolescents versus adults applying a matchstick problem task (MPT) to 
assess visuo-spatial creative problem solving (inside the scanner), and the creative ability test 
(CAT; Van Dam & Van Wesel, 2006) to assess visuo-spatial divergent thinking (outside the 
scanner). We obtained this latter measure to reveal individual differences in brain activations 
during creative problem solving related to divergent thinking capacity. We focused on visuo-
spatial tasks because performance is relatively independent of conceptual development and 
knowledge, both which differ substantially between age groups (Kavac, et al. 2010).  
Based on the results obtained by Goel and Vartanian (2005), we anticipated bilateral PFC 
activation during creative problem solving, and predicted that activation of these regions would 
correlate with creative problem solving performance, as measured with MPT, and with divergent 
thinking capacity, as measured with CAT. Based on the hypothesis that middle adolescence is a 
time window of enhanced neural activity in lateral prefrontal cortex, advantageous for exploration 
and adaptive flexibility (Luna et al., 2010; Dahl, 2011), we predicted that adolescents would show 
more activation in task-relevant prefrontal cortex areas than adults, and that this activation would 
be associated with better creative performance. 
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Methods 
Participants 
Forty-two participants with no history of neurological or psychiatric disorders participated 
in the present study, divided across two age-groups: 25 adolescents (15–17-year-olds) and 17 
adults (25–30-year-olds). The final analyses involved thirty-six participants; 20 adolescents (Mage 
= 16.07 years, SD = .48, 11 male), and 16 adults (Mage = 27.03 years, SD = 1.81, 7 male). Two 
participants were excluded from the analysis due to technical failures. Four adolescents with 
lowest IQ-scores were excluded to avoid significant differences between age groups. Gender 
distributions did not differ between age-groups (χ2 (1) = .44, p = .51). 
Participants were recruited from local schools and through local advertisements. All 
participants provided informed consent. In the case of minors, consent was also obtained from 
primary caregivers. Participation was compensated with either money or course credits. All 
procedures were approved by the Medical Ethics Committee of Leiden University Medical Center 
(LUMC). 
To obtain an estimate of intelligence we included two subscales of the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale (Digit Span and Similarities; Wechsler, 1991, 1997; see Soveri, Laine, 
Hämäläinen & Hugdahl, 2011). The estimated IQ scores did not differ between age groups 
(Madolescents = 24.79, SDadolescents = 2.25; Madults = 27.00, SDadults) = 3.41; t (34) = 1.64, p = .12, 
corrected for unequal variances (Levene’s test for equality of variances: p < .05).  
Creative Problem Solving Tasks 
Matchstick problem task 
Participants were presented with a computerized MPT inside the scanner, consisting of a 
total of 48 matchstick problems (28 experimental, 20 control). Problems contained 22-match 
formations that consisted of eight fully formed squares (Figure 3-1; Goel & Vartanian, 2005). 
Underneath the matchsticks, a caption instructed participants to remove a specified number of 
matchsticks in order to generate a specified number of fully formed squares.  On experimental 
trials participants had to determine whether the problem was solvable (18 out of 28 problems were 
solvable). These problems required divergent thinking and set-breaking (shifting between 
representations of the problem space) as well as convergent thinking (to verify the correctness of a 
possible solution). On control trials, a certain number of matches were already crossed out. 
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Participants had to determine whether the provided solution was correct (10 out of 20 control trials 
were correct). Figure 1 shows a visual display of events captioned by the time line. Each trial 
started with a 4-second-presentation of one of two questions: ‘Is there a solution for the following 
problem’ (experimental problems) or; ‘Is the following solution correct’ (control problems). Next, 
an experimental or control matchstick problem was presented for 15 seconds. Participants could 
respond by pressing a button with the right index finger (for ‘no’) or with the right middle finger 
(for ‘yes’). A red border appeared after 12 seconds to indicate that there were 3 seconds left to 
respond.  A fixation cross was presented in between trials with randomly varied duration (0 - 7.7 
seconds, jitter). Experimental and control problems were presented in random order over three 
blocks (18 trials per block); there was no repetition of matchstick problems within or between 
experimental and control trials.  
The dependent variables were the percentages correct responses for experimental and 
control trials. In addition, we distinguished between trials that were solvable and trials that were 
not solvable.  
Figure 3-1. Time-line of a Match Problem Task trial (see text for explanation) 
 
Creative ability test 
To assess divergent thinking in the visuo-spatial domain, we used a pencil and paper 
version of the Creative Ability Test (CAT; Van Dam & Van Wesel, 2006), which was 
administered outside the scanner. This task consists of nine squares that include one to five open 
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and/or filled circles. Participants were asked to search for triads of squares with corresponding 
properties (i.e., same number of circles, same position of circles), such that the other six squares 
would not correspond on this property. A valid solution would, for example, be the notation of 
three squares that included exactly four circles, whereas the other six included either more or less 
than four circles. There was a time limit of 10 minutes during which participants were requested to 
find as many triads as possible. The dependent variable was the number of correct solutions. One 
adolescent was not given the CAT because of logistical reasons. 
Procedure 
Outside the scanner, participants received instructions and completed a four-trial practice 
session of the MPT. Then they were acclimated to the MRI environment in a mock scanner. After 
completion of the scanning phase (during which they performed the MPT), they completed the 
WAIS subtests Digit Span and Similarities, as well as the CAT. 
MRI data acquisition 
Scanning was performed with a standard whole-head coil on a 3-Tesla Philips Achieva 
MRI system (Best, The Netherlands) in the Leiden University Medical Center. Three runs of 167  
T2*-weighted whole-brain EPIs, preceded by two dummy scans to allow for equilibration of T1 
saturation effects, were subsequently acquired (TR = 2.2 s; TE = 30 ms, flip angle = 80 degrees, 
38 transverse slices, 2.75 x 2.75 x 2.75 mm (+ 10% inter-slice gap). Stimuli were presented 
running E-prime software (version 1.2, Psychology Tools Inc.) and projected onto a screen at the 
head of the scanner bore. Participants viewed the stimuli by means of a mirror mounted on the 
head coil assembly. Head motion was restricted by using pillow and foam inserts that surrounded 
the head. The maximum movement parameters were below 3 mm and the maximum rotation was 
below 0.5 degrees for all participants and all scans.  In accordance with Leiden University 
Medical Center policy, all anatomical scans were reviewed and cleared by a radiologist from the 
Radiology department. 
MRI data analysis 
SPM5 software (Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK, 
http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk) was used for image preprocessing and analyses. Images were 
corrected for slice-time differences, followed by rigid body motion correction. Functional volumes 
were spatially normalized to EPI templates based on MNI305 stereotaxic space (Cocosco et al., 
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1997) using a 12-parameter affine transformation together with a nonlinear transformation 
involving cosine basis functions. Data were resampled to 3 mm cubic voxels. Functional volumes 
were smoothed using an 8 mm full-width half-maximum 3D Gaussian kernel. For each 
participant, the functional time series were modeled by a series of events convolved with a 
canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF). Matchstick problems were modeled separately 
based on condition (experimental or control), solvability (solvable or unsolvable), and 
performance (correct or incorrect), with the time point of presentation as onset and response-time 
as duration, and entered in a general linear model along with a basic set of cosine functions to 
high-pass filter the data, and a covariate for run effects. In addition, the questions preceding the 
experimental and control trials were modeled as covariates of no interest (onset: presentation 
onset; duration: 4000 ms). Only correct trials were included in higher level analyses (number of 
trials: experimental solvable: Madolescents = 4.20 , 0-9; Madults = 2.81, 0-6; Experimental unsolvable: 
Madolescents = 15.93, 7-10; Madults = 15.19, 6-10; Control solvable: Madolescents = 9.25, 7-10; Madults = 
9.25, 7-10; control unsolvble: Madolescents =8.85 , 7-10; Madults = 8.69, 6-10) . The least square 
parameter estimates of height of best fitting canonical HRF for each condition were used in pair 
wise contrasts (experimental > fixation; control > fixation; experimental > control). The resulting 
first level contrast images, computed on a subject-by-subject basis, were submitted to group 
analyses. At the group level, we performed one-tailed t-tests on these three contrasts, treating 
participants as a random effect, and two-sample t-tests to compare age groups.  
We further conducted whole-brain regression analyses on the contrasts experimental > 
control and experimental > fixation to test for brain behavior relations using mean performance on 
experimental trials and performance on the CAT respectively. Whole brain fMRI analyses were 
FDR corrected for multiple comparisons (Genovese et al., 2002), with p < .05 and with at least 10 
contiguous voxels. For whole-brain regression analyses and age group (2) x condition (2) analyses 
we applied both FDR correction (voxel level) and the commonly used threshold of p < .001 
uncorrected with at least 10 contiguous voxels. Results are reported in the MNI305 stereotaxic 
space.  
Region-of-interest (ROI) analyses 
ROI analyses were performed to illustrate creative problem solving differences in lateral 
PFC between the age-groups. ROIs were derived from the whole brain contrast experimental > 
control, including inferior frontal gyrus triangularis (IFG-tri) and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
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PFC between the age-groups. ROIs were derived from the whole brain contrast experimental > 
control, including inferior frontal gyrus triangularis (IFG-tri) and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
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(DLPFC). Analyses were performed using the MarsBaR toolbox in SPM5 (Brett et al., 2002), 
averaging signals across the voxels that make up an ROI.  
Results 
Matchstick Problem Task 
Performances 
To test for age differences in problem solving performance we conducted a 2 (condition) x 
2 (solvability) x 2 (age group) mixed ANOVA. Results, which are presented in Table 3-1 and 
Figure 3-2, showed three significant effects: a main effect of condition with more correct answers 
for control problems than experimental problems (F (1,34) = 620.52, p < .001; η2 = .94), a main 
effect of solvability with more correct answers for unsolvable than solvable problems (F (1,34) = 
314.64, p < .001; η2 = .89), and an interaction effect between solvability and condition (F (1,34) = 
510.86, p < .001; η2 = .93). As can be seen in Figure 3-2 (left panel), the differences in accuracy 
for the control versus experimental conditions were present for solvable problems but not 
significant for unsolvable problems (solvable: F (1,34) = 951.69, p < .001; η2 = .97; unsolvable: F 
(1,34) = .37, p > .5; η2 = .01). 
There were no significant overall effects including age group (all p’s>.05). However, our 
main interest was in solvable experimental problems because these problems especially 
represented creative problems, requiring generation of new, appropriate representations of the 
problem space. Analysis on accuracy for solvable experimental problems, applying an 
independent t-test, revealed a significant age-group effect showing better performance for 
adolescents than adults (t (34) = 2.08; p = .047; corrected for unequal variances).  
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Table 3-1. Means and standard deviations for MPT and CAT performances 
      15-17 yrs  25-30 yrs 
      M SD  M SD 
MPTa (% correct)            
experimental solvable 23.33 14.60  15.63 7.09 
    unsolvable 88.50 8.75  84.38 14.59 
control solvable 92.50 7.86  92.50 8.56 
 
  unsolvable 88.50 8.13  86.88 11.95 
MPTb (RT in ms) 
   
 
  
experimental solvable 9918.24 2106.05  10163.39 2265.33 
    unsolvable 10555.35 1047.51  10179.91 1892.62 
control solvable 8474.22 1747.87  8399.39 1939.51 
 
  unsolvable 7973.13 2095.15  7623.33 1967.50 
 
             
CATc (nr correct)   10.21 2.44  8.81 2.78 
Note.  
a 15-17 yrs, n=20; 25-30 yrs, n=16; b 15-17 yrs, n=18; 25-30 yrs, n=15; c 15-17 yrs, n=19; 
25-30 yrs, n=16;   
MPT = matchstick problem task; CAT = creative ability test. 
 
Response times 
Response times for correct trials are shown in Table 3-1 and Figure 3-2 (right panel). One 
adult and two adolescents were not included in the analysis because they did not have 
observations for correct solvable experimental trials. A 2 (condition) x 2 (solvability) x 2 (age 
group) mixed-model ANOVA on response times revealed a significant main effect of condition (F 
(1,31) = 61.30, p < .001; η2  = .67) with longer response times for experimental trials, and a 
condition x solvability interaction effect (F (1,31) = 6.58, p = .015; η2  = .18). The interaction 
effect was determined by larger RT differences for unsolvable trials (F (1,31) = 80.44, p < .001; 
η2 = .72) relative to solvable trials (F (1,31) = 19.66, p .001; η2 = .39). No age groups effects were 
revealed (all p’s > .05), rendering it unlikely that age group effects for fMRI results were related 
to response time differences. 
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(DLPFC). Analyses were performed using the MarsBaR toolbox in SPM5 (Brett et al., 2002), 
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510.86, p < .001; η2 = .93). As can be seen in Figure 3-2 (left panel), the differences in accuracy 
for the control versus experimental conditions were present for solvable problems but not 
significant for unsolvable problems (solvable: F (1,34) = 951.69, p < .001; η2 = .97; unsolvable: F 
(1,34) = .37, p > .5; η2 = .01). 
There were no significant overall effects including age group (all p’s>.05). However, our 
main interest was in solvable experimental problems because these problems especially 
represented creative problems, requiring generation of new, appropriate representations of the 
problem space. Analysis on accuracy for solvable experimental problems, applying an 
independent t-test, revealed a significant age-group effect showing better performance for 
adolescents than adults (t (34) = 2.08; p = .047; corrected for unequal variances).  
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Table 3-1. Means and standard deviations for MPT and CAT performances 
      15-17 yrs  25-30 yrs 
      M SD  M SD 
MPTa (% correct)            
experimental solvable 23.33 14.60  15.63 7.09 
    unsolvable 88.50 8.75  84.38 14.59 
control solvable 92.50 7.86  92.50 8.56 
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    unsolvable 10555.35 1047.51  10179.91 1892.62 
control solvable 8474.22 1747.87  8399.39 1939.51 
 
  unsolvable 7973.13 2095.15  7623.33 1967.50 
 
             
CATc (nr correct)   10.21 2.44  8.81 2.78 
Note.  
a 15-17 yrs, n=20; 25-30 yrs, n=16; b 15-17 yrs, n=18; 25-30 yrs, n=15; c 15-17 yrs, n=19; 
25-30 yrs, n=16;   
MPT = matchstick problem task; CAT = creative ability test. 
 
Response times 
Response times for correct trials are shown in Table 3-1 and Figure 3-2 (right panel). One 
adult and two adolescents were not included in the analysis because they did not have 
observations for correct solvable experimental trials. A 2 (condition) x 2 (solvability) x 2 (age 
group) mixed-model ANOVA on response times revealed a significant main effect of condition (F 
(1,31) = 61.30, p < .001; η2  = .67) with longer response times for experimental trials, and a 
condition x solvability interaction effect (F (1,31) = 6.58, p = .015; η2  = .18). The interaction 
effect was determined by larger RT differences for unsolvable trials (F (1,31) = 80.44, p < .001; 
η2 = .72) relative to solvable trials (F (1,31) = 19.66, p .001; η2 = .39). No age groups effects were 
revealed (all p’s > .05), rendering it unlikely that age group effects for fMRI results were related 
to response time differences. 
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Figure 3-2. Performance on the match problem task. Accuracy measures (% correct) are presented left, response times 
(ms) are presented right. * p < .05 
 
Creative ability test 
Results for the CAT are displayed in Table 3-1. Even though the mean number of correct 
solutions for the adolescent-group was higher than that for the adult-group, the group difference 
for visuo-spatial creative fluency was not significant (F (1,34) = 2.51, p = .12; pη2 = .07). 
fMRI results 
Whole-brain comparisons 
To extract the activation patterns related to creative problem solving we conducted whole-
brain voxel-wise t-tests on activation levels for the contrast correctly solved experimental (E) 
problems > correctly solved control (C) problems (E > C) across all participants (N = 36). These 
analyses were performed collapsed across solvable and unsolvable conditions because these 
conditions resulted in similar activation patterns (see ROI analyses below for an exception). 
Results revealed a number of significantly activated regions, which are presented in Figure 3-3a 
and Table 3-2, including left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and left middle frontal gyrus (MFG) 
(FDR corrected, p < .05).  
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Table 3-2. Neural activations for the contrast experimental > control for all participants 
Brain regions L/R K Z-value peak voxel 
MNI coordinates 
x  y z 
Inferior frontal gyrus (tri), medial frontal gyrus L 159 5.22 -45 36 24 
Middle cingulate cortex, superior medial gyrus L 22 4.09 -12 27 33 
   3.55 -9 24 42 
Inferior parietal lobule L 11 4.01 -30 -60 39 
Note. N = 36; L/R = left or right hemisphere; K = cluster size (nr of voxels); MNI = Montreal Neurological Institute. 
Significance threshold set at p < .05, FDR corrected; > 10 contiguous voxels. 
 
To test for developmental differences, a two-sample t-test (adolescents versus adults) was 
conducted on the contrast E > C. The contrast adults > adolescents revealed no significant results. 
The reversed contrast adolescents > adults, however, resulted in increased activation in left IFG 
and MFG, left inferior parietal lobule, and right DLPFC (uncorrected, p < .001, > 10 voxels; see 
Figure 3-3b and Table 3-3). The regions in left IFG and MFG overlapped with the area within the 
left IFG identified in the main contrast E > C across participants. Moreover, the right DLPFC 
region overlapped with a region previously associated with an increasing numbers of correct 
solutions for the matchstick problems (Goel & Vartanian, 2005). Notably, left IFG and right 
DLPFC remained significant in the two-sample t-test when applying false discovery rate (FDR) 
correction (p < .05; > 10 contiguous voxels; see Table 3-3). 
  
46 47
Chapter 3    Prefrontal cortex involvement in creative problem solving 
 
Figure 3-2. Performance on the match problem task. Accuracy measures (% correct) are presented left, response times 
(ms) are presented right. * p < .05 
 
Creative ability test 
Results for the CAT are displayed in Table 3-1. Even though the mean number of correct 
solutions for the adolescent-group was higher than that for the adult-group, the group difference 
for visuo-spatial creative fluency was not significant (F (1,34) = 2.51, p = .12; pη2 = .07). 
fMRI results 
Whole-brain comparisons 
To extract the activation patterns related to creative problem solving we conducted whole-
brain voxel-wise t-tests on activation levels for the contrast correctly solved experimental (E) 
problems > correctly solved control (C) problems (E > C) across all participants (N = 36). These 
analyses were performed collapsed across solvable and unsolvable conditions because these 
conditions resulted in similar activation patterns (see ROI analyses below for an exception). 
Results revealed a number of significantly activated regions, which are presented in Figure 3-3a 
and Table 3-2, including left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and left middle frontal gyrus (MFG) 
(FDR corrected, p < .05).  
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Table 3-2. Neural activations for the contrast experimental > control for all participants 
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MNI coordinates 
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Middle cingulate cortex, superior medial gyrus L 22 4.09 -12 27 33 
   3.55 -9 24 42 
Inferior parietal lobule L 11 4.01 -30 -60 39 
Note. N = 36; L/R = left or right hemisphere; K = cluster size (nr of voxels); MNI = Montreal Neurological Institute. 
Significance threshold set at p < .05, FDR corrected; > 10 contiguous voxels. 
 
To test for developmental differences, a two-sample t-test (adolescents versus adults) was 
conducted on the contrast E > C. The contrast adults > adolescents revealed no significant results. 
The reversed contrast adolescents > adults, however, resulted in increased activation in left IFG 
and MFG, left inferior parietal lobule, and right DLPFC (uncorrected, p < .001, > 10 voxels; see 
Figure 3-3b and Table 3-3). The regions in left IFG and MFG overlapped with the area within the 
left IFG identified in the main contrast E > C across participants. Moreover, the right DLPFC 
region overlapped with a region previously associated with an increasing numbers of correct 
solutions for the matchstick problems (Goel & Vartanian, 2005). Notably, left IFG and right 
DLPFC remained significant in the two-sample t-test when applying false discovery rate (FDR) 
correction (p < .05; > 10 contiguous voxels; see Table 3-3). 
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Table 3-3. Neural activations for adolescents > adults for the contrast experimental > control 




    MNI coordinates  
      x         y          z  
Frontal lobe Inferior frontal gyrus (tri), middle frontal gyrus 
(DLPFC) 
R 77 4.73 33 24 15 * 
   4.16 39 33 18 * 
    3.53 48 42 24  
 Middle orbital gyrus L 32 4.17 -27 45 -9 * 
    3.44 -18 -54 -9  
 Precentral gyrus L 67 4.08 -45 3 42 * 
    3.48 -36 -3 36  
 Inferior frontal gyrus (tri) L 58 3.87 -51 27 27 * 
    3.53 -39 24 27  
 Precentral gyrus, postcentral gyrus1 R 20 3.78 54 -18 45  
    3.18 45 -12 45  
 Inferior frontal gyrus (tri) L 10 3.65 -39 24 15  
 Inferior frontal gyrus (tri), middle frontal gyrus L 41 3.48 -36 42 12  
    3.37 -48 42 9  
    3.15 -33 42 21  
 Supra marginal area L 10 3.48 -6 21 45  
Parietal lobe Inferior parietal lobule L 48 3.61 -36 -54 45  
    3.30 -36 -66 51  
Temporal lobe Superior temporal gyrus R 44 4.43 60 -27 9 * 
 Middle temporal gyrus L 11 3.18 -48 -6 -15  
Occipital lobe Superior occipital gyrus R 27 3.99 24 -78 36 * 
 Cuneus R 13 3.53 21 -87 9  
 Middle occipital gyrus L 12 3.61 42 -78 3  
 Inferior occipital gyrus L 25 3.41 -33 -78 -9  
    3.36 -45 -75 -12  
Basal ganglia Caudate nucleus L 15 4.22 -18 3 18  
 Pallidum L 12 3.48 -15 -6 -3  
Cerebellum  R/L 314 4.31 6 -66 -27 * 
    3.99 -9 -69 -30 * 
    3.88 -9 -75 -15  
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Note. Nadults = 16, Nadolescents = 20; L/R = left or right hemisphere; K = cluster size (nr of voxels); DLPFC = 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; MNI = Montreal Neurological Institute. 
*regions that are significant with the stricter significance threshold of p < .05, FDR correction, > 10 voxels. 




Figure 3-3. Whole brain activations for a) the contrast experimental > control overall (N = 36; p < .05, FDR corrected, 
> 10 contiguous voxels), and b) adolescents > adults for the contrast experimental > control (significance threshold set 
at p < .001, uncorrected) 
 
ROI analyses 
To inspect the patterns revealed in the age group analyses visually, post-hoc ROI analyses 
of variances were conducted on regions within the left IFG and right DLPFC identified in the two-
sample t-test for the contrast E > C ( p < .001, uncorrected; similar results were obtained for p < 
.05, FDR corrected). Results are displayed in Figure 3-3c, which shows that adolescents but not 
adults recruited left IFG more for experimental compared to control matchstick problems 
(condition effectadults: F(1,15) =.47, p  > .10; condition effectadolescents: F(1,19) =34.46, p < .001). A 
largely similar pattern is observed for the right DLPFC, with more activation during experimental 
relative to control problems for adolescents (F(1,19) =13.91, p = .001), but an opposite effect (C > 
E) for adults (F(1,15) =27.52, p < .001).  
Additional analyses of variances on solvability effects, applying 2 (condition) x 2 
(solvability) x 2 (age group) mixed ANOVAs, revealed a significant main effect of solvability for 
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Table 3-3. Neural activations for adolescents > adults for the contrast experimental > control 
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Note. Nadults = 16, Nadolescents = 20; L/R = left or right hemisphere; K = cluster size (nr of voxels); DLPFC = 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; MNI = Montreal Neurological Institute. 
*regions that are significant with the stricter significance threshold of p < .05, FDR correction, > 10 voxels. 




Figure 3-3. Whole brain activations for a) the contrast experimental > control overall (N = 36; p < .05, FDR corrected, 
> 10 contiguous voxels), and b) adolescents > adults for the contrast experimental > control (significance threshold set 
at p < .001, uncorrected) 
 
ROI analyses 
To inspect the patterns revealed in the age group analyses visually, post-hoc ROI analyses 
of variances were conducted on regions within the left IFG and right DLPFC identified in the two-
sample t-test for the contrast E > C ( p < .001, uncorrected; similar results were obtained for p < 
.05, FDR corrected). Results are displayed in Figure 3-3c, which shows that adolescents but not 
adults recruited left IFG more for experimental compared to control matchstick problems 
(condition effectadults: F(1,15) =.47, p  > .10; condition effectadolescents: F(1,19) =34.46, p < .001). A 
largely similar pattern is observed for the right DLPFC, with more activation during experimental 
relative to control problems for adolescents (F(1,19) =13.91, p = .001), but an opposite effect (C > 
E) for adults (F(1,15) =27.52, p < .001).  
Additional analyses of variances on solvability effects, applying 2 (condition) x 2 
(solvability) x 2 (age group) mixed ANOVAs, revealed a significant main effect of solvability for 
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left IFG (F(1,31) = 4.41, p = .044), but none of the interaction effects was significant (all p’s > .1). 
However, there was a significant condition x solvability x age group interaction (F (1,31) = 14.97, 
p = .001) for the right DLPFC. The condition x age group interaction effect for the right DLPFC 
was larger for the solvable problems (F(1,31) = 39.71, p < .001) than for unsolvable problems 
(F(1,31) = 4.32, p = .05). These findings suggest that the condition x age group effect for 
activation in the right DLPFC region mainly relies on creative success for matchstick problems.  
Individual differences 
To test for brain areas directly related to creative problem solving performance, we 
conducted whole-brain voxel-wise regression analyses on the contrast E > C (significance 
threshold p < .001, uncorrected) with performance on experimental trials (E-correct) as covariate 
of interest. Results showed significant activation in a region in the left IFG directly adjacent to the 
abovementioned IFG region observed for the contrast adolescents > adults in the whole-brain E > 
C analysis (see Figure 3-4; ROI-peak-Z-value = 3.68 at MNI coordinates -48 12 27, 34 contiguous 
voxels). Notably, the correlation between the contrast E > C and E-correct was significant after 
controlling for age group (rpartial (33) = .46, p = .005, confirming that this region is involved in 
successful task performance independent of age. 
 
Figure 3-4. Left: whole brain activations for the regression on the contrast experimental > control with performance 
on experimental matchstick problems (% correct) (p < .001, uncorrected; > 10 contiguous voxels; section coordinates: 
Y = 12, Z = 27). Right: correl 
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Next, we performed whole-brain voxel-wise regression analyses with post-scanning CAT 
performance (number of correct solutions) to gain knowledge on brain activations related to visuo-
spatial creative cognition in general (p < .001, uncorrected). No significant relations were 
observed for the contrast E > C. However, a regression analysis on E > fixation revealed a positive 
relation between activation right DLPFC and CAT performance (see Figure 3-5; ROI-peak-Z-
value = 3.64 at MNI coordinates 39 33 27, 14 contiguous voxels). This region was in close 
proximity with the right DLPFC area showing a significant condition x age group interaction 
effect for the contrast E > C. 
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Discussion 
In the present study, we examined developmental differences in creative problem solving 
capabilities and related these to brain activation patterns during a matchstick problems task. We 
hypothesized that adolescence is a period of enhanced PFC activation for exploration and adaptive 
purposes. The behavioral results showed that creative problem solving is already well developed 
in middle adolescents. Overall performance on creative problem solving did not differ between 
adolescents and adults, but age groups differences of solvable experimental problems of the MPT 
indicate better creative problem solving capacities for the middle adolescents.  
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The second part of our research goal concerned the question whether there were 
developmental differences in the underlying brain regions that support creative cognition. Brain 
imaging data yielded three main results: 1) Consistent with prior studies, we found increased 
activation of left lateral PFC during successful creative problem solving. 2) A direct comparison 
between age groups revealed increased activation in left IFG and right DLPFC during successful 
creative problem solving for adolescents compared to adults. 3) Individual differences analyses 
revealed that activation in left IFG and right DLPFC during successful creative problem solving 
was correlated with performance on experimental matchstick problems and on a visuo-spatial 
divergent thinking task that was administered outside the scanner, respectively. These results 
imply that adolescents, relative to adults, have a tendency to recruit relevant prefrontal brain areas 
during creative problem solving and show activity patterns common to persons with high 
divergent thinking capacities. Below, possible mechanisms underlying the observed results are 
discussed in further detail. 
Lateral PFC and representation selection 
Consistent with prior studies using a matchstick problems task (Goel & Vartanian, 2005), 
and a different visuo-spatial creative thinking task (Aziz-Zadeh, Liew & Dandehar, in press), we 
found that left lateral PFC was significantly more active during experimental relative to control 
problems. These findings underscore the importance of left lateral PFC areas in thinking and 
problem solving (e.g., Gazzangia, 2000). More specifically, these processes might comprise 
generating and choosing among various representations of the problem space and processing 
conflicting representations. Indeed, previous studies have shown left IFG involvement during both 
verbal (Thompson-Schill et al, 2002) and non-verbal (Brandon et al., 2004) tasks that require 
overriding a highly activated representation or selecting among weakly activated, incompatible 
representations (Hirshorn & Thompson-Schill, 2006). These two forms of conflict create demands 
for cognitive control and indicate a specific role of the left IFG for switching between 
representations (see also Crone et al., 2006b).  
Besides the left IFG, adolescents also showed activation in the right DLPFC during 
experimental matchstick problems. Goel and Vartanian (2005) reported that this region was 
specifically important for finding more solutions for experimental matchstick problems. 
Interestingly, in the current study this area was also positively correlated with performance on a 
separate creativity task (CAT), measuring visuo-spatial divergent thinking, that was taken outside 
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the scanner. These results suggest that persons with high exploratory capacities have tendency to 
recruit right DLPFC to a relative large extent during successful creative problem solving.  
Right DLPFC activations have previously been implicated in working memory processes 
(Crone et al.,2006; Curtis & d’Esposito 2003; Jolles et al., 2011), which fits with recent results 
showing a positive correlation between working memory and creative cognition (De Dreu, et al., 
2012). Other studies indicated the importance of right DLPFC in higher level cognitive control 
functions such as monitoring behavior in accordance with task goals (Shallice, 2004), and 
planning and manipulating internal representations of problem information (Ruh et al., 2012), 
Impaired right DLPFC functioning, on the other hand, has been associated with impulsive 
behavior (Ridderinkhof et al., 2011).  
These prior findings, together with our present neuroimaging results, suggest a controlled 
though flexible manner of processing, especially in middle adolescents, that is successful for 
creative problem solving.  
Developmental differences 
A direct comparison of activation demonstrated that these task-relevant areas in PFC, IFG 
and DLPFC, are more engaged in adolescents than in adults. This finding is consistent with prior 
studies that reported increased activation in lateral PFC in middle adolescents (see Crone & Dahl, 
2012 for an overview). Such age-related decreases are generally ascribed to less efficiency of 
functional networks including the referred brain regions, whereas age-related increases are 
commonly interpreted as insufficient recruitment of late-developing brain regions (reviewed in 
Crone & Ridderinkhof, 2011). However, these maturational interpretations might be too 
simplistic. Indeed, several studies found adolescent specific peaks in prefrontal regions for 
working memory tasks, inhibition tasks, relational reasoning tasks, and task shifting (e.g., Crone, 
et al., 2006a; Dumontheil et al., 2010; Geier et al., 2009; Velanova et al., 2009).  
An alternative hypothesis considered here is that increased activation in PFC during 
middle adolescence is important for this developmental period and provides advantages for this 
phase in life. For example, the road toward adult individuality includes leaving parental custody 
and building one’s own life in a world full of opportunities as well as uncertainties. To achieve 
these goals, it is presumably beneficial to be tuned toward exploration and adaptive flexibility 
(Dahl, 2011; Crone & Dahl, 2012), which in turn may be associated with better, rather than less 
developed creative problem solving abilities (Kleibeuker et al., 2013; see also De Dreu et al., 
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2011). This hypothesis finds support in a recent animal study (Johnson & Willbrecht, 2011) that 
found that explorative learning is more adaptive in adolescent than adult mice. In agreement with 
these findings, analyses of the behavioral patterns in the current fMRI study indicated a slight 
advantage for adolescents relative to adults on problems that required creative cognition most 
evidently (solvable experimental matchstick problems). The current neuroimaging data provide 
additional evidence into the direction of the alternative maturational hypothesis by showing that 
adolescence recruit brain regions in a way common to persons with high divergent thinking and 
creative problem solving capacities. 
This hypothesis should be tested in more detail in future research, but provides important 
implications putting forward that middle adolescence is an essential phase in cognitive 
development.  
Limitations of the current study include the use of a cross-sectional rather than a 
longitudinal design. Interpretations of developmental changes from adolescence toward adulthood 
made in this study are consequently merely suggestive and require confirmation from analyses of 
creative cognition over time. Inclusion of an additional age group of younger participants in future 
studies would make it possible to explicitly test the hypothesis that adolescence is a period of a 
peak in effective increased prefrontal activations. Another issue to be considered for future 
research is the use of tasks from other domains. Creativity is a general concept that covers 
outcomes from a wide range of fields. It would be interesting to investigate whether the observed 
age-related differences are specific to the visuo-spatial requirements of the current tasks, or more 
general effects existing across creativity domains.   
Conclusion 
Taken together, we showed that middle adolescents reveal high levels of creative problem 
solving. To the best of our knowledge, this study was the first to demonstrate that adolescents 
show more activation in PFC than adults in a manner which is task relevant, and, thereby, 
contrasts with a simplistic maturational view of functional brain development (Johnson, 2011). 
We suggest an alternative hypothesis arguing that increased activation in PFC is adaptive for 
creative problem solving during a phase in life that is tuned toward exploration and developing 
individuality.  
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Figure 3-S1b. Performance on the Match Problem Task: response times (ms) for correctly solved problems. Nadolescents 











Figure 3-S2. Whole brain activations for the contrast experimental > control overall (N = 40; p < .05, FDR corrected, 
> 10 contiguous voxels). 
Figure 3-S3. Developmental differences: dolescents > adults for the contrast experimental > control (significance 
threshold set at p < .001, uncorrected, > 10 contiguous voxels; Nadolescents = 24, Nadults = 16. 









Figure 3-S5. Whole brain activations for the regression on the contrast experimental > fixation with performance 
on the CAT (number of correct solutions) (p < .001, uncorrected; > 10 contiguous voxels: section coordinates: Y 
= 33, Z = 27). 
Figure 3-S4. Whole brain activations for the regression on the contrast experimental > control with performance 
on the experimental Matchstick Problems (% correct) (p < .001, uncorrected; > 10 contiguous voxels; section 
coordinates: Y = 12, Z = 27). 
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Abstract 
Creativity is considered key to human prosperity, yet the neurocognitive principles 
underlying creative performance, and their development, are still poorly understood. To fill this 
void, we examined the neural correlates of divergent thinking in adults (25-30 years) and 
adolescents (15-17 years). Participants generated alternative uses (AU) or ordinary characteristics 
(OC) for common objects while brain activity was assessed using fMRI. Adults outperformed 
adolescents on the number of solutions for AU and OC trials. Contrasting neural activity for AU 
with OC trials revealed increased recruitment of left angular gyrus, left supramarginal gyrus, and 
bilateral middle temporal gyrus in both adults and adolescents. When only trials with multiple AU 
were included in the analysis, participants showed additional left inferior frontal gyrus 
(IFG)/middle frontal gyrus (MFG) activation for AU compared to OC trials. Correspondingly, 
individual difference analyses showed a positive correlation between activations for AU relative to 
OC trials in left IFG/MFG and divergent thinking performance and activations were more 
pronounced in adults than in adolescents. Taken together, the results of this study demonstrated 
that creative idea generation involves recruitment of mainly left lateralized parietal and temporal 
brain regions. Generating multiple creative ideas, a hallmark of divergent thinking, shows 
additional lateral PFC activation that is not yet optimized in adolescence. 
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Introduction 
Creative performance – generating ideas, solutions, and insights that are both novel and 
useful (Sternberg and Lubert, 1996) – is key to human survival and prosperity. For example, 
creativity predicts success in conflict situations (De Dreu & Nijstad, 2008), academic success 
(Furnham & Bachtiar, 2008) and serves important adaptive purposes (Runco, 2004). However, 
despite its importance for an extensive range of domains of life, the neurocognitive foundations of 
creative performance are still poorly understood. Furthermore, we know exceedingly little about 
the developmental trajectories in creative performance. Accordingly, the present study examined 
neural correlates of divergent thinking performance – a critical ingredient of creative performance 
(Baas, De Dreu & Nijstad, 2008) with significant predictive value for creative success (e.g. Kim, 
2008) – in adolescents and adults.  
Creativity research distinguishes a variety of approaches, associated with different views 
concerning the components underlying creative success. Creativity is sometimes considered to be 
an attribute of a few brilliant minds, and a result of deviant brain functioning. In contrast, the 
creative cognition approach emphasizes that creative capacity is inherent to normative human 
cognitive functioning and that relevant processes are open to investigation. Our exceptional 
flexible use of language, our ability to create and use new mental categories to organize our 
experiences, and our ability to mentally manipulate objects are only some examples of mundane 
forms of creativity that support the creative cognition approach (Ward, Smith, & Finke, 1999). 
These creative outcomes are a function of a variety of cognitive and motivational processes.  
De Dreu and colleagues distinguished two pathways of processes that breed creative 
outcomes: flexible processing and perseverance, which are summarized in the Dual Pathway to 
Creativity Model (DPCM) (Baas, De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2008; Nijstad, De Dreu, Rietzschel, & 
Baas, 2010). Here, creative performance including the generation of original ideas and creative 
insights are related to flexible, divergent thinking on the one hand and persistent, bottom-up 
processing on the other. The flexibility pathway involves the generation of novel ideas and 
creative insights through the use of extensive cognitive categories, flexible switching between 
categories and strategies, and the use of distant (rather than close) associations (e.g., Amabile, 
1983; Eysenck, 1993; Mednick, 1962; Koestler, 1964; Simonton, 1999). Indeed, creativity is often 
associated with deviating from traditional procedures or ‘breaking set’, and with overcoming 
cognitive biases or ‘functional fixedness’ (e.g., Duncker, 1945; Smith & Blankenship, 1991; 
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Wertheimer, 1945). The persistence pathway encompasses the processes that lead to creative 
ideas, insights and problem solutions through systematic and effortful exploration of possibilities 
within only a few categories or perspectives (Boden, 1998; Dietrich, 2004; Finke, 1996; Newell & 
Simon, 1972; Simonton, 1997). For example, De Dreu et al. (2012; also see Oberauer, Suss, 
Wilhelm & Wittmann, 2008) showed that working memory capacity predicted creative 
performance when time-on-task was long rather than short, because working memory capacity 
enabled individuals to persist and persevere in generating ideas and creative insights. 
Although DPCM identifies creative processes at a cognitive level, the neural processes and 
developmental trajectories are still poorly understood. Here we explore neural correlates of 
performing a widely used creativity task- the Alternative Uses Test (AUT) (Guilford, 1967). The 
AUT asks people to generate as many as possible alternative uses (AU) for a common object (e.g., 
a brick; with an alternative usage being, e.g., making music). Ideas generated during such a 
divergent thinking task are commonly coded for originality (the less frequent the idea being 
mentioned, the more original it is), flexibility (the more uses from different semantic categories, 
the more flexible someone is), and fluency (the more ideas, the more fluent). Neuroimaging 
research on creative cognition research in general and divergent thinking in particular has revealed 
varied results. The most consistent finding across verbal divergent thinking paradigms is the 
involvement of (left) temporo-parietal regions, including angular gyrus (AG) and supramarginal 
gyrus (SMG) (Arden, Chavez, Grazioplene, & Jung, 2010; Dietrich & Kanso, 2010). Activity 
changes of these brain areas have for example been observed during tasks that require linking 
incoherent sentences (Sieborger, Ferstl, & von Cramo, 2007) or words (Bechtereva et al., 2004, 
Starchenko, Bechtevera, Pakhomov, & Medvedev, 2003) into a coherent story, creating metaphors 
and analogies (Hansen, Azzopardi, Matthews, & Geake, 2008), or thinking of AU for common 
objects (Abraham et al., 2012; Fink et al., 2009, 2010). Fink et al. (2009, 2010) compared activity 
during the generation of AU with activity during the retrieval of ordinary characteristics (OC), 
which is thought to be more related to intelligence in general. Results showed increased activity in 
left angular gyrus (AG) and supramarginal gyrus (SMG), and decreased activity in right AG for 
generating AU relative to retrieving OC. Another finding that is relatively consistent across 
various divergent thinking studies concerns the involvement of prefrontal cortex (PFC) (e.g., 
Abraham et al., 2012; Carlsson, Wendt, & Risberg, 2000; Chavez-Eakle et al., 2007; Folley 
&Park, 2005; Howard-Jones, et al., 2005; Mashal, Faust, Hendler, & Jung-Beeman, 2007), a brain 
region that is generally associated with cognitive control functioning and coordinating lower level 
(associative) brain regions (e.g., Miller & Cohen, 2001). Notably, a substantial part of the studies 
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Wertheimer, 1945). The persistence pathway encompasses the processes that lead to creative 
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incoherent sentences (Sieborger, Ferstl, & von Cramo, 2007) or words (Bechtereva et al., 2004, 
Starchenko, Bechtevera, Pakhomov, & Medvedev, 2003) into a coherent story, creating metaphors 
and analogies (Hansen, Azzopardi, Matthews, & Geake, 2008), or thinking of AU for common 
objects (Abraham et al., 2012; Fink et al., 2009, 2010). Fink et al. (2009, 2010) compared activity 
during the generation of AU with activity during the retrieval of ordinary characteristics (OC), 
which is thought to be more related to intelligence in general. Results showed increased activity in 
left angular gyrus (AG) and supramarginal gyrus (SMG), and decreased activity in right AG for 
generating AU relative to retrieving OC. Another finding that is relatively consistent across 
various divergent thinking studies concerns the involvement of prefrontal cortex (PFC) (e.g., 
Abraham et al., 2012; Carlsson, Wendt, & Risberg, 2000; Chavez-Eakle et al., 2007; Folley 
&Park, 2005; Howard-Jones, et al., 2005; Mashal, Faust, Hendler, & Jung-Beeman, 2007), a brain 
region that is generally associated with cognitive control functioning and coordinating lower level 
(associative) brain regions (e.g., Miller & Cohen, 2001). Notably, a substantial part of the studies 
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that put forward the significance of prefrontal recruitment revealed positive relations between PFC 
activations and creative performances (e.g., Carlsson et al., 2000; Chavez et al., 2004; Chavez-
Eakle et al., 2007; Gibson, Folley, & Park, 2009). In all, these results indicate that temporo-
parietal regions are involved in divergent thinking processes in general whereas the ability to 
recruit PFC successfully might be discriminative concerning creative capacities. 
Interestingly, in a prior behavioral study we showed that adults were more successful than 
adolescents in generating original ideas, although there were no age differences in fluency and 
flexibility (Kleibeuker, De Dreu, & Crone, 2013). One hypothesis is that these age differences are 
associated with immature cognitive control processes and related prefrontal brain functioning. 
PFC regions are upon the latest to mature; structural (gray and white matter) and functional 
changes have been observed throughout adolescence and into adulthood (Luna, et al., 2010; Giedd 
and Rapoport, 2010; Shaw et al., 2008).  Age related changes of PFC activations have been 
observed for several cognitive functions including working memory, interference control and task-
switching (for a review, see Bunge and Wright, 2007). Therefore, we differentiated in our analyses 
between adolescents and adults in order to understand how possible developmental differences in 
divergent thinking are associated with neural activity in the prefrontal cortex and, possibly, 
temporo-parietal regions including left AG and SMG. Specifically, we conducted an fMRI study 
in which adults and adolescents were asked to provide AU or ordinary characteristics (OC) for 
common objects (Fink et al., 2009; Fink et al. 2010). To reveal brain regions involved in creative 
cognition, activity for AU generation was contrasted with activity for ordinary characteristics 
retrieval. According to previous studies, we expected to find activation in left AG and left SMG 
for alternative generation relative to ordinary characteristic retrieval. To better understand the 
processes underlying the divergent aspect of creative idea generation, we investigated activation 
patterns for the generation of multiple creative ideas, which specifically requires switching 
between solutions. Based on prior research results, we anticipated lateral PFC activations to be 
positively associated with divergent thinking performance in both adults and adolescents and to be 
larger in adults than in adolescents. 
 




Forty-five right-handed participants with no self-reported history of neurological or 
psychiatric disorders participated in the present study, divided across two age groups: 25 
adolescents (15–17-year-olds) and 20 adults (25–30-year-olds). Analyses involved forty-three 
participants; 24 adolescents (Mage = 16.89 yrs, SD = .63, 12 male), and 19 adults (Mage = 26.83 yrs, 
SD = 1.37, 9 male). One adolescent was excluded from the analysis due to technical failures, and 
one adult was excluded because of excessive head motion (> 1.75 mm). Gender distributions did 
not differ between age groups (χ2 (1) = .03, p = .86). 
Participants were recruited from local schools and through local advertisements. All 
participants provided informed consent. In case of minors, consent was also obtained from 
primary caregivers. Participation was compensated with either money or course credits. All 
procedures were approved by the Internal Review Board of Leiden University Medical Center 
(LUMC). 
To obtain an estimate of intelligence we included two subscales of the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale (Digit Span and Similarities; Wechsler, 1991, 1997, see Soveri et al., 2011). 
The scaled intelligence scores did not differ between age groups (Adolescents: M = 24.54, SD = 
2.32; Adults: M = 25.89, SD = 4.16; t (41) = 1.27, p = .22, corrected for unequal variances) or 
gender (Males: M = 25.48, SD = 2.93; females: M = 24.82, SD = 3.65; t (41) = .65, p = .29). 
Tasks 
Scanner task  
To examine the neural correlates of divergent thinking, participants performed an adapted 
version of the AUT ( Guilford, 1967, 1950) inside the MRI scanner while neural activity was 
measured. The task consisted of two conditions: the free association-related Alternative Uses 
(AU) condition and the more verbal ability-related Object Characteristics (OC) control condition, 
based on Fink et al., (2009). During AU trials participants had to think of as many unusual and 
original uses of a common object as possible (e.g. ‘umbrella’, example answer: ‘baseball bat’). 
During OC trials participants had to think of as many typical characteristics of a common object as 
possible (e.g. ‘shoe’, example answer: ‘fits on a foot’). Each trial started with a 3-second-
instruction screen to instruct the participant to think of either alternative uses, or common object 
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characteristics. Then, a written item was presented in the middle of the screen for 15 seconds with 
the text ‘ordinary characteristics’ or ‘alternative uses’ on the top of the screen during OC and AU 
trials, respectively, to remind participants of the instruction (see Figure 4-1). Directly after the 
target screen, an evaluation screen appeared for 3 seconds. Participants indicated how many 
solutions they had found by pressing one of four buttons on a left/right button-box that was 
attached to their left/right leg respectively; the left middle finger for 0 or 1 solution, the left index 
finger for 2 solutions, the right index finger for 3 solutions and the right middle finger for 4 or 
more solutions. Each trial was preceded by a fixation cross that was presented for a variable 
duration (0 – 7.7 seconds) to optimize the event-related design. A total of 40 items (20 AU and 20 
OC) were presented in a random order, divided across three blocks with duration of approximately 
7 minutes each. Short breaks were introduced between blocks to prevent fatigue.  
For both the AU and OC condition we calculated the percentage of trials for which 
participants indicated that they thought of zero or one solution, two solutions, three solutions, and 
four or more solutions. In addition a composite score was calculated for each condition (AU-score 
and OC-score). The composite score was the sum of a) the proportion of zero or one solution 
times one, b) the proportion of two solutions times two, c) the proportion of three solutions times 
three, and d) the proportion of four or more solutions times four.  
Figure 4-1. Time-line of the AUT-scanner task trial (see text for explanation) 
Alternative uses test-brick task (AUT-brick) 
A computerized version of the AUT was administered outside the scanner to test for 
convergent validity. This task measures divergent thinking in the verbal domain, similar to the 
task administered during the scan-session, but now for an extended period of time. Participants 
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were given the name of an object and asked to generate as many alternative uses for the object as 
possible. In the current version, participants were instructed to generate alternative uses for a brick 
(e.g., Friedman & Förster, 2001). Solutions can be unusual but must be appropriate. Participants 
were instructed to type their solutions one at the time on a laptop. Answers could be typed for a 
fixed length of 4 minutes. Fluency scores were computed by counting the number of correct 
solutions provided. Flexibility was measured by the number of solution-categories. An 
independent trained rater assigned each solution to one of 35 predefined solution-categories (e.g. 
building aspect; load; toy; De Dreu et al., 2008; Rietschel et al., 2006). The number of applied 
solution-categories was counted for each participant individually. Originality was measured on a 
5-point scale (from 1 = ‘not original’ to 5 = ‘highly original’). An independent trained researcher 
rated the originality of each solution separately according to a previously developed rating scheme 
to reliably score originality (De Dreu et al., 2008; Rietschel et al., 2006). Originality scores were 
calculated for each participant by averaging the rating across all solutions.  
Verbal fluency test 
The verbal fluency test used in the present study was a subtest of the Groninger 
Intelligentie Test (GIT, Luteijn & Van der Ploeg, 1983). The test contained two items: animals 
and professions, which were applied consecutively. For each item, participants were asked to 
name as many words as possible that fall within the category of that item, within 1 minute. 
Answers could be given only once. Verbal fluency was scored as the total number of correct 
answers for both items together.  
Procedure 
Outside the scanner, participants received oral instructions and completed a four-trial 
practice session (2 AU and 2 OC trials) of the scanner task. Then they were acclimated to the MRI 
environment in a mock scanner. After the scanning phase (during which they performed the 
scanner task), they completed the WAIS subtests Digit Span and Similarities, the Verbal Fluency 
test and the 4-minutes AUT-brick.  
MRI Data Acquisition 
Scanning was performed with a Philips 8-channels SENSE whole-head coil on a 3-Tesla 
Philips Achieva MRI system (Best, The Netherlands) in the Leiden University Medical Center. 
Three runs of 167  T2*-weighted whole-brain EPIs, preceded by two dummy scans for each run to 
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characteristics. Then, a written item was presented in the middle of the screen for 15 seconds with 
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times one, b) the proportion of two solutions times two, c) the proportion of three solutions times 
three, and d) the proportion of four or more solutions times four.  
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possible. In the current version, participants were instructed to generate alternative uses for a brick 
(e.g., Friedman & Förster, 2001). Solutions can be unusual but must be appropriate. Participants 
were instructed to type their solutions one at the time on a laptop. Answers could be typed for a 
fixed length of 4 minutes. Fluency scores were computed by counting the number of correct 
solutions provided. Flexibility was measured by the number of solution-categories. An 
independent trained rater assigned each solution to one of 35 predefined solution-categories (e.g. 
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solution-categories was counted for each participant individually. Originality was measured on a 
5-point scale (from 1 = ‘not original’ to 5 = ‘highly original’). An independent trained researcher 
rated the originality of each solution separately according to a previously developed rating scheme 
to reliably score originality (De Dreu et al., 2008; Rietschel et al., 2006). Originality scores were 
calculated for each participant by averaging the rating across all solutions.  
Verbal fluency test 
The verbal fluency test used in the present study was a subtest of the Groninger 
Intelligentie Test (GIT, Luteijn & Van der Ploeg, 1983). The test contained two items: animals 
and professions, which were applied consecutively. For each item, participants were asked to 
name as many words as possible that fall within the category of that item, within 1 minute. 
Answers could be given only once. Verbal fluency was scored as the total number of correct 
answers for both items together.  
Procedure 
Outside the scanner, participants received oral instructions and completed a four-trial 
practice session (2 AU and 2 OC trials) of the scanner task. Then they were acclimated to the MRI 
environment in a mock scanner. After the scanning phase (during which they performed the 
scanner task), they completed the WAIS subtests Digit Span and Similarities, the Verbal Fluency 
test and the 4-minutes AUT-brick.  
MRI Data Acquisition 
Scanning was performed with a Philips 8-channels SENSE whole-head coil on a 3-Tesla 
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allow for equilibration of T1 saturation effects, were subsequently acquired (TR = 2.2 s; TE = 
30 ms, flip angle = 80 degrees, 38 transverse slices, 2.75 x 2.75 x 2.75 mm (+ 10% inter-slice 
gap). Stimuli were presented running E-prime software (version 1.2, Psychology Tools Inc.) and 
projected onto a screen at the head of the scanner bore. Participants viewed the stimuli by means 
of a mirror mounted on the head coil assembly. Head motion was restricted by using pillow and 
foam inserts that surrounded the head. The maximum movement parameters were below 1.75 mm 
and the maximum rotation was below 0.5 degrees for all participants and all scans.  All anatomical 
scans were reviewed and cleared by a radiologist.  
MRI Data Analysis 
SPM5 software (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk) was used for image preprocessing and analyses. 
Images were corrected for slice-time differences, followed by rigid body motion correction. 
Functional volumes were spatially normalized to EPI templates based on MNI305 stereotaxic 
space (Cocosco, Kollokian, Kwan & Evans, 1997) using a 12-parameter affine transformation 
together with a non-linear transformation involving cosine basis functions. Data were resampled 
to 3 mm cubic voxels. Functional volumes were smoothed using an 8mm full-width half-
maximum 3D Gaussian kernel. For each participant, the functional time series were modeled by a 
series of events convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF). Trials were 
modeled separately based on condition (AU or OC), with the time point of presentation as onset 
and duration of 15 seconds, and entered in a general linear model along with a basic set of cosine 
functions to high-pass filter the data, and a covariate for run effects. In addition, the instruction 
screen preceding the AU and OC trials and the evaluation screen after trials were modeled 
separately (onset: presentation onset; duration: 0 ms). Another set of analyses was applied to 
investigate the process of generating multiple solutions, a hallmark of divergent thinking. Here, 
trials were modeled not only based on the condition (AU or OC), but also on the number of 
solutions (0/1 or 2+) to make it possible to a) contrast trials with multiple AU with trials with 
multiple OC (AU2+ > OC2+); and b) contrast trials with multiple alternative uses with trials with 
only zero or one alternative uses (AU2+ > AU0/1). The least square parameter estimates of height 
of best fitting canonical HRF for each condition were used in pair wise contrasts (OC > fixation; 
AU > fixation; AU > OC; AU2+ > OC2+; AU2+ > AU0/1). The resulting first level contrast 
images, computed on a subject-by-subject basis, were submitted to group analyses. At the group 
level, contrasts between conditions were computed by performing one-tailed t-tests on these 
contrasts, treating participants as a random effect, and two-sample t-tests to compare age groups. 
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Whole brain fMRI analyses were FDR corrected for multiple comparisons at p < .05 (voxel level) 
(Genovese, Laxar, & Nichols, 2002) with at least 10 contiguous voxels. We further conducted 
whole-brain regression analyses to test for brain behavior relations using the composite AU-score 
of the scanner task. For whole-brain regression analyses none of the regions survived FDR 
correction. In addition, we applied the threshold of p < .001 uncorrected with at least 10 
contiguous voxels to overcome the relatively low power inherent to analyses of individual 
differences, and focused specifically on prefrontal regions in accordance with our hypotheses. 
Results are reported in the MNI305 stereotaxic space. Brain regions are derived from the SPM 
anatomy toolbox v1.8 (Eickhoff et al. 2005, 2006, 2007).  
Region-of-Interest (ROI) Analyses 
Region-of-interest (ROI) analyses were performed with MarsBaR toolbox in SPM5 (Brett, 
Anton, Valabregue & Poline, 2005) to illustrate 1) the activation patterns for the AU and OC 
conditions within temporo-parietal and prefrontal brain regions and, 2) the correlation between 
activations related to creative idea generation (AU - OC) and AU performance. ROIs were derived 
from the whole brain contrasts. The output ‘contrast estimates’ was used. Contrast estimates were 
derived for each condition relative to baseline (i.e., OC-baseline, AU-baseline). Masked ROIs, 
including SMG, MTG and AG were derived from the contrast AU > OC and were masked with 




To test for creative idea generation performance we conducted a 2 (condition) x 4 (number 
of solutions) x 2 (age group) mixed-model ANOVA with age group as between-subjects factor. 
The dependent variable was the number of trials for which a certain number of solutions was 
generated. We applied Greenhouse-Geisser corrections if sphericity was violated. 
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Figure 4-2. Performance on the AUT-scanner task. Percentage of trials (y-axis) for which a certain number of 
solutions (x-axis) is generated. Results for the Ordinary Characteristics condition are presented on the left; results for 
the Alternative Uses condition are presented on the right. 
 
Results are presented in Figure 4-2 and show two significant effects: an interaction effect of 
condition x number with more solutions generated in the OC condition compared to the AU 
condition (F (3,123) = 58.81, p < .001; η2 = .56), and an interaction effect of number x age group 
(F (3,123) = 5.44, p = .009; η2 = .12) with more answers generated by adults than by adolescents. 
There was no significant condition x number x age group interaction effect (F (3,123) = .64, p = 
.56, η2 = .02), indicating that adults were not specifically more creative, but generated more 
answers in general. Post hoc analyses for the number of solutions separately (OC0/1, OC2, OC3, 
OC4+, AU0/1, AU2, AU3, and AU4+) showed that in both conditions, adults generated four or 
more solutions more often than adolescents (OC4+: t = 3.44, p = .047; AU4+: t = 2.66, p = .014, 
corrected for unequal variances); adolescents generated two solutions more often than adults, 
specifically in the OC condition (t = 1.6, p = .034, corrected for unequal variances). Similar 
results were obtained for the composite AU- and OC-scores, which are presented in Table 4-1 
(condition effect: F (1,41) = 160.84, p < .001, η2 = .80; age group effect: F (1, 41) = 7.19, p = 
.011, η2 = .15; condition x age group n.s.: F (1,41) = .68, p = .41, η2 = .02).  
To test for possible gender effects, we conducted additional repeated measures ANOVA on 
the scanner task composite scores. No main effect of gender was observed (p > .05). The 
interaction effect between condition and gender appeared significant with larger discrepancy 
between AU-score and OC-score for females relative to males (F(1,41) = 6.25, p = .02, η2 = .13). 
Post hoc analyses showed no significant gender differences for the two measures (AU-score and 
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OC-score) separately (p’s > .05). Interactions with age group (gender x age group, gender x 
condition x age group) were not significant (p’s > .05). 
Table 4-1. Age group performances 
  Adolescents   Adults 
  N Mean SD   N Mean SD 
AUT-scanner 
          AU-score* 24   2.26   .50 
 
19   2.68   .61 
   OC-score** 24   3.32   .48 
 
19   3.61   .37 
        Verbal Fluency* 24 41.50 7.30 
 
18 47.56 6.48 
        AUT-brick 
          fluency* 22   8.45 3.51
 
17 12.71 5.82
   flexibility 22   6.32 2.36  17   7.82 2.74 
   originality 22   1.72   .27  17   1.61   .37 
 
* p ≤ .05,  ** p ≤ .01. 
  
 
     
Additional tasks 
Performances for the tasks taken outside the scanner, the verbal fluency test and the AUT-
Brick task, are presented in Table 4-1.  
Verbal fluency test 
To test for age group differences on verbal fluency an independent samples t-test was 
applied on verbal fluency scores with age group as independent variable. Results revealed a 
significant age group effect, showing that adults performed better than adolescents: t (40) = 2.79, p 
= .008. No gender effect or age group x gender effect was observed (p’s > .1) 
AUT-brick 
To examine age group differences for divergent thinking, a multivariate analysis of 
variances (MANOVA) was performed on the AUT-brick measures fluency, flexibility, and 
originality.  Results showed a significant age group effect (F (4,34) = 3.34, p = .02). Post hoc 
analyses showed that the effect was driven by a significant age group effect for AUT-brick 
fluency with better performance for adults compared to adolescents (AUT-brick fluency: t (37) = 
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condition (F (3,123) = 58.81, p < .001; η2 = .56), and an interaction effect of number x age group 
(F (3,123) = 5.44, p = .009; η2 = .12) with more answers generated by adults than by adolescents. 
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.56, η2 = .02), indicating that adults were not specifically more creative, but generated more 
answers in general. Post hoc analyses for the number of solutions separately (OC0/1, OC2, OC3, 
OC4+, AU0/1, AU2, AU3, and AU4+) showed that in both conditions, adults generated four or 
more solutions more often than adolescents (OC4+: t = 3.44, p = .047; AU4+: t = 2.66, p = .014, 
corrected for unequal variances); adolescents generated two solutions more often than adults, 
specifically in the OC condition (t = 1.6, p = .034, corrected for unequal variances). Similar 
results were obtained for the composite AU- and OC-scores, which are presented in Table 4-1 
(condition effect: F (1,41) = 160.84, p < .001, η2 = .80; age group effect: F (1, 41) = 7.19, p = 
.011, η2 = .15; condition x age group n.s.: F (1,41) = .68, p = .41, η2 = .02).  
To test for possible gender effects, we conducted additional repeated measures ANOVA on 
the scanner task composite scores. No main effect of gender was observed (p > .05). The 
interaction effect between condition and gender appeared significant with larger discrepancy 
between AU-score and OC-score for females relative to males (F(1,41) = 6.25, p = .02, η2 = .13). 
Post hoc analyses showed no significant gender differences for the two measures (AU-score and 
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OC-score) separately (p’s > .05). Interactions with age group (gender x age group, gender x 
condition x age group) were not significant (p’s > .05). 
Table 4-1. Age group performances 
  Adolescents   Adults 
  N Mean SD   N Mean SD 
AUT-scanner 
          AU-score* 24   2.26   .50 
 
19   2.68   .61 
   OC-score** 24   3.32   .48 
 
19   3.61   .37 
        Verbal Fluency* 24 41.50 7.30 
 
18 47.56 6.48 
        AUT-brick 
          fluency* 22   8.45 3.51
 
17 12.71 5.82
   flexibility 22   6.32 2.36  17   7.82 2.74 
   originality 22   1.72   .27  17   1.61   .37 
 
* p ≤ .05,  ** p ≤ .01. 
  
 
     
Additional tasks 
Performances for the tasks taken outside the scanner, the verbal fluency test and the AUT-
Brick task, are presented in Table 4-1.  
Verbal fluency test 
To test for age group differences on verbal fluency an independent samples t-test was 
applied on verbal fluency scores with age group as independent variable. Results revealed a 
significant age group effect, showing that adults performed better than adolescents: t (40) = 2.79, p 
= .008. No gender effect or age group x gender effect was observed (p’s > .1) 
AUT-brick 
To examine age group differences for divergent thinking, a multivariate analysis of 
variances (MANOVA) was performed on the AUT-brick measures fluency, flexibility, and 
originality.  Results showed a significant age group effect (F (4,34) = 3.34, p = .02). Post hoc 
analyses showed that the effect was driven by a significant age group effect for AUT-brick 
fluency with better performance for adults compared to adolescents (AUT-brick fluency: t (37) = 
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2.66, p = .01, corrected for variance differences). Age group differences were only marginally 
significant for AUT-brick flexibility ( t (37) = 1.84, p = .07). No age group effects were observed 
for AUT-brick originality. Additional analyses on gender and gender x age group effects revealed 
no significant results. On a behavioral level, these results are in line with performance on the 
scanner task, indicating that adults showed greater fluency in general.  
Correlations 
To validate the processes that are involved in the AU and OC conditions, bivariate 
correlations were estimated between AU- and OC-scores of the scanner task, and performances on 
the verbal fluency test and AUT-brick task. Results are presented in Table 4-2. Significant 
correlations were observed for OC-score with both fluency measures; verbal fluency (r = .44, p < 
.001) and AUT-brick fluency (r = .36, p = .02), but not for OC-score with AUT-brick flexibility, 
or AUT-brick originality. AU-score correlated significantly with AUT-brick fluency (r = .54, p < 
.001) and AUT-brick flexibility (r = .36, p = .02), and marginally with AUT-brick originality (r = 
.30, p = .07), but not with verbal fluency (r = .26, p > .1). Similar results were obtained when 
analyses were controlled for gender. When controlling for age, results showed some deviations: 
OC-scores correlated no longer with AUT-brick fluency scores (r = .26, p = .12); AU-scores 
correlated only marginally with AUT-brick flexibility scores (r = .29, p = .08), but significantly 
with AUT-brick originality scores (r = .40, p = .01). In all, these results support the differentiation 
between the two conditions with the AU condition related to creativity-related divergent thinking 
aspects and OC condition associated with more verbal ability-related fluency capacities (Fink et 
al., 2009). 
 
Table 4-2. Bivariate correlations for fluency and creativity measures 
  AUT-scanner 
  AU-score OC-score 
Verbal Fluency .26 .44** 
AUT-brick fluency .54** .36* 
AUT-brick flexibility .36* .15 
AUT-brick originality .30~ .07 
Note. AU = alternative uses, OC = ordinary characteristics, AUT = Alternative Uses Test 
* p ≤ .05,  ** p ≤ .01, ~ p ≤ .10 
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fMRI results 
To extract the neural correlates of creative idea generation we conducted whole-brain 
voxel-wise t-tests on activation levels for the contrast AU > OC across all participants (N = 43). 
Results revealed a number of regions including left SMG, left and right MTG, and left AG (FDR 
corrected, p < .05; see Figure 4-3 and Table 4-3), which is in line with prior studies (Fink et 
al.,2009; Fink et al., 2010).  The opposite contrast OC > AU showed increased activity for 
retrieval of characteristics relative to alternative uses for common objects in a number of different 
brain regions (see Table 4-4). Results were most pronounced in left and right posterior 
SMG/anterior AG and thereby resemble previous findings by Fink et al., 2010.  
 
Figure 4-3. Top: Whole brain results for the contrast AU > OC (N = 43; p < .05, FDR corrected (voxel level), > 10 
contiguous voxels). Below: Time series for the anatomically masked functional ROIs for the AU and OC conditions, 
with onset of instruction screen at time = 0 s. The gray beams beneath the graphs represent object presentation (time = 
3.0 – 18.0 s) during which participants are required to generate solutions. Time series are presented for illustrative 
purposes only. AU = Alternative Uses, OC = Ordinary Characteristics, L SMG = left supramarginal gyrus, L MTG = 
left middle temporal gyrus, L AG = left angular gyrus. 
 
We conducted a second set of analyses to examine neural correlates for trials on which 
multiple solutions were generated, a crucial characteristic of divergent thinking success. 
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2.66, p = .01, corrected for variance differences). Age group differences were only marginally 
significant for AUT-brick flexibility ( t (37) = 1.84, p = .07). No age group effects were observed 
for AUT-brick originality. Additional analyses on gender and gender x age group effects revealed 
no significant results. On a behavioral level, these results are in line with performance on the 
scanner task, indicating that adults showed greater fluency in general.  
Correlations 
To validate the processes that are involved in the AU and OC conditions, bivariate 
correlations were estimated between AU- and OC-scores of the scanner task, and performances on 
the verbal fluency test and AUT-brick task. Results are presented in Table 4-2. Significant 
correlations were observed for OC-score with both fluency measures; verbal fluency (r = .44, p < 
.001) and AUT-brick fluency (r = .36, p = .02), but not for OC-score with AUT-brick flexibility, 
or AUT-brick originality. AU-score correlated significantly with AUT-brick fluency (r = .54, p < 
.001) and AUT-brick flexibility (r = .36, p = .02), and marginally with AUT-brick originality (r = 
.30, p = .07), but not with verbal fluency (r = .26, p > .1). Similar results were obtained when 
analyses were controlled for gender. When controlling for age, results showed some deviations: 
OC-scores correlated no longer with AUT-brick fluency scores (r = .26, p = .12); AU-scores 
correlated only marginally with AUT-brick flexibility scores (r = .29, p = .08), but significantly 
with AUT-brick originality scores (r = .40, p = .01). In all, these results support the differentiation 
between the two conditions with the AU condition related to creativity-related divergent thinking 
aspects and OC condition associated with more verbal ability-related fluency capacities (Fink et 
al., 2009). 
 
Table 4-2. Bivariate correlations for fluency and creativity measures 
  AUT-scanner 
  AU-score OC-score 
Verbal Fluency .26 .44** 
AUT-brick fluency .54** .36* 
AUT-brick flexibility .36* .15 
AUT-brick originality .30~ .07 
Note. AU = alternative uses, OC = ordinary characteristics, AUT = Alternative Uses Test 
* p ≤ .05,  ** p ≤ .01, ~ p ≤ .10 
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fMRI results 
To extract the neural correlates of creative idea generation we conducted whole-brain 
voxel-wise t-tests on activation levels for the contrast AU > OC across all participants (N = 43). 
Results revealed a number of regions including left SMG, left and right MTG, and left AG (FDR 
corrected, p < .05; see Figure 4-3 and Table 4-3), which is in line with prior studies (Fink et 
al.,2009; Fink et al., 2010).  The opposite contrast OC > AU showed increased activity for 
retrieval of characteristics relative to alternative uses for common objects in a number of different 
brain regions (see Table 4-4). Results were most pronounced in left and right posterior 
SMG/anterior AG and thereby resemble previous findings by Fink et al., 2010.  
 
Figure 4-3. Top: Whole brain results for the contrast AU > OC (N = 43; p < .05, FDR corrected (voxel level), > 10 
contiguous voxels). Below: Time series for the anatomically masked functional ROIs for the AU and OC conditions, 
with onset of instruction screen at time = 0 s. The gray beams beneath the graphs represent object presentation (time = 
3.0 – 18.0 s) during which participants are required to generate solutions. Time series are presented for illustrative 
purposes only. AU = Alternative Uses, OC = Ordinary Characteristics, L SMG = left supramarginal gyrus, L MTG = 
left middle temporal gyrus, L AG = left angular gyrus. 
 
We conducted a second set of analyses to examine neural correlates for trials on which 
multiple solutions were generated, a crucial characteristic of divergent thinking success. 
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Contrasting trials for which participants indicated that they had found two or more alternative uses 
with trials for which they had thought of two or more ordinary characteristics (AU2+ > OC2+), 
revealed similar results as the contrast AU > OC, including left SMG, left AG and bilateral MTG. 
However, additional activation was observed in several regions, including left middle frontal 
gyrus (MFG) and left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) pars Triangularis (see Table 4-5). A direct 
comparison of AU trials with two or more solutions and trials with zero or one solution (AU2+ > 
AU0/1) revealed no significant effects. However, applying a more liberal significance threshold (p 
< .001, uncorrected) revealed activations mainly in the left hemisphere, including left middle 
frontal gyrus (MFG) and left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) pars Triangularis (see Table 4-6). These 
findings are in congruence with the findings for contrast AU2+ > OC 2+ and indicate that the 
differences between the contrasts AU > OC and AU2+ > OC2+ are not the result of differences 
between OC0/1 and OC2+ trials. 
To test for developmental differences, whole-brain two-sample t-tests (adolescents versus 
adults) were conducted on the contrast AU > OC. There were no age group differences 
(significance threshold: p < .05 FDR corrected). There were also no age group differences when 
we analyzed only those trials for which participants gave at least two solutions (AU2+ > OC2+). 
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Table 4-3. Neural activations for the contrast AU > OC 
Brain regions L/R K  
Z-value   MNI coordinates 
peak voxel    x   y  z 
Supra Marginal Gyrus L 189 6.63 -60 -30 36 
Inferior Parietal Cortex (PGp), Middle Temporal  L 265 5.01 -42 -84 30 
   Gyrus 
  
4.25 -54 -66 0 
   
4.04 -45 -63 9 
Anterior Cingulate Cortex, Middle Orbital Gyrus L 834 4.91 -3 48 0 
   
4.86 -9 48 -6 
   
4.76 0 51 12 
Postcentral Gyrus R 199 4.73 36 -30 51 
Middle Temporal Gyrus R 160 4.49 48 -63 15 
   
3.81 51 -75 21 
Hippocampus L 26 4.06 -24 -12 -18 
Superior Frontal Gyrus (BA6) L 55 3.99 -21 -6 60 
Calcarine Gyrus L 65 3.79 -6 -51 6 
   
3.47 -9 -60 9 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus (p. Orbitalis) L 31 3.61 -30 33 -15 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus (p. Opercularis) L 12 3.44 -51 6 24 
Note. Abbreviations: MNI = Montreal Neurological Institute; L = Left hemisphere; R = Right hemisphere.  
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Contrasting trials for which participants indicated that they had found two or more alternative uses 
with trials for which they had thought of two or more ordinary characteristics (AU2+ > OC2+), 
revealed similar results as the contrast AU > OC, including left SMG, left AG and bilateral MTG. 
However, additional activation was observed in several regions, including left middle frontal 
gyrus (MFG) and left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) pars Triangularis (see Table 4-5). A direct 
comparison of AU trials with two or more solutions and trials with zero or one solution (AU2+ > 
AU0/1) revealed no significant effects. However, applying a more liberal significance threshold (p 
< .001, uncorrected) revealed activations mainly in the left hemisphere, including left middle 
frontal gyrus (MFG) and left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) pars Triangularis (see Table 4-6). These 
findings are in congruence with the findings for contrast AU2+ > OC 2+ and indicate that the 
differences between the contrasts AU > OC and AU2+ > OC2+ are not the result of differences 
between OC0/1 and OC2+ trials. 
To test for developmental differences, whole-brain two-sample t-tests (adolescents versus 
adults) were conducted on the contrast AU > OC. There were no age group differences 
(significance threshold: p < .05 FDR corrected). There were also no age group differences when 
we analyzed only those trials for which participants gave at least two solutions (AU2+ > OC2+). 
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Table 4-3. Neural activations for the contrast AU > OC 
Brain regions L/R K  
Z-value   MNI coordinates 
peak voxel    x   y  z 
Supra Marginal Gyrus L 189 6.63 -60 -30 36 
Inferior Parietal Cortex (PGp), Middle Temporal  L 265 5.01 -42 -84 30 
   Gyrus 
  
4.25 -54 -66 0 
   
4.04 -45 -63 9 
Anterior Cingulate Cortex, Middle Orbital Gyrus L 834 4.91 -3 48 0 
   
4.86 -9 48 -6 
   
4.76 0 51 12 
Postcentral Gyrus R 199 4.73 36 -30 51 
Middle Temporal Gyrus R 160 4.49 48 -63 15 
   
3.81 51 -75 21 
Hippocampus L 26 4.06 -24 -12 -18 
Superior Frontal Gyrus (BA6) L 55 3.99 -21 -6 60 
Calcarine Gyrus L 65 3.79 -6 -51 6 
   
3.47 -9 -60 9 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus (p. Orbitalis) L 31 3.61 -30 33 -15 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus (p. Opercularis) L 12 3.44 -51 6 24 
Note. Abbreviations: MNI = Montreal Neurological Institute; L = Left hemisphere; R = Right hemisphere.  
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Table 4-4. Neural activations for the contrast OC > AU 
Brain regions L/R K  
Z-value      MNI coordinates 
peak voxel        x      y  z 




7.54 33 -63 48 
   Supra Marginal Gyrus (hIP1) 5.99 51 -51 48 
   
5.11 48 -63 48 
Middle Temporal Gyrus, Precentral Gyrus (Area 4a, L 6441 6.87 -66 -51 48 
   3b), Angular Gyrus (hIP1)   6.14 -36 -42 39 
   6.02 -33 -36 -6 
Inferior Temporal Gyrus, Rolandic Operculum (OP 4) R 1069 5.43 57 -24 57 
   4.35 66 -63 42 
   4.21 63 -39 -18 
Inferior Occipital Gyrus (hOC3v (V3v), Fusiform  L 1025 4.91 -27 -27 -18 
   Gyrus, Middle Occipital Gyrus   4.78 -33 -3 12 
   4.55 -39 -93 -9 
Middle Cingulate Cortex R 221 4.69 3 -72 -15 
Precentral Gyrus (Area 6) R 61 3.62 21 -87 -3 
Middle Temporal Gyrus L 35 3.60 -54 -33 33 
Medial Temportal Pole R 12 2.71 48 -27 60 
Lingual Gyrus (Area 17) R 19 2.54 9 6 -24 
   2.50 3 9 -24 
Note. Abbreviations: MNI = Montreal Neurological Institute; L = Left hemisphere; R = Right hemisphere 
Significance threshold: p < .05, FDR corrected (voxel level); > 10 voxels 
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Table 4-5. Neural activations for the contrast AU 2+ > OC 2+ 
Brain regions L/R K 
Z-value       MNI coordinates 
peak voxel         x     y    z 
Inferior Parietal Cortex (PGp), Middle Temporal  L 106 5.34 -42 -84 30 
   Gyrus 
  
3.72 -42 -63 15 
   
3.37 -51 -69 15 
Fusiform Gyrus L 40 4.39 -24 -33 -21 
   
3.43 -33 -42 -21 
Hippocampus L 18 4.37 -24 -15 -18 
Postcentral Gyrus (area 2) R 39 4.34 36 -33 48 
Anterior Cingulate Cortex, Middle Orbital Gyrus L 147 4.34 0 36 -6 
   
4.27 -9 51 -6 
   
3.64 -3 48 0 
Olfactory cortex L 27 4.24 0 12 -6 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus (p. Opercularis; Area 44),  L 36 4.14 -51 6 24 
   Rolandic Operculum 
  
3.36 -42 -3 18 
Middle Frontal Gyrus (Area 6) L 62 4.13 -24 0 60 
   
3.42 -24 -9 48 
Middle Temporal Gyrus/Middle Occipital Gyrus  R 65 4.07 48 -63 15 
   (PGp) 
  
3.64 51 -75 24 
Middle Temporal Gyrus L 28 4.05 -54 -66 -3 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus (p. Orbitalis) L 29 4.03 -27 33 -15 
Superior Frontal Gyrus L 11 3.88 -18 21 39 
Inferior Parietal Lobule (Area 2/hIP3) L 22 3.65 -39 -39 48 
   
3.25 -30 -36 39 
Superior Frontal Gyrus L/R 17 3.61 3 57 12 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus (p. Triangularis), Middle  L 24 3.60 -45 33 12 
   Frontal Gyrus 
  
3.54 -45 39 18 
Calcarine gyrus L 12 3.45 -9 -48 6 
Note. Abbreviations: MNI = Montreal Neurological Institute; L = Left hemisphere; R = Right hemisphere 
Significance threshold: p < .05, FDR corrected; > 10 voxels 
74 75
Chapter 4    The neural coding of creative idea generation 
Table 4-4. Neural activations for the contrast OC > AU 
Brain regions L/R K  
Z-value      MNI coordinates 
peak voxel        x      y  z 




7.54 33 -63 48 
   Supra Marginal Gyrus (hIP1) 5.99 51 -51 48 
   
5.11 48 -63 48 
Middle Temporal Gyrus, Precentral Gyrus (Area 4a, L 6441 6.87 -66 -51 48 
   3b), Angular Gyrus (hIP1)   6.14 -36 -42 39 
   6.02 -33 -36 -6 
Inferior Temporal Gyrus, Rolandic Operculum (OP 4) R 1069 5.43 57 -24 57 
   4.35 66 -63 42 
   4.21 63 -39 -18 
Inferior Occipital Gyrus (hOC3v (V3v), Fusiform  L 1025 4.91 -27 -27 -18 
   Gyrus, Middle Occipital Gyrus   4.78 -33 -3 12 
   4.55 -39 -93 -9 
Middle Cingulate Cortex R 221 4.69 3 -72 -15 
Precentral Gyrus (Area 6) R 61 3.62 21 -87 -3 
Middle Temporal Gyrus L 35 3.60 -54 -33 33 
Medial Temportal Pole R 12 2.71 48 -27 60 
Lingual Gyrus (Area 17) R 19 2.54 9 6 -24 
   2.50 3 9 -24 
Note. Abbreviations: MNI = Montreal Neurological Institute; L = Left hemisphere; R = Right hemisphere 
Significance threshold: p < .05, FDR corrected (voxel level); > 10 voxels 
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Table 4-5. Neural activations for the contrast AU 2+ > OC 2+ 
Brain regions L/R K 
Z-value       MNI coordinates 
peak voxel         x     y    z 
Inferior Parietal Cortex (PGp), Middle Temporal  L 106 5.34 -42 -84 30 
   Gyrus 
  
3.72 -42 -63 15 
   
3.37 -51 -69 15 
Fusiform Gyrus L 40 4.39 -24 -33 -21 
   
3.43 -33 -42 -21 
Hippocampus L 18 4.37 -24 -15 -18 
Postcentral Gyrus (area 2) R 39 4.34 36 -33 48 
Anterior Cingulate Cortex, Middle Orbital Gyrus L 147 4.34 0 36 -6 
   
4.27 -9 51 -6 
   
3.64 -3 48 0 
Olfactory cortex L 27 4.24 0 12 -6 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus (p. Opercularis; Area 44),  L 36 4.14 -51 6 24 
   Rolandic Operculum 
  
3.36 -42 -3 18 
Middle Frontal Gyrus (Area 6) L 62 4.13 -24 0 60 
   
3.42 -24 -9 48 
Middle Temporal Gyrus/Middle Occipital Gyrus  R 65 4.07 48 -63 15 
   (PGp) 
  
3.64 51 -75 24 
Middle Temporal Gyrus L 28 4.05 -54 -66 -3 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus (p. Orbitalis) L 29 4.03 -27 33 -15 
Superior Frontal Gyrus L 11 3.88 -18 21 39 
Inferior Parietal Lobule (Area 2/hIP3) L 22 3.65 -39 -39 48 
   
3.25 -30 -36 39 
Superior Frontal Gyrus L/R 17 3.61 3 57 12 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus (p. Triangularis), Middle  L 24 3.60 -45 33 12 
   Frontal Gyrus 
  
3.54 -45 39 18 
Calcarine gyrus L 12 3.45 -9 -48 6 
Note. Abbreviations: MNI = Montreal Neurological Institute; L = Left hemisphere; R = Right hemisphere 
Significance threshold: p < .05, FDR corrected; > 10 voxels 
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Table 4-6. Neural activations for the contrast AU 2+ > AU 0/1 
Brain regions L/R K 
Z-value MNI coordinates 
peak voxel x y z 
Anterior Cingulate Cortex, Cingulate Gyrus L/R 33 4.40 -6 9 24 
   
3.24 3 0 27 
Rolandic Operculum, Precentral Gyrus (Area 44) L 71 4.35 -48 3 12 
   
4.17 -48 3 21 
   
3.43 -39 -3 15 
Postcentral Gyrus (Area 1), Inferior Parietal Lobule L 122 3.91 -42 -30 63 
(Area 2/hIP3), Postcentral Gyrus (Area 2/3b) 
  
3.84 -36 -39 48 
   
3.55 -42 -27 48 
Precentral Gyrus (Area 6) L 24 3.84 -24 -9 66 
   
3.27 -30 -21 63 
Cerebellum (Lobule VI, Hem) R 14 3.77 27 -51 -30 
Superior Frontal Gyrus L 25 3.76 -15 21 54 
   
3.58 -15 12 57 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus (p. Triangularis) L 53 3.63 -45 33 15 
Note. Abbreviations: MNI = Montreal Neurological Institute; L = Left hemisphere; R = Right hemisphere 
Significance threshold: p < .001, uncorrected (voxel level) 
Individual differences 
To test for brain regions directly related to divergent thinking performance (fluency), we 
conducted whole-brain voxel-wise regression analyses on the contrast AU > OC with performance 
on AU trials (AU- score of the scanner task, see methods section) as covariate of interest. No 
significant findings were observed at the threshold p < .05 FDR corrected. However, when the 
threshold was lowered to p < .001, uncorrected, > 10 contiguous voxels, significant correlations 
were found in a number of regions for which we had a priori hypotheses (see Table 4-7). 
Specifically, activation levels for the contrast AU > OC were correlated with creative 
performances in a region in the left lateral PFC (MFG and IFG pars Triangularis, see Figure 4-4a, 
b). Notably, this region overlapped with the left MFG/IFG regions that were significantly more 
activated for AU2+ trials relative to AU0/1 trials. As such, our results show both within- and 
between-subject support for a significant role for left lateral PFC in divergent thinking. In addition 
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to left lateralized brain regions, the regression analyses with AU-scores (p < .001, uncorrected for 
multiple comparisons) revealed significant results in the right hemisphere, including right MFG 
and right IFG pars Triangularis (see Table 4-7). Thus, while successful divergent thinking (2+ 
solutions; within subjects) was associated with increased left lateralized prefrontal activations, 
divergent thinking performance (AU- score; between subjects) related to activity changes in both 
left and right prefrontal cortices. 
 
Figure 4-4. A) Whole brain results for the regression of AU-score on the contrast AU > OC, thresholded at p < .001, 
uncorrected; > 10 contiguous voxels (section coordinates: X = -45, Z = 12). Color –scale represents t-values. B) 
Correlation between creative thinking related activation (AU-OC) for the left IFG/MFG (ROI-peak-value at MNI 
coordinates -45, 39, 12) and AU-score for adolescents (open circles) and adults (filled triangles). C) Contrast 
estimates for AU and OC conditions relative to baseline for left IFG/MFG. Results for adolescents are presented left, 
results for adults are presented right. CE = Contrast estimate. ** p ≤ .01 
 
We hypothesized that adolescents would show immature divergent thinking performance 
related to immature PFC activation patterns. To test these hypotheses we performed ROI analyses 
on the contrast estimates of the left IFG/MFG cluster, which were derived from the regression 
analyses described above. First, we examined whether age group differences were present using a 
2 (condition) x 2 (age groups) mixed ANOVA on contrast estimates for AU and OC conditions 
relative to baseline (AU- baseline; OC- baseline). Results revealed a significant age group x 
condition interaction effect (F(1,41) = 7.21, p = .01, η2 = .15; see Figure 4-4c). Adults showed 
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Table 4-6. Neural activations for the contrast AU 2+ > AU 0/1 
Brain regions L/R K 
Z-value MNI coordinates 
peak voxel x y z 
Anterior Cingulate Cortex, Cingulate Gyrus L/R 33 4.40 -6 9 24 
   
3.24 3 0 27 
Rolandic Operculum, Precentral Gyrus (Area 44) L 71 4.35 -48 3 12 
   
4.17 -48 3 21 
   
3.43 -39 -3 15 
Postcentral Gyrus (Area 1), Inferior Parietal Lobule L 122 3.91 -42 -30 63 
(Area 2/hIP3), Postcentral Gyrus (Area 2/3b) 
  
3.84 -36 -39 48 
   
3.55 -42 -27 48 
Precentral Gyrus (Area 6) L 24 3.84 -24 -9 66 
   
3.27 -30 -21 63 
Cerebellum (Lobule VI, Hem) R 14 3.77 27 -51 -30 
Superior Frontal Gyrus L 25 3.76 -15 21 54 
   
3.58 -15 12 57 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus (p. Triangularis) L 53 3.63 -45 33 15 
Note. Abbreviations: MNI = Montreal Neurological Institute; L = Left hemisphere; R = Right hemisphere 
Significance threshold: p < .001, uncorrected (voxel level) 
Individual differences 
To test for brain regions directly related to divergent thinking performance (fluency), we 
conducted whole-brain voxel-wise regression analyses on the contrast AU > OC with performance 
on AU trials (AU- score of the scanner task, see methods section) as covariate of interest. No 
significant findings were observed at the threshold p < .05 FDR corrected. However, when the 
threshold was lowered to p < .001, uncorrected, > 10 contiguous voxels, significant correlations 
were found in a number of regions for which we had a priori hypotheses (see Table 4-7). 
Specifically, activation levels for the contrast AU > OC were correlated with creative 
performances in a region in the left lateral PFC (MFG and IFG pars Triangularis, see Figure 4-4a, 
b). Notably, this region overlapped with the left MFG/IFG regions that were significantly more 
activated for AU2+ trials relative to AU0/1 trials. As such, our results show both within- and 
between-subject support for a significant role for left lateral PFC in divergent thinking. In addition 
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to left lateralized brain regions, the regression analyses with AU-scores (p < .001, uncorrected for 
multiple comparisons) revealed significant results in the right hemisphere, including right MFG 
and right IFG pars Triangularis (see Table 4-7). Thus, while successful divergent thinking (2+ 
solutions; within subjects) was associated with increased left lateralized prefrontal activations, 
divergent thinking performance (AU- score; between subjects) related to activity changes in both 
left and right prefrontal cortices. 
 
Figure 4-4. A) Whole brain results for the regression of AU-score on the contrast AU > OC, thresholded at p < .001, 
uncorrected; > 10 contiguous voxels (section coordinates: X = -45, Z = 12). Color –scale represents t-values. B) 
Correlation between creative thinking related activation (AU-OC) for the left IFG/MFG (ROI-peak-value at MNI 
coordinates -45, 39, 12) and AU-score for adolescents (open circles) and adults (filled triangles). C) Contrast 
estimates for AU and OC conditions relative to baseline for left IFG/MFG. Results for adolescents are presented left, 
results for adults are presented right. CE = Contrast estimate. ** p ≤ .01 
 
We hypothesized that adolescents would show immature divergent thinking performance 
related to immature PFC activation patterns. To test these hypotheses we performed ROI analyses 
on the contrast estimates of the left IFG/MFG cluster, which were derived from the regression 
analyses described above. First, we examined whether age group differences were present using a 
2 (condition) x 2 (age groups) mixed ANOVA on contrast estimates for AU and OC conditions 
relative to baseline (AU- baseline; OC- baseline). Results revealed a significant age group x 
condition interaction effect (F(1,41) = 7.21, p = .01, η2 = .15; see Figure 4-4c). Adults showed 
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larger condition effects than adolescents, which is in line with our hypothesis that adolescents do 
not yet recruit left lateral PFC for creative thinking at a similar level as adults.  
Second, we applied a 2 (conditions) x 2 (age groups) mixed ANOVA with AU-scores 
entered as covariate, given that age groups differed in performance. Results revealed a significant 
interaction effect for condition x AU-score (F( 1,41) = 15.56, p < .001, η2 = .28) but no significant 
age group effect (p = .15). These results indicate that divergent thinking performance predicts left 
IFG/MFG activation for creative idea generation across both age groups, and adolescents do not 
recruit these relevant brain regions at an adult level yet.   
  
Chapter 4     The neural coding of creative idea generation 
 
Table 4-7. Neural activations for the regression AU > OC with AU-scores 
Brain regions L/R K 
Z-value MNI coordinates 
peak voxel x y z 
Supplementary Motor Area (bilateral), Superior  L/R 93 4.44 9 15 48 
   Medial Gyrus (L) 
  
3.48 -3 18 45 
   
3.43 -9 27 36 
Cerebellum (Lobule VI Hem, vermis) R 190 4.24 15 -75 -24 
   
4.13 30 -63 -27 
   
3.54 6 -66 -24 
Middle Frontal Gyrus R 51 4.00 30 9 51 
   
3.81 27 -3 45 
Middle Frontal Gyrus R 48 3.96 42 42 21 
Precentral Gyrus, Superior Frontal Gyrus (Area 6) L 30 3.90 -33 -9 66 
   
3.54 -27 -3 69 
   
3.38 -3 -27 21 
Precentral gyrus L 63 3.85 -36 0 33 
   
3.82 -45 0 39 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus (p. Triangularis), Middle  L 45 3.76 -45 39 12 
   Frontal Gyrus 
  
3.69 -36 48 15 
   
3.31 -33 51 24 
Cerebellum (Lobule VI, Hem) L 23 3.75 -9 -78 -21 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus (p. Orbitalis) R 43 3.76 42 27 -9 
Inferior Parietal Lobule (hIP1) L 22 3.51 -39 -45 33 
   
3.13 -42 -51 42 
Supplementary Motor Area (Area 6) L 10 3.26 0 0 57 
Note. Abbreviations: MNI = Montreal Neurological Institute; L = Left hemisphere; R = Right hemisphere 
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Gender differences 
To test for possible gender differences (see Abraham et al., 2012) we applied explorative 
whole-brain analyses. No significant effects were observed (significance threshold: p < .05, FDR 
corrected, > 10 contiguous voxels). Additional mixed ANOVA’s on contrast estimates for the AU 
and OC conditions relative to baseline for the four functional ROIs (lMTG, lSMG, lAG, L 
IFG/MFG) showed no effects for lAG and lIFG/MFG. For lMTG and lSMG, significant 
interaction effects were observed for gender x condition (AU > OC) with larger discrepancies for 
males relative to females (SMG: F(1,41) = 4.88, p = .03, η2 = .10; MTG: F(1,41) = 6.59, p = .01, 
η2 = .14). 
Discussion 
The aim of the study was to better understand distinctive neural activation patterns 
supporting creative idea generation in adolescents and adults. For this purpose, we applied an 
adapted version of the AUT (Guilford, 1967, 1950; Fink et al., 2009, 2010) while scanning with 
fMRI. Significant correlations with tests performed outside the scanner (AUT-brick task and 
verbal fluency test) validated the two conditions used to extract processes underlying creative idea 
generation (alternative uses and ordinary characteristics). On the behavioral level, adults 
outperformed adolescents on generating AU as well as naming ordinary characteristics. The fMRI 
data yielded three important findings: 1) consistent with prior studies, we found increased 
activation of left supramarginal gyrus (SMG) and angular gyrus (AG), as well as left middle 
temporal gyrus (MTG) and medial frontal cortex for creative idea generation relative to naming 
ordinary characteristics; 2) trials during which participants generated multiple solutions (AU2+ > 
OC2+ and AU2+ > AU0/1), a hallmark of divergent thinking, revealed additional left IFG/MFG 
activation; 3) individual differences analyses showed that performance on the AU trials predicted 
left IFG/MFG activations related to creative idea generation, and adults recruited this brain region 
more than adolescents. The discussion is organized along the lines of these three main findings. 
Neural Correlates of Creative Idea Generation 
Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Fink et al., 2009, 2010; Bechtereva et al., 2004; 
Starchenko et al., 2003), generating alternative uses relative to naming ordinary characteristics 
resulted in increased activity in mainly left hemisphere regions, including AG, SMG and MTG. 
These temporo-parietal regions are argued to be critically involved in verbal creative thinking 
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(Bechtevera et al., 2004; Fink et al., 2009).  One possible role of these brain regions in the current 
task concerns semantic processing: activation of an object’s semantic information is likely a 
precursor for generating possible uses of that object. Several prior studies have demonstrated that 
the AG, SMG (posterior) and MTG are involved during semantic tasks (e.g., Jung-Beeman 2005; 
Binder, Desai, Graves, & Conant, 2009; Vigneau et al., 2006). Moreover, MTG and SMG have 
been specifically related to tool use and action knowledge, including semantic information of tools 
and imaginative tool use (Beauchamp, Lee, Haxby & Martin, 2002, Johnson-Frey, 2004; Lewis, 
2006). It is likely that processing these types of information on tool use is especially profitable 
when thinking about alternative uses of objects. Furthermore, activation of the SMG and AG may 
contribute to the flexible character of creative thinking: prior neuroimaging and clinical studies 
indicate the importance of these temporo-parietal regions in the flexible switching between tasks 
(e.g., Sohn et al. 2000; see also Starchenko et al., 2003; Bechtereva et al., 2004) and between 
attention foci (e.g., Humphreys et al., 1994).  
Besides the anticipated temporo-parietal regions, creative idea generation was associated 
with activation in e.g., a large cluster within the medial PFC, including (anterior) cingulate cortex 
(ACC). One possible interpretation for these results is that creative idea generation involves 
monitoring of information retrieval. The ACC is commonly associated with error or conflict 
monitoring processes (e.g., Botvinick, Cohen & Carter, 2004). This interpretation would be in 
congruence with the idea that flexible processing requires an evaluation mechanism (‘idea 
monitor’) to judge the appropriateness of generated responses (Nijstad et al., 2010; Dietrich, 2004; 
Iyer et al.,2009). 
Some regions that were more active when thinking about alternative uses than ordinary 
characteristics, such as the AG and the medial PFC, are part of the default mode network (Raichle, 
2001). These areas have previously been associated with free thinking, mentalizing and mind 
wandering (e.g., Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008; Christoff, 2010; Gruberger, Ben-
Simon, Levkovitz, Zangen, & Hendler, 2011; Mason et al., 2007). It is reasonable to assume that 
these processes are also involved when thinking ‘out of the box’. Indeed, mind wandering has 
been thought of as micro incubation (Sawyer, 2011), a process during which one refrains from 
conscious thought and after which a creative insight ‘suddenly’ appears in the conscious mind (see 
e.g. Dijksterhuis & Meurs, 2006). An interesting question for future research is to examine 
activations of resting state networks in combination with divergent thinking tasks to better 
80 81
Chapter 4    The neural coding of creative idea generation 
Gender differences 
To test for possible gender differences (see Abraham et al., 2012) we applied explorative 
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(Bechtevera et al., 2004; Fink et al., 2009).  One possible role of these brain regions in the current 
task concerns semantic processing: activation of an object’s semantic information is likely a 
precursor for generating possible uses of that object. Several prior studies have demonstrated that 
the AG, SMG (posterior) and MTG are involved during semantic tasks (e.g., Jung-Beeman 2005; 
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been specifically related to tool use and action knowledge, including semantic information of tools 
and imaginative tool use (Beauchamp, Lee, Haxby & Martin, 2002, Johnson-Frey, 2004; Lewis, 
2006). It is likely that processing these types of information on tool use is especially profitable 
when thinking about alternative uses of objects. Furthermore, activation of the SMG and AG may 
contribute to the flexible character of creative thinking: prior neuroimaging and clinical studies 
indicate the importance of these temporo-parietal regions in the flexible switching between tasks 
(e.g., Sohn et al. 2000; see also Starchenko et al., 2003; Bechtereva et al., 2004) and between 
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Besides the anticipated temporo-parietal regions, creative idea generation was associated 
with activation in e.g., a large cluster within the medial PFC, including (anterior) cingulate cortex 
(ACC). One possible interpretation for these results is that creative idea generation involves 
monitoring of information retrieval. The ACC is commonly associated with error or conflict 
monitoring processes (e.g., Botvinick, Cohen & Carter, 2004). This interpretation would be in 
congruence with the idea that flexible processing requires an evaluation mechanism (‘idea 
monitor’) to judge the appropriateness of generated responses (Nijstad et al., 2010; Dietrich, 2004; 
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2001). These areas have previously been associated with free thinking, mentalizing and mind 
wandering (e.g., Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008; Christoff, 2010; Gruberger, Ben-
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these processes are also involved when thinking ‘out of the box’. Indeed, mind wandering has 
been thought of as micro incubation (Sawyer, 2011), a process during which one refrains from 
conscious thought and after which a creative insight ‘suddenly’ appears in the conscious mind (see 
e.g. Dijksterhuis & Meurs, 2006). An interesting question for future research is to examine 
activations of resting state networks in combination with divergent thinking tasks to better 
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understand the role of these networks in divergent thinking (see also Takeuchi et al., 2011a, 
2011b).  
Performance Related Activation of lateral PFC 
The results in this study showed that generating multiple creative ideas (within subjects) 
and better creative performance (between subjects) were both related to increased activity in left 
lateral PFC. This brain region is generally associated with cognitive control functioning and has 
been shown to be involved in switching between semantic (sub)categories (Hirshorn and 
Thompson-Schill, 2006). These findings are in line with the conceptions that creative thinking 
involves cognitive flexibility and working memory (e.g., De Dreu et al, 2012; Vartanian, 2009; 
Zabelina & Robbinson, 2010), as it refers to the generation of original and useful ideas by 
combining already stored information (Dietrich, 2004). Furthermore, the brain-behavior 
correlations support the hypothesis that PFC activity is predictive of divergent thinking 
performance, whereas temporo-parietal activations are related to creative thinking in general. 
Therewith, our results complement previous studies showing activation levels for PFC brain 
regions discriminative concerning divergent thinking (e.g., Carlsson et al., 2000; Chavez et al., 
2004; Chavez-Eakle et al., 2007; Gibson et al., 2009). Creating alternative uses relative to 
ordinary characteristics of objects revealed activations in left lateral PFC, whereas better, relative 
to poorer, performance on the AU trials was associated with larger lateral PFC activations in both 
hemispheres. These findings indicate that divergent thinking in general is dominated by left 
hemisphere activation, but creativity performance is related to the level of recruitment of both 
hemispheres. It should be noted that performance-related activation was also found in other areas 
for which we did not have a priori hypotheses. Future studies should examine the robustness of the 
role of PFC in divergent thinking and the possible role of other areas and their connections with 
PFC.  
Developmental Differences 
One additional question that was addressed in this study was whether there would be a 
difference in neural recruitment during divergent thinking in adolescents compared to adults. This 
hypothesis was based on the assumption that there is continued development of brain regions 
implicated in divergent thinking, especially of the lateral PFC (Luna et al., 2010; Giedd and 
Rapoport, 2010; Shaw et al., 2008), although the specifics are currently debated, with some 
studies reporting more activation in adolescents compared to adults, and others reporting less 
Chapter 4     The neural coding of creative idea generation 
 
activation in lateral PFC in adolescents compared to adults (see Crone & Dahl, 2012 for an 
overview). Behaviorally, our results indicate that adolescents are still developing creative abilities, 
showing immature fluency measures, but not originality or flexibility measures. Notably, these 
results deviate from a prior study, showing immature originality, but not fluency performance 
(Kleibeuker et al., 2013). A possible explanation for this difference is that the adolescent age 
groups slightly differed in mean age, with older participants in the current study. Another possible 
explanation concerns a shift in the balance of quality (originality) and quantity (fluency) of 
answers whereby participants in the current study focused more on quality rather than quantity of 
answers, as a result of the emphasis on alternative object uses in the scanner task.  
The current neuroimaging findings revealed no age differences at the whole brain level. 
However, region-of-interest analyses revealed that the left lateral PFC, which was related to 
individual differences in divergent thinking performance, was more activated in adults than in 
adolescents. One possible interpretation is that adolescents were not yet able to recruit these task-
relevant brain regions to a mature level for the task at hand. Indeed, creativity promoting complex 
abilities of controlling thought processes and flexibly changing perspectives are thought to 
develop throughout adolescence (Wu & Chiou, 2008). Specifically, prior studies have suggested 
that attentional inhibition and cognitive flexibility are still developing in adolescence (Huizinga, 
Dolan, & van der Molen, 2006). However, it should be noted that this PFC region was extracted 
from an individual differences contrast and age-effects disappeared when performance was 
entered as a covariate. Moreover, there were no general age effects for the main contrast AU>OC. 
A possible interpretation is that higher fluency/divergent thinking performance is associated with 
higher IFG/MFG activation, and that adults may achieve higher performance by stronger 
recruitment of this region. How exactly inhibition and cognitive flexibility, and their 
developmental trajectories, relate to creative cognition, remains an important question for future 
studies. To our knowledge, this is the first study comparing adults’ and adolescents’ brain activity 
during creative divergent thinking, and future studies will provide more insight into these 
compelling questions.  
Gender Differences 
Although males and females did not differ in task performance for the two scanner task 
conditions (AU and OC) separately, there was a small gender difference in relative performance 
for these two conditions with females showing larger discrepancies between retrieval success and 
creative thinking. These results might be the consequence of slight differences in creative thinking 
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understand the role of these networks in divergent thinking (see also Takeuchi et al., 2011a, 
2011b).  
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correlations support the hypothesis that PFC activity is predictive of divergent thinking 
performance, whereas temporo-parietal activations are related to creative thinking in general. 
Therewith, our results complement previous studies showing activation levels for PFC brain 
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2004; Chavez-Eakle et al., 2007; Gibson et al., 2009). Creating alternative uses relative to 
ordinary characteristics of objects revealed activations in left lateral PFC, whereas better, relative 
to poorer, performance on the AU trials was associated with larger lateral PFC activations in both 
hemispheres. These findings indicate that divergent thinking in general is dominated by left 
hemisphere activation, but creativity performance is related to the level of recruitment of both 
hemispheres. It should be noted that performance-related activation was also found in other areas 
for which we did not have a priori hypotheses. Future studies should examine the robustness of the 
role of PFC in divergent thinking and the possible role of other areas and their connections with 
PFC.  
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One additional question that was addressed in this study was whether there would be a 
difference in neural recruitment during divergent thinking in adolescents compared to adults. This 
hypothesis was based on the assumption that there is continued development of brain regions 
implicated in divergent thinking, especially of the lateral PFC (Luna et al., 2010; Giedd and 
Rapoport, 2010; Shaw et al., 2008), although the specifics are currently debated, with some 
studies reporting more activation in adolescents compared to adults, and others reporting less 
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activation in lateral PFC in adolescents compared to adults (see Crone & Dahl, 2012 for an 
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results deviate from a prior study, showing immature originality, but not fluency performance 
(Kleibeuker et al., 2013). A possible explanation for this difference is that the adolescent age 
groups slightly differed in mean age, with older participants in the current study. Another possible 
explanation concerns a shift in the balance of quality (originality) and quantity (fluency) of 
answers whereby participants in the current study focused more on quality rather than quantity of 
answers, as a result of the emphasis on alternative object uses in the scanner task.  
The current neuroimaging findings revealed no age differences at the whole brain level. 
However, region-of-interest analyses revealed that the left lateral PFC, which was related to 
individual differences in divergent thinking performance, was more activated in adults than in 
adolescents. One possible interpretation is that adolescents were not yet able to recruit these task-
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A possible interpretation is that higher fluency/divergent thinking performance is associated with 
higher IFG/MFG activation, and that adults may achieve higher performance by stronger 
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Gender Differences 
Although males and females did not differ in task performance for the two scanner task 
conditions (AU and OC) separately, there was a small gender difference in relative performance 
for these two conditions with females showing larger discrepancies between retrieval success and 
creative thinking. These results might be the consequence of slight differences in creative thinking 
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strategies (McCarthy et al., 2012). Accordingly, behavioral effects were accompanied with larger 
creative thinking related activations of left MTG and SMG in males relative to females. These 
results are in line with previous findings in research on gender differences in creative thinking 
(Abraham, Thybusch, Piertz & Hermann, 2013). The lack of age related differences in these 
gender effects indicate that possible discrepancies in creative thinking strategies are already 
present in adolescence.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
Some limitations of the current study should be taken into account when drawing 
conclusions on the underlying processes of creative thinking. First of all, one should be cautious 
with generalizing the present results. The current study examined neural correlates of flexible, 
divergent thinking as one of the key drivers underlying creative performance and original ideation. 
However, the Dual Pathway to Creativity Model (Baas et al., 2008; De Dreu et al., 2008; Nijstad 
et al., 2010) highlighted another pathway, namely perseverance. Future research is needed to 
develop fMRI tasks that capture perseverance, so that the neural correlates of flexible processing 
as well as perseverance can be examined alone and in combination. Here we applied an adapted 
version of the AUT where creative thinking was operationalized by the processes underlying idea 
generation. These processes likely involve e.g., semantic processing and (verbal) working 
memory, inherent to the identity of the task. In the present fMRI design creative performance was 
operationalized as the number of generated alternative uses for common objects as indicated by 
the participant, implying an indirect measure of creative performance. Another limitation of this 
study, regarding the interpretability of developmental changes, is that the results were cross-
sectional and not longitudinal. The reliability of the observed age differences is therefore limited. 
Future studies are necessary to understand the development of processes that underlie creative 
idea generation. Moreover, for future research it would be interesting to focus on possible 
improvements and related changes in brain recruitment in adolescents, applying practice/training 
of idea generation. These results are expected to give better understanding of the possibilities and 
limitations of the adolescent brain regarding creative idea generation.  
Conclusion 
Taken together, the results of this study demonstrated that creative idea generation in 
general involves recruitment of mainly left lateralized parietal and temporal brain regions that are 
associated with semantic activation, imagination and tool use, including AG, SMG and MTG. 
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However, generating multiple creative ideas, a hallmark of divergent thinking, shows additional 
lateral PFC activation, which is not yet optimized in middle adolescence. 
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Training creative cognition: Adolescence as a flexible period for 
improving creativity 
This chapter is published as: Stevenson, C. E*., Kleibeuker, S. W*., De Dreu, C. K. W., & 
Crone, E. A. (2015). Training creative cognition: Adolescence as a flexible period for improving 
creativity. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8:827, 1-16. 
Abstract 
Creativity commonly refers to the ability to generate ideas, solutions, or insights that are 
novel yet feasible. The ability to generate creative ideas appears to develop and change from 
childhood to adulthood. Prior research, although inconsistent, generally indicates that adults 
perform better than adolescents on the alternative uses task, a commonly used index of creative 
ideation. The focus of this study was whether developmental differences could be reduced by 
practicing alternative uses generation. We examined the effectiveness of creative ideation training 
in adolescents (13-16 yrs., N=71) and adults (23-30 yrs., N=61). Participants followed one of three 
types of training, each comprising 8 twenty-minute practice sessions within two weeks time: 1) 
alternative uses generation (experimental condition: creative ideation); 2) object characteristic 
generation (control condition: general ideation); 3) rule-switching (control condition: rule-
switching). Progression in fluency, flexibility, originality of creative ideation was compared 
between age-groups and training conditions. Participants improved in creative ideation and 
cognitive flexibility, but not in general ideation. Participants in all three training conditions 
became better in fluency and originality on the alternative uses task. With regard to originality, 
adolescents benefitted more from training than adults, although this was independent of training 
condition. These results are interpreted in relation to a) the different underlying processes targeted 
in the three conditions and b) developmental differences in brain plasticity with increased 
sensitivity to training in adolescents. In sum, the results show that improvement can be made in 
creative ideation and supports the hypothesis that adolescence is a developmental stage of 
increased flexibility optimized for learning and explorative behavior. 
* Both authors contributed equally to this work 
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Introduction 
Creativity is considered one of humans most complex as well as important behaviors. Its 
effects are evident and widespread, recognized in domains ranging from daily life problem solving 
to science and the arts. Creativity commonly refers to the ability to generate ideas, solutions, or 
insights that are novel yet feasible (e.g., Mumford, 2003). Within the creative cognition 
framework (e.g., Ward, Smith, & Finke, 1999), creative capacity is considered inherent to 
normative human cognitive functioning, rather than an innate talent available to only a select few. 
The ability to create and use new mental categories to organize our experiences, and the ability to 
mentally manipulate objects are some examples of creativity that support the creative cognition 
approach (Ward et al., 1999). The creative cognition framework and more recent dual-processing 
models of creativity emphasize the dependence of creative thinking on fundamental cognitive 
processes such as working memory and executive control (Nijstad, De Dreu, Rietzschel, & Baas, 
2010; Sowden, Pringle, & Gabora, 2014). As such, individual differences in creativity can be 
understood in terms of variations in the efficiency of such cognitive processes (e.g., Ward et al., 
1999). Furthermore, the development and malleability of the underlying mental operations used in 
creative problem solving processes (e.g., Jolles, van Buchem, Crone, & Rombouts, 2011; Karbach 
& Schubert, 2013; Klingberg, 2010) imply that creativity develops with training and age. Indeed, 
numerous studies have demonstrated the effectiveness of interventions geared toward improving 
creativity – training in divergent thinking particularly influences performance gains in terms of 
originality, and to a lesser extent fluency and flexibility (e.g., Scott, Leritz, & Mumford, 2004). 
Moreover, studies show that practice with creative ideation is highly effective in both adults (Bott 
et al., 2014; Kienitz et al, 2014; Glover, 1980), and children (Cliatt, Shaw, & Sherwood, 1980; 
Torrance, 1972).  
In this study we examine the possibility that creative ideation develops from adolescence 
to adulthood, and can be trained with relatively simple interventions. Adolescence is a phase of 
development characterized by flexible adaption to a rapidly changing social landscape marked by 
changes from dependency to autonomy and individuality (Crone and Dahl, 2012). It forms a 
crucial phase for the development of cognitive abilities assumed to be related to creative cognition 
such as working memory and cognitive control (e.g., Bunge & Wright, 2007; Crone & Dahl, 2012; 
Diamond, Kirkham, & Amso, 2002; Huizinga & van der Molen, 2007). Yet, relatively little is 
known about whether and how malleable divergent thinking is in adolescence. Training in other 
higher cognitive skills such as working memory (Jolles, van Buchem, Rombouts, & Crone, 2012; 
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Klingberg, 2010), executive control (Karbach & Kray, 2009; Zinke, Einert, Pfennig, & Kliegel, 
2012), relational reasoning (Dumontheil, Houlton, Christoff, & Blakemore, 2010) and algebraic 
equation solving (Qin et al., 2004) emphasize the plasticity of the adolescent brain. In this study 
we test this hypothesis with regard to the development of creative ideation skills.  
Creative ideation can be tracked with the Alternative Uses Task (AUT, Guilford, 1967; 
Kim 2008), in which participants generate alternative uses for a common object (e.g., a brick; with 
alternative, original uses such as ‘making music’ or ‘Geisha pillow’). These ideas are typically 
coded for three core components of creative ideation: originality or uniqueness (less frequent is 
considered more original), flexibility (more semantic categories implies more flexible), and 
creative fluency (more ideas translates to greater fluency). Especially originality improves with 
age (e.g., Kleibeuker, De Dreu, & Crone, 2013; Lau & Cheung, 2010; Runco & Bahleda, 1986; 
Urban, 1991) – although performance slumps at different stages in adolescence may occur (Lau & 
Cheung, 2010). Studies comparing adolescents and adults on the AUT often reveal advantages for 
adults. For example, Kleibeuker et al. (2013) found that adults’ AUT solutions were more unique 
than those of 12-13 and 15-16 year olds.  
Results with regard to fluency and flexibility are more mixed. In some studies no 
differences were found between adolescents and adults (Kleibeuker, et al., 2013; Wu, Cheng, Ip, 
& McBride-Chang, 2005). In contrast, Kleibeuker, Koolschijn, Jolles, De Dreu, and Crone 
(2013b) found that late adolescents of 15-17 years had lower fluency and flexibility scores, but not 
originality scores, than adults on the alternative uses task. Furthermore, Jaquish and Ripple (1981) 
found that adolescents obtained higher fluency and flexibility scores, but not originality scores, 
compared to children. On the whole, in the verbal divergent thinking domain applied in this study, 
adolescents generally provide less original solutions and, especially in late adolescence, show less 
fluency and flexibility than adults. 
The present study aimed to extend investigations into the development of creative ideation 
by examining the progression of adults and adolescents within a simple training paradigm. The 
main question was whether creative ideation in adolescents is limited by maturational constraints 
or that exposure to divergent thinking training leads to progression in creative ideation thereby 
narrowing the gap in performance between adolescents and adults. To this end, participants were 
asked to practice generating alternative uses for everyday objects over a two week period. To 
examine the effects of training two active control groups employed (Jolles & Crone, 2012), both 
trained in cognitive processes that were associated with but not directly related to creative 
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ideation. One control group generated ordinary characteristics of everyday objects (adapted from 
Fink et al., 2009). This task has successfully served as a general ideation control task (Fink et al., 
2009, 2010; Kleibeuker, Koolschijn, Jolles, De Dreu, et al., 2013b). The second active control 
group practiced in rule-switching. Here, participants were asked to quickly and accurately apply 
and switch between two rule sets (Huizinga, Burack, & Van der Molen, 2010).  
Given findings from previous research, routine practice in creating original, appropriate 
uses for everyday objects was expected to improve creative performance over the course of a 
short, but intensive training period for both adolescents and adults. Participants who practiced 
generating alternative uses (creativity training condition) were expected to improve more on 
measures of creative fluency, flexibility and originality compared to the active controls. Adults 
were expected to initially provide more creative solutions to the alternative uses task than 
adolescents on originality, and perhaps fluency and flexibility (Kleibeuker, De Dreu, & Crone, 
2013; Kleibeuker, Koolschijn, Jolles, De Dreu, et al., 2013b); however, adolescents were expected 
to improve more over the course of training based on the hypothesis that adolescence is a period 
of enhanced sensitivity to training of high-level cognitive skills compared to adults (Jolles & 
Crone, 2012; Steinberg, 2005).  
Methods 
Participants 
The sample comprised 71 adolescents (Mage=14.9, SD=.7, Range=13.0-16.2 years, 67% 
females) and 61 adults (Mage=25.3, SD=2.4, Range=22.1-31.1 years, 50% females). Adolescents 
were recruited from local high schools (college preparation level) and adults were recruited from 
Leiden University and colleges in The Hague. All participants provided informed consent. In case 
of minors, consent was also obtained from primary caregivers. Participation was compensated 
with gift vouchers, money or course credits. All procedures were approved by the Internal Review 
Board of Leiden University Institute of Psychology.  
The data was gathered in two waves separated by 15 months. In both waves adolescents 
and adults were recruited and randomly assigned to one of the training conditions (creative 
ideation; general ideation; rule-switching). There were two drop-outs. During the pretest and 
posttest not all data was available for all participants on all tasks. In some cases this was due to 
technical errors and in other cases students were absent from a testing session. Because the data 
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was missing at random and not due to selection bias or systematic error, the validity of the 
statistical tests was not affected (Shafer and Graham, 2002). The number of subjects used in 
statistical analyses is reported separately per task and, as recommended, Maximum Likelihood 
estimation was used when appropriate.  
General cognitive ability 
Creativity is associated with verbal fluency (Gihooly et al., 2007), fluid reasoning 
(Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011) and working memory (De Dreu et al., 2012). Tasks that measure these 
constructs were administered at pretest in order to check for any differences between training 
conditions. The verbal fluency test (subtest of the Groningen Intelligence Test, GIT-2, Luteijn & 
Barelds, 2004) was used to measure general verbal ideation ability. Fluid reasoning was measured 
with the Raven Advanced Progressive Matrices (APM, Raven, Raven, & Court, 1998). Working 
memory was assessed using the mental counters task (Huizinga, Dolan, & van der Molen, 2006). 
Analyses of Variance were conducted with Age (adolescent, adult) and Training Condition 
(creative ideation, general ideation and rule-switching) as between-subjects factors to assess any 
differences in performance on these three tasks. See Tables 5-1 and 5-2 for descriptive statistics 
and F-test results respectively. No age group or training condition differences were found with 
regard to fluid reasoning. Adults outperformed adolescents on the measures of verbal fluency and 
working memory; however, there were no significant effects for training condition or age-group 
by training condition. 
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Table 5-1. Descriptive statistics of pretest and posttest measures per training condition and age group on control 
variables: fluid reasoning, verbal fluency and working memory 
 Creative Ideation training General ideation training Rule-Switch training 
 N M SD N M SD N M SD 
Verbal Fluency           
Adolescents 25 23.16 3.44 23 22.96 5.09 21 23.38 5.18 
Adults 21 27.24 5.07 19 26.84 8.30 19 24.79 6.72 
Raven APM           
Adolescents 23 9.26 2.01 21 9.38 3.14 20 8.45 3.58 
Adults 19 9.68 1.60 18 10.11 3.32 16 10.00 1.97 
Working Memory           
Adolescents          
accuracy 19 .88 .08 16 .86 .09 18 .84 .19 
reaction time* 19 574 98 16 594 122 18 534 89 
Adults          
accuracy 20 .90 .09 19 .91 .09 18 .92 .05 
reaction time* 20 487 115 19 555 152 18 502 106 
Note. *Reaction time is reported in milliseconds. 
 
Table 5-2. F-test results for comparisons of general cognitive ability measures of verbal fluency, fluid reasoning, and 
working memory per training condition and age group 
 F df p ηp2 
Verbal Fluency     
Age 9.54 1, 122 <.01 .07 
Condition 0.43 2, 122 .65 .01 
Age x Condition 0.70 2, 122 .50 .01 
Raven APM     
Age 3.17 1, 111 .08 .03 
Condition 0.34 2, 111 .71 .01 
Age x Condition 0.43 2, 111 .65 .01 
Working Memory     
Accuracy     
Age 5.95 1, 104 .02 .05 
Condition 0.05 2, 104 .95 .00 
Age x Condition 0.68 2, 104 .51 .01 
Reaction Time     
Age 5.55 1, 104 .02 .05 
Condition 2.34 2, 104 .10 .04 
Age x Condition 0.65 2, 104 .53 .01 
VF=verbal fluency, WM=working memory. Reaction time is reported in milliseconds. 
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Design and Procedure 
A pretest-training-posttest design with three training conditions (creative ideation, general 
ideation, rule-switching) and two age groups (adolescents, adults) was employed, yielding a 2 
(pre/post) x 2 (Age group) x 3 (training) factorial with the second and third factor between-
subjects.  
During the pretest session, all participants were administered two tasks measuring creative 
ideation, the AUT ‘Tin Can’ task and the Alternative Uses part of a combined Alternative Uses / 
Ordinary Characteristics task (AU/OC task). General ideation was assessed using the Ordinary 
Characteristics part of the AU / OC task. A rule-switching task was also administered. In addition, 
verbal fluency, working memory and fluid reasoning were assessed in order to ascertain whether 
the three training x two age groups did not differ on these control variables prior to training.  
In the two weeks following the pretest session, participants followed an online training 
during their free time at home or at school. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three 
different trainings: creative ideation, general ideation, or rule-switching. Participants were asked 
to train eight times with a minimum of one day and a maximum of two days between training 
sessions and received an email or text message when needed to prompt them to train on time.  
The posttest session comprised of the same tasks as the pretest and was administered one 
or two days following the last training session. 
Instruments 
Creative Ideation 
Alternative Uses Test: Pretest and Posttest 
A computerized four-minute version of the Alternative Uses Test (AUT; Guilford, 1950, 
1967) was administered to measure creative ideation. Participants were given the name of an 
object and asked to generate as many alternative uses for the object as possible within a four 
minute period (e.g., Friedman & Förster, 2001). At pretest the object was ‘Tin Can’ and at posttest 
the object was ‘Brick’. Participants were instructed to type in their solutions one at the time. After 
submitting the solution the text was no longer shown on the screen. From the generated ideas, we 
derived indices of fluency, flexibility, and originality after removing erroneous solutions (e.g., 
empty solutions, random strings such as ‘asdfjk;’ and nonsense solutions such as ‘blah’). 
Originality was rated on a 5-point scale (from 1=‘not original’ to 5=‘highly original’) by trained 
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Table 5-1. Descriptive statistics of pretest and posttest measures per training condition and age group on control 
variables: fluid reasoning, verbal fluency and working memory 
 Creative Ideation training General ideation training Rule-Switch training 
 N M SD N M SD N M SD 
Verbal Fluency           
Adolescents 25 23.16 3.44 23 22.96 5.09 21 23.38 5.18 
Adults 21 27.24 5.07 19 26.84 8.30 19 24.79 6.72 
Raven APM           
Adolescents 23 9.26 2.01 21 9.38 3.14 20 8.45 3.58 
Adults 19 9.68 1.60 18 10.11 3.32 16 10.00 1.97 
Working Memory           
Adolescents          
accuracy 19 .88 .08 16 .86 .09 18 .84 .19 
reaction time* 19 574 98 16 594 122 18 534 89 
Adults          
accuracy 20 .90 .09 19 .91 .09 18 .92 .05 
reaction time* 20 487 115 19 555 152 18 502 106 
Note. *Reaction time is reported in milliseconds. 
 
Table 5-2. F-test results for comparisons of general cognitive ability measures of verbal fluency, fluid reasoning, and 
working memory per training condition and age group 
 F df p ηp2 
Verbal Fluency     
Age 9.54 1, 122 <.01 .07 
Condition 0.43 2, 122 .65 .01 
Age x Condition 0.70 2, 122 .50 .01 
Raven APM     
Age 3.17 1, 111 .08 .03 
Condition 0.34 2, 111 .71 .01 
Age x Condition 0.43 2, 111 .65 .01 
Working Memory     
Accuracy     
Age 5.95 1, 104 .02 .05 
Condition 0.05 2, 104 .95 .00 
Age x Condition 0.68 2, 104 .51 .01 
Reaction Time     
Age 5.55 1, 104 .02 .05 
Condition 2.34 2, 104 .10 .04 
Age x Condition 0.65 2, 104 .53 .01 
VF=verbal fluency, WM=working memory. Reaction time is reported in milliseconds. 
  
Chapter 5    Training creative cognition in adolescents and adults 
 
Design and Procedure 
A pretest-training-posttest design with three training conditions (creative ideation, general 
ideation, rule-switching) and two age groups (adolescents, adults) was employed, yielding a 2 
(pre/post) x 2 (Age group) x 3 (training) factorial with the second and third factor between-
subjects.  
During the pretest session, all participants were administered two tasks measuring creative 
ideation, the AUT ‘Tin Can’ task and the Alternative Uses part of a combined Alternative Uses / 
Ordinary Characteristics task (AU/OC task). General ideation was assessed using the Ordinary 
Characteristics part of the AU / OC task. A rule-switching task was also administered. In addition, 
verbal fluency, working memory and fluid reasoning were assessed in order to ascertain whether 
the three training x two age groups did not differ on these control variables prior to training.  
In the two weeks following the pretest session, participants followed an online training 
during their free time at home or at school. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three 
different trainings: creative ideation, general ideation, or rule-switching. Participants were asked 
to train eight times with a minimum of one day and a maximum of two days between training 
sessions and received an email or text message when needed to prompt them to train on time.  
The posttest session comprised of the same tasks as the pretest and was administered one 
or two days following the last training session. 
Instruments 
Creative Ideation 
Alternative Uses Test: Pretest and Posttest 
A computerized four-minute version of the Alternative Uses Test (AUT; Guilford, 1950, 
1967) was administered to measure creative ideation. Participants were given the name of an 
object and asked to generate as many alternative uses for the object as possible within a four 
minute period (e.g., Friedman & Förster, 2001). At pretest the object was ‘Tin Can’ and at posttest 
the object was ‘Brick’. Participants were instructed to type in their solutions one at the time. After 
submitting the solution the text was no longer shown on the screen. From the generated ideas, we 
derived indices of fluency, flexibility, and originality after removing erroneous solutions (e.g., 
empty solutions, random strings such as ‘asdfjk;’ and nonsense solutions such as ‘blah’). 
Originality was rated on a 5-point scale (from 1=‘not original’ to 5=‘highly original’) by trained 
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raters according to a pre-specified scheme (De Dreu et al., 2008; Rietzschel et al., 2006). The 
interrater reliability of the originality scores of this task were ICC=0.91. Fluency scores were the 
sum of correct solutions provided. Flexibility was measured by the number of solution-categories 
per participant after trained raters assigned each solution to a set of predefined solution-categories 
(e.g., building aspect; load; toy; De Dreu, Baas, & Nijstad, 2008; Rietzschel, Nijstad, & Stroebe, 
2006). Unicity provides an indication of how unique a particular solution was and was scored as 
the number of persons who provided the same solution, where higher scores indicate less unique 
solutions. 
Combined Alternative Uses / Ordinary Characteristics Task: Pretest and Posttest 
In the combined Alternative Uses (AU) and Ordinary Characteristics (OC) task the 
participant was presented with an object and requested to list object properties according to the 
rules of the task. During AU trials participants were asked to name as many novel uses of a 
common object as possible (e.g., ‘umbrella’, example answer: ‘baseball bat’). During OC trials as 
many typical characteristics of a common object (e.g., ‘shoe’, example answer: ‘fits on a foot’) 
were requested. The AU trials measures creative ideation similar to the traditional Alterative Uses 
Test (AUT, Guildford, 1950, 1967), but now for multiple objects within a shorter time period. The 
OC part of the task is described  in the section ‘General ideation’. 
For each trial the participant was shown an instruction screen (3s) identifying the trial type 
(‘alternative uses’ or ‘ordinary characteristics’). In the next screen the target object name appeared 
in the middle of the screen with the instruction ‘alternative uses’ or ‘ordinary characteristics’ 
reiterated at the top of the screen (see Figure 5-1). The participant was given 20 seconds to list 
solutions out loud. The solutions were recorded and later transcribed. Per session 30 items (15 AU 
and 15 OC) were in random order, divided across two blocks (7 min each) separated by a short 
break. There were 60 items in total; the allocation to session (pretest, posttest) and type (AU, OC) 
were counterbalanced over participants and training conditions. 
The AU responses were coded for creative fluency (average number of unique solutions 
across trials), and originality (the average rating across AU trials per stimulus). Two independent 
trained raters assessed originality on this measure with interrater reliability ICC=0.73. 
Alternative Uses:  Training 
Participants in the AU training condition trials were administered 10 AU items during each 
of the eight training sessions. The items lasted 2 minutes each. A short break was provided 
halfway through the training. Each session began with a brief: ‘Generate as many alternative uses 
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for each presented object.’ This was followed by one screen per item with the instruction briefly 
reiterated at the top of the screen. The participant typed the solutions into a text box and each 
submitted solution was posted below on the same screen. After two minutes the next item was 
shown. A total of 80 stimuli were presented in random order across trials over training sessions. 
The total duration of training was approximately 20 minutes. 
The AU training sessions were coded for originality (the average rating across trials per 
stimulus) and creative fluency (average number of unique solutions across trials within one 
session). Flexibility (the number of categories used from a set of predefined solution-categories) 
was also measured for the first trial per training session.  
General ideation  
Combined Alternative Uses / Ordinary Characteristics Task: Pretest and Posttest 
General ideation is the second skill assessed in the combined Alternative Uses (AU) and 
Ordinary Characteristics (OC) task. The OC task was based on Fink et al. (2009) and served as a 
general control for the creative ideation training, appealing to memory retrieval processes. For 
each OC trial the participant was shown an instruction screen (3s) identifying the trial type 
(‘ordinary characteristics’). In the next screen the target object name appeared in the middle of the 
screen with the instruction ‘ordinary characteristics’ reiterated at the top of the screen (see Figure 
5-1). The participant was given 20 seconds to list solutions out loud. The solutions were recorded 
and later transcribed. Per session 15 OC trials (and 15 AU trials) were presented in random order. 
There were 30 OC items in total across pretest and posttest; the allocation to session (pretest, 
posttest) and type (AU, OC) was counterbalanced over participants and training conditions. 
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raters according to a pre-specified scheme (De Dreu et al., 2008; Rietzschel et al., 2006). The 
interrater reliability of the originality scores of this task were ICC=0.91. Fluency scores were the 
sum of correct solutions provided. Flexibility was measured by the number of solution-categories 
per participant after trained raters assigned each solution to a set of predefined solution-categories 
(e.g., building aspect; load; toy; De Dreu, Baas, & Nijstad, 2008; Rietzschel, Nijstad, & Stroebe, 
2006). Unicity provides an indication of how unique a particular solution was and was scored as 
the number of persons who provided the same solution, where higher scores indicate less unique 
solutions. 
Combined Alternative Uses / Ordinary Characteristics Task: Pretest and Posttest 
In the combined Alternative Uses (AU) and Ordinary Characteristics (OC) task the 
participant was presented with an object and requested to list object properties according to the 
rules of the task. During AU trials participants were asked to name as many novel uses of a 
common object as possible (e.g., ‘umbrella’, example answer: ‘baseball bat’). During OC trials as 
many typical characteristics of a common object (e.g., ‘shoe’, example answer: ‘fits on a foot’) 
were requested. The AU trials measures creative ideation similar to the traditional Alterative Uses 
Test (AUT, Guildford, 1950, 1967), but now for multiple objects within a shorter time period. The 
OC part of the task is described  in the section ‘General ideation’. 
For each trial the participant was shown an instruction screen (3s) identifying the trial type 
(‘alternative uses’ or ‘ordinary characteristics’). In the next screen the target object name appeared 
in the middle of the screen with the instruction ‘alternative uses’ or ‘ordinary characteristics’ 
reiterated at the top of the screen (see Figure 5-1). The participant was given 20 seconds to list 
solutions out loud. The solutions were recorded and later transcribed. Per session 30 items (15 AU 
and 15 OC) were in random order, divided across two blocks (7 min each) separated by a short 
break. There were 60 items in total; the allocation to session (pretest, posttest) and type (AU, OC) 
were counterbalanced over participants and training conditions. 
The AU responses were coded for creative fluency (average number of unique solutions 
across trials), and originality (the average rating across AU trials per stimulus). Two independent 
trained raters assessed originality on this measure with interrater reliability ICC=0.73. 
Alternative Uses:  Training 
Participants in the AU training condition trials were administered 10 AU items during each 
of the eight training sessions. The items lasted 2 minutes each. A short break was provided 
halfway through the training. Each session began with a brief: ‘Generate as many alternative uses 
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for each presented object.’ This was followed by one screen per item with the instruction briefly 
reiterated at the top of the screen. The participant typed the solutions into a text box and each 
submitted solution was posted below on the same screen. After two minutes the next item was 
shown. A total of 80 stimuli were presented in random order across trials over training sessions. 
The total duration of training was approximately 20 minutes. 
The AU training sessions were coded for originality (the average rating across trials per 
stimulus) and creative fluency (average number of unique solutions across trials within one 
session). Flexibility (the number of categories used from a set of predefined solution-categories) 
was also measured for the first trial per training session.  
General ideation  
Combined Alternative Uses / Ordinary Characteristics Task: Pretest and Posttest 
General ideation is the second skill assessed in the combined Alternative Uses (AU) and 
Ordinary Characteristics (OC) task. The OC task was based on Fink et al. (2009) and served as a 
general control for the creative ideation training, appealing to memory retrieval processes. For 
each OC trial the participant was shown an instruction screen (3s) identifying the trial type 
(‘ordinary characteristics’). In the next screen the target object name appeared in the middle of the 
screen with the instruction ‘ordinary characteristics’ reiterated at the top of the screen (see Figure 
5-1). The participant was given 20 seconds to list solutions out loud. The solutions were recorded 
and later transcribed. Per session 15 OC trials (and 15 AU trials) were presented in random order. 
There were 30 OC items in total across pretest and posttest; the allocation to session (pretest, 
posttest) and type (AU, OC) was counterbalanced over participants and training conditions. 
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Figure 5-1. Alternative Uses / Ordinary Characteristics task: (A) example Alternative Uses item and (B) example 
Ordinary Characteristics item. Participants were asked to list as many alternative uses for or ordinary characteristics of 
an everyday object as possible. 
 
Ordinary Characteristics: Training 
Participants in the general ideation condition were asked to solve 10 OC items lasting 2 
minutes each, with a short break halfway, during each of the eight training sessions. Each session 
began with a brief instruction ‘List as many ordinary characteristics as possible for the object on 
the screen’. This was followed by one screen per item with the instruction briefly reiterated at the 
top of the screen. The participant typed solutions into a text box and each submitted solution was 
posted below on the same screen. After two minutes the next item was shown. A total of 80 
stimuli were presented in random order across trials over sessions. The total duration of the 
general ideation training was approximately 20 minutes. The OC responses were coded for 
fluency, i.e. the average number of correct solutions across all OC trials within the session. 
Rule-switching 
Rule-switching was measured and trained with the global/local rule switch task (Huizinga 
et al., 2010). Participants were shown a rule comprising of two objects: (1) a large square and a 
rectangle (global rule) or (2) a small square and a small rectangle (local rule). Next the stimulus, a 
large square or rectangle composed of smaller squares or rectangles (2 x 2 possible stimuli), was 
presented in between the two rule objects. During this time the participant was asked to indicate 
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which rule the stimulus belonged to. The decision rule was based on the size of the square and 
rectangle on either side of the target. If the side figures were large the ‘global’ rule was to be 
applied – i.e., indicate the stimulus as a whole was a large square or rectangle. If the side figures 
were small then the ‘local’ rule was required – i.e., indicate whether the stimulus was composed of 
small squares or rectangles. See Figure 5-2 for an example. During the first and second blocks of 
this task decisions were based on only one rule (‘global’ or ‘local’). During the remaining blocks 
the two rules were mixed and the participant had to switch between the rules. The switching costs 
for accuracy and reaction time computed using the ration between rule repeat trials and trials 
directly following a rule switch. 
 
Figure 5-2. Rule-switching task example items: (A) global rule and (B) local rule. The participant was cued to apply 
the global rule to the figure in the middle when the two side figures were large. The local rule was applied if the side 
figures were small. Switch blocks involved implying both rules in random order. In both figures the correct solution is 
on the left-hand side, thus the participant would press the left button. 
 
Rule-switching: Pretest and Posttest 
Four blocks of 50 trials were administered. The task lasted approximately 10 minutes. 
Rule-switching: Training 
Four blocks of 80 trials each were administered. The total duration of a RS training session 
was approximately 20 minutes, including a short break between blocks two and three. 
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Figure 5-1. Alternative Uses / Ordinary Characteristics task: (A) example Alternative Uses item and (B) example 
Ordinary Characteristics item. Participants were asked to list as many alternative uses for or ordinary characteristics of 
an everyday object as possible. 
 
Ordinary Characteristics: Training 
Participants in the general ideation condition were asked to solve 10 OC items lasting 2 
minutes each, with a short break halfway, during each of the eight training sessions. Each session 
began with a brief instruction ‘List as many ordinary characteristics as possible for the object on 
the screen’. This was followed by one screen per item with the instruction briefly reiterated at the 
top of the screen. The participant typed solutions into a text box and each submitted solution was 
posted below on the same screen. After two minutes the next item was shown. A total of 80 
stimuli were presented in random order across trials over sessions. The total duration of the 
general ideation training was approximately 20 minutes. The OC responses were coded for 
fluency, i.e. the average number of correct solutions across all OC trials within the session. 
Rule-switching 
Rule-switching was measured and trained with the global/local rule switch task (Huizinga 
et al., 2010). Participants were shown a rule comprising of two objects: (1) a large square and a 
rectangle (global rule) or (2) a small square and a small rectangle (local rule). Next the stimulus, a 
large square or rectangle composed of smaller squares or rectangles (2 x 2 possible stimuli), was 
presented in between the two rule objects. During this time the participant was asked to indicate 
Chapter 5    Training creative cognition in adolescents and adults 
 
which rule the stimulus belonged to. The decision rule was based on the size of the square and 
rectangle on either side of the target. If the side figures were large the ‘global’ rule was to be 
applied – i.e., indicate the stimulus as a whole was a large square or rectangle. If the side figures 
were small then the ‘local’ rule was required – i.e., indicate whether the stimulus was composed of 
small squares or rectangles. See Figure 5-2 for an example. During the first and second blocks of 
this task decisions were based on only one rule (‘global’ or ‘local’). During the remaining blocks 
the two rules were mixed and the participant had to switch between the rules. The switching costs 
for accuracy and reaction time computed using the ration between rule repeat trials and trials 
directly following a rule switch. 
 
Figure 5-2. Rule-switching task example items: (A) global rule and (B) local rule. The participant was cued to apply 
the global rule to the figure in the middle when the two side figures were large. The local rule was applied if the side 
figures were small. Switch blocks involved implying both rules in random order. In both figures the correct solution is 
on the left-hand side, thus the participant would press the left button. 
 
Rule-switching: Pretest and Posttest 
Four blocks of 50 trials were administered. The task lasted approximately 10 minutes. 
Rule-switching: Training 
Four blocks of 80 trials each were administered. The total duration of a RS training session 
was approximately 20 minutes, including a short break between blocks two and three. 
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Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for all pretest and posttest measures per age group (adolescent, adult) 
and training condition (creative ideation, general ideation and rule-switching) are shown in Table 
5-3. Correlations between each of the pretest and posttest measures are shown in Table 5-4. 
 
Table 5-3. Descriptive statistics of pretest and posttest measures per training condition and age group on the combined 
Alternative Uses/Ordinary Characteristics task (AUOC task), the Alternative Uses test and the Rule-Switching task. 
Both versions of the alternative uses task measure creative ideation. The ordinary characteristics task measures 
general ideation. 
 Creative Ideation training General ideation training Rule-Switch training 
 N M SD N M SD N M SD 
 Pretest 
Combined AUOC pretest          
Adolescents          
AU originality 23 2.08 0.36 22 2.19 0.41 22 1.99 0.40 
AU fluency 23 2.46 0.81 22 2.25 0.73 22 2.76 1.13 
OC fluency 23 3.53 1.30 22 3.69 0.85 22 3.75 1.26 
Adults          
AU Originality 21 2.37 0.41 19 2.25 0.28 17 2.49 0.39 
AU fluency 21 2.65 0.87 19 2.83 0.99 17 2.27 0.71 
OC fluency 21 4.16 1.24 19 4.63 1.49 17 4.43 0.89 
Alternative Uses pretest          
Adolescents          
fluency 25 11.92 5.53 23 12.83 6.55 23 12.70 6.72 
flexibility 25 6.16 2.17 23 5.91 2.17 23 6.17 2.76 
originality 25 1.68 0.35 23 1.64 0.27 23 1.69 0.34 
Adults          
fluency 22 11.41 3.45 20 11.65 5.71 19 12.74 5.51 
flexibility 22 6.91 1.82 20 5.70 3.08 19 6.95 2.12 
originality 22 1.73 0.37 20 1.75 0.33 19 1.67 0.29 
Rule-Switching pretest          
Adolescents          
accuracy 17 .00 .09 14 .03 .06 14 .02 .04 
reaction time* 17 104 115 14 81 76 14 70 35 
Adults          
accuracy 21 .00 .04 19 .00 .08 18 .00 .05 
reaction time* 21 55 54 19 79 52 18 100 88 
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 Posttest 
AUOC posttest          
Adolescents          
AU originality 25 2.46 0.18 19 2.50 0.27 18 2.47 0.24 
AU fluency 25 2.99 1.35 19 2.55 0.85 18 3.15 1.12 
OC fluency 25 3.69 0.96 19 4.20 1.02 18 4.23 1.30 
Adults          
AU Originality 21 2.61 0.22 20 2.58 0.19 17 2.62 0.23 
AU fluency 21 3.07 0.93 20 2.80 0.79 17 2.49 1.28 
OC fluency 21 3.96 0.98 20 4.76 1.09 17 3.99 1.10 
Alternative Uses posttest          
Adolescents          
fluency 23 14.35 7.99 19 11.32 7.37 20 17.25 7.15 
flexibility 23 8.48 2.11 19 7.53 2.46 20 9.85 2.80 
originality 23 1.66 0.34 19 1.79 .49 20 1.75 0.44 
Adults          
fluency 18 13.39 4.47 15 12.20 4.16 16 10.81 5.74 
flexibility 18 9.44 2.18 15 8.33 2.16 16 7.38 2.96 
originality 18 1.70 0.30 15 1.60 0.24 16 1.67 0.32 
Rule-Switching posttest          
Adolescents          
accuracy 18 -.03 .04 15 -.01 .04 16 -.02 .06 
reaction time* 18 89 68 15 45 80 16 30 28 
Adults          
accuracy 20 .00 .04 18 .00 .03 20 .02 .07 
reaction time* 20 26 34 18 53 38 20 30 30 
 
Note. AU=alternative uses, OC=ordinary characteristics, RS=rule-switching; The rule-switching task reports switch costs. 
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AU fluency 21 2.65 0.87 19 2.83 0.99 17 2.27 0.71 
OC fluency 21 4.16 1.24 19 4.63 1.49 17 4.43 0.89 
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Adolescents          
fluency 25 11.92 5.53 23 12.83 6.55 23 12.70 6.72 
flexibility 25 6.16 2.17 23 5.91 2.17 23 6.17 2.76 
originality 25 1.68 0.35 23 1.64 0.27 23 1.69 0.34 
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fluency 22 11.41 3.45 20 11.65 5.71 19 12.74 5.51 
flexibility 22 6.91 1.82 20 5.70 3.08 19 6.95 2.12 
originality 22 1.73 0.37 20 1.75 0.33 19 1.67 0.29 
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reaction time* 17 104 115 14 81 76 14 70 35 
Adults          
accuracy 21 .00 .04 19 .00 .08 18 .00 .05 
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 Posttest 
AUOC posttest          
Adolescents          
AU originality 25 2.46 0.18 19 2.50 0.27 18 2.47 0.24 
AU fluency 25 2.99 1.35 19 2.55 0.85 18 3.15 1.12 
OC fluency 25 3.69 0.96 19 4.20 1.02 18 4.23 1.30 
Adults          
AU Originality 21 2.61 0.22 20 2.58 0.19 17 2.62 0.23 
AU fluency 21 3.07 0.93 20 2.80 0.79 17 2.49 1.28 
OC fluency 21 3.96 0.98 20 4.76 1.09 17 3.99 1.10 
Alternative Uses posttest          
Adolescents          
fluency 23 14.35 7.99 19 11.32 7.37 20 17.25 7.15 
flexibility 23 8.48 2.11 19 7.53 2.46 20 9.85 2.80 
originality 23 1.66 0.34 19 1.79 .49 20 1.75 0.44 
Adults          
fluency 18 13.39 4.47 15 12.20 4.16 16 10.81 5.74 
flexibility 18 9.44 2.18 15 8.33 2.16 16 7.38 2.96 
originality 18 1.70 0.30 15 1.60 0.24 16 1.67 0.32 
Rule-Switching posttest          
Adolescents          
accuracy 18 -.03 .04 15 -.01 .04 16 -.02 .06 
reaction time* 18 89 68 15 45 80 16 30 28 
Adults          
accuracy 20 .00 .04 18 .00 .03 20 .02 .07 
reaction time* 20 26 34 18 53 38 20 30 30 
 
Note. AU=alternative uses, OC=ordinary characteristics, RS=rule-switching; The rule-switching task reports switch costs. 
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Table 5-4. Correlations between the pretest and posttest measures Alternative Uses test (AUT), combined Alternative 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Chapter 5    Training creative cognition in adolescents and adults 
 
Initial comparisons 
Initial comparisons were conducted on each of the pretest tasks between the two age 
groups and three training conditions to examine whether differences prior to training were present. 
The results of the Analysis of Variance (ANOVAs) with Age and Condition as between-subjects 
factors are presented in Table 5-5. Here we see that age effects emerged on the combined AU/OC 
task for the measures of AU originality and OC fluency. In both cases adults obtained higher 
scores than adolescents. No further main effects for Age or Training Condition were found on any 
of the pretest creative ideation, general ideation and rule-switching tasks. Age x Training 
Condition effects were not present on the AUT or rule-switching tasks; however, an interaction 
was present on the combined AU/OC task for the AU originality and AU fluency measures. Post 
hoc analyses with Bonferroni correction revealed that these interaction effects emerged because of 
Age effects in some but not all Training Conditions (see Figure 5-3). For AU originality Age 
effects, with higher scores for adults, were present for the AU and RS conditions (AU condition: 
F(1, 42)=6.12, p=.02, ηp2=.13; RS condition: F(1,37)=15.40, p<.001, ηp2=.29) but not for the OC 
condition (p>.10). For AU fluency we found a significant Age effect for the OC condition 
(F(1,39)=4.65, p=.04, ηp2=.11 ), where adults obtained higher scores, but not for the AU and RS 
conditions. In sum, age-group differences were present on the combined AU/OC task; however, 
these initial differences were accounted for in our main analyses as we applied repeated measures 
ANOVAs. 
Table 5-5. F-test results for pretest and posttest measures per training condition and age group on the combined 
Alternative Uses/Ordinary Characteristics task (AUOC task), the Alternative Uses test (AUT) and the Rule-Switching 
task. 
 F df p ηp2 
AUOC task     
AU originality     
Age 16.08 1, 118 <.001 .12 
Condition 0.14 2, 118 .87 .00 
Age x Condition 2.79 2, 118 .07 .05 
AU fluency     
Age 0.30 1, 118 .58 .00 
Condition 0.01 2, 118 .99 .00 
Age x Condition 4.01 2, 118 .02 .06 
OC fluency     
Age 12.75 1, 118 <.001 .10 
Condition 0.77 2, 118 .47 .01 
Age x Condition 0.17 2, 118 .85 .00 
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Table 5-4. Correlations between the pretest and posttest measures Alternative Uses test (AUT), combined Alternative 
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Alternative Uses Test     
originality     
Age 0.57 1, 126 .45 .00 
Condition 0.04 2, 126 .96 .00 
Age x Condition 0.37 2, 126 .69 .01 
fluency     
Age 0.30 1, 126 .58 .00 
Condition 0.38 2, 126 .69 .01 
Age x Condition 0.12 2, 126 .89 .00 
flexibility     
Age 1.10 1, 126 .30 .01 
Condition 1.39 2, 126 .25 .02 
Age x Condition 0.60 2, 126 .55 .01 
Rule-switching Task     
switch costs accuracy     
Age 1.47 1, 97 .23 .02 
Condition 0.44 2, 97 .65 .01 
Age x Condition 0.49 2, 97 .62 .01 
switch costs reaction time     
Age 0.14 1, 97 .71 .00 
Condition 0.02 2, 97 .98 .00 




Figure 5-3. Pretest to posttest progression for adults and adolescents on the creative ideation measure of the combined 
Alternative Uses / Ordinary Characteristics task: (A) originality (1=‘not original’ to 5=‘highly original’) and (B) 
fluency (number of alternative uses listed). In general participants improved in AU originality from pretest to posttest. 
Adults had higher mean originality scores than adolescents; however, adolescents showed greater gains from pretest 
to posttest than adults in AU originality. In general participants had higher mean AU fluency scores on the posttest 
compared to pretest; however, no age group or training condition differences were found. 
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Correlations 
Associations between the pretest measures were in the expected directions. Firstly, AU 
originality measures (AUT and combined AU/OC version) were all positively correlated, although 
the expected association between originality on the four-minute AU Tin test and the AU/OC task 
was not significant. Secondly, the associations between the AU and OC fluency measures were all 
moderate to strong. Finally, rule-switching performance during pretest was strongly related to 
rule-switching performance during the RS training condition participants’ first training session. In 
sum, the pretest correlations support the validity of our tasks. 
Correlations between each of the posttest measures were generally as expected and these 
correlations were often stronger than during the pretest. The two AU originality measures (AUT 
and combined AU/OC version) were positively correlated.  
Correlations between pretest and posttest measures of the same task were generally all 
positive but varied in strength. The correlation between the AUT originality pretest and posttest 
was not significant; however, as we will see in the next section this is most likely due to changes 
taking place in some groups but not others. 
Pretest to posttest change  
We had two main inquiries concerning pretest to posttest change on the three training-
related measures of creative ideation, general ideation and rule switching. Our first research 
question concerned the effectiveness of the intervention; we expected participants within a 
training condition to improve more on the task they practiced than participants in the other two 
training conditions. Our second research question focused on differential progression from pretest 
to posttest between age groups; we examined whether adolescents showed greater improvement in 
performance than adults on all tasks.  
In order to test our hypotheses concerning pretest to posttest change on the measures of 
creative ideation (AU tasks), general ideation (OC task) and rule-switching (RS task), repeated 
measures ANOVAs were conducted with Age (adolescent, adult) and Training Condition (creative 
ideation, general ideation, rule-switching) as between-subjects factors and Session (pretest, 
posttest) as within-subjects factor. Homogeneity of variance between factors was examined with 
Levene’s test. For the AUT, equal task difficulty for the Tin Can (pretest) and Brick (posttest) 
versions could not be assumed. Accordingly, ANCOVAs with Age and Condition as between-
subjects factors and the AUT pretest score as covariate was conducted to test our hypotheses.  
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Creative Ideation 
Two tasks measured creative ideation: (1) the alternative uses part of the combined 
Alternative Uses / Ordinary Characteristics (AU/OC) task and (2) the Alternative Uses Test. 
Pretest to posttest change on these two tasks was examined separately and is described in the 
following subsections. We hypothesized that participants trained in creative ideation would 
improve more in originality, fluency (number of valid creative solutions) and flexibility (ability to 
change categories during creative ideation) on the AU tasks than participants trained in general 
ideation or rule-switching. 
Alternative Uses: AU/OC task 
The alternative uses part of the combined AU/OC task comprised of measures of AU 
originality and AU fluency. The first set of analyses tested for training effects on AU originality 
scores. A main effect of Session showed that participants generally improved on the AU 
originality measure from pretest to posttest (F(1,98)=64.02, p<.001, ηp2=.395). A main effect of 
Age showed that adults obtained higher scores on the AU originality measure on the whole 
(F(1,98)=22.53, p<.001, ηp2=.187). A Session x Age interaction showed that adolescents 
progressed more from pretest to posttest on AU originality (F(1,51)=61.42, p<.001) than adults 
(F(1,47)=14.19, p<.001): Session x Age effect: F(1,98)=5.14, p=.03, ηp2=.05 (see Figure 5-3A). 
Pretest to posttest change in AU originality did not differ between training conditions (Session x 
Training Condition effect: F(2,98)=.13, p=.88, ηp2=.00); Session x Age x Training Condition 
effect: F(2,98)=.23, p=.79, ηp2=.01). 
The same analyses for AU fluency showed that in general, participants improved in AU 
fluency from pretest to posttest (Session effect: F(1,102)=8.91, p<.01 ηp2=.09). No significant 
differences in AU fluency progression were observed for Age (Age effect: F(1,98)=0.01, p=.91, 
ηp2=.00 or Session x Age effect: F(1,102)=0.10, p=.76, ηp2=.00 see Figure 5-3B), Condition 
(Session x Condition effect: F(2,102)=0.90, p=.41, ηp2=.02) or Age x Condition (Session x Age x 
Condition effect: F(2,102)=1.20, p=.31, ηp2=.02).  
Alternative Uses Tin Can and Brick 
The AU Brick task was the posttest counterpart of the AU Tin Can pretest task. 
Originality, fluency, flexibility and unicity (inverse of uniqueness) were measured on the AUT. 
Results are shown in Figure 5-4.  
 




Figure 5-4. Alternative Uses ‘brick’ posttest performance for adults and adolescents per training condition on 
measures: (A) originality (1=‘not original’ to 5=‘highly original’), (B) fluency (number of solutions), (C) flexibility 
(number of categories used in solutions) and (D) unicity (inverse of uniqueness, i.e. mean frequency of provided 
solutions in dataset). No differences were found in originality between age groups and training conditions. Fluency 
was marginally greater in adolescents trained in rule switching versus those trained in general ideation. Adolescents 
the rule switch training condition had greater flexibility scores than the adolescents in the creative and general 
ideation conditions. In adults, the opposite was observed for flexibility, where adults trained in creative ideation 
outperformed the active control groups in flexibility. For unicity, adolescents had marginally lower scores indicating 
greater uniqueness of solutions. 
 
No main effects for Condition or Age were found for originality (Condition: 
F(2,104)=0.10, p=.91, ηp2=.00, Age: F(2,104)=1.48, p=.23, ηp2=.01). Also, no Age x Training 
Condition interaction was found on the measure of originality (F(2,104)=1.01, p=.37, ηp2=.02). 
For fluency there were no main effects for Condition (F(2,104)=1.44, p=.24, ηp2=.03) or 
Age (F(2,104)=3.33, p=.07, ηp2=.03). There was a significant interaction effect between Age and 
Condition on fluency (F(2,104)=3.16, p=.047, ηp2=.06). Therefore, an additional ANCOVA per 
age-group with Bonferroni-corrected post hoc comparisons was conducted. These analyses 
revealed a marginally greater fluency in adolescents in the rule-switching condition versus the 
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No main effects for Condition or Age were found for originality (Condition: 
F(2,104)=0.10, p=.91, ηp2=.00, Age: F(2,104)=1.48, p=.23, ηp2=.01). Also, no Age x Training 
Condition interaction was found on the measure of originality (F(2,104)=1.01, p=.37, ηp2=.02). 
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general ideation condition (ΔM=5.62, SE=2.31, p=.05). No other significant differences between 
the training conditions were found. 
For flexibility there were also no main effects for Condition (F(2,104)=1.19, p=.31, 
ηp2=.02), or Age (F(2,104)=1.33, p=.25, ηp2=.01), The Condition x Age effect was significant: 
F(2,104)=6.42, p<.01, ηp2=.11. This was investigated further with an ANCOVA per age-group 
with Bonferroni corrected post hoc tests for Condition. These revealed greater flexibility for the 
Rule-switching than General ideation training condition in adolescents (ΔM=2.18, SE=0.74, 
p=.01) and marginally greater flexibility for the Creative ideation versus Rule-switching condition 
in adults (ΔM=2.09, SE=0.84, p=.05). No other significant differences between training conditions 
were found.  
Adolescents had marginally lower scores for unicity (i.e., higher scores infer less unique 
solutions) compared to adults (F(1,104)=3.82, p=.05, ηp2=.03), indicating greater uniqueness of 
solutions for adolescents. There was no main effect for Condition (F(2,104)=0.25, p=.78, 
ηp2=.00), nor was there an interaction effect for Condition x Age (F(2,104)=0.98, p=.38, ηp2=.02).  
AU Tin Can performance was positively related to AU Brick performance; although it was 
not a significant covariate for originality (F(2,104)=2.58, p=.11, ηp2=.02), it did form a significant 
covariate for fluency (F(2,104)=5.78, p=.02, ηp2=.05), flexibility (F(2,104)=8.78, p<.01, ηp2=.08) 
and unicity (F(2,104)=8.04, p=.01, ηp2=.07). In general this shows that individuals with high 
pretest ‘Tin Can’ scores also obtained high posttest ‘Brick’ scores. 
General ideation 
Repeated measures ANOVAs for OC fluency revealed no significant changes across 
sessions (Session effect: F(1,98)=1.69, p=.20, ηp2=.02). There was a main effect of Age 
(F(1,102)=5.71, p=.02, ηp2=.05 see Figure 5-5) where adults obtained higher OC fluency scores 
compared to adolescents. No significant differences in OC fluency progression were observed for 
the two age groups (Session x Age effect: F(2,102)=3.54, p=.06, ηp2=.03) or training conditions 
(Session x Condition effect: F(2,102)=2.20, p=.12, ηp2=.04) or Age x Condition (Session x Age x 
Condition effect: F(2,102)=0.15, p=.87, ηp2=.00). 
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Figure 5-5. Pretest to posttest progression for adults and adolescents on the general ideation measure of the combined 
Alternative Uses / Ordinary Characteristics task. Adults had higher mean OC fluency scores (number of ordinary 
characteristics listed) on average; however, no other main or interaction effects for session, age group or training 
condition were found in OC fluency performance. 
 
Rule Switching 
Performance on the rule switch (RS) task comprised measures of switch costs (mean repeat 
trial minus mean switch trial) for accuracy and reaction time. Participants trained with the RS task 
were expected to improve more than those trained in AU or OC.  
Switch costs decreased for accuracy from pretest to posttest (Session effect: F(1,76)=5.36, 
p=.02, ηp2=.07). A Session x Age interaction was found for accuracy (F(1,76)=9.40, p<.01, 
ηp2=.11), where adolescents decreased more in switch costs than adults (see Figure 5-6). No 
Session x Condition or Session x Condition x Age effects were found for accuracy (F(1,76)=0.61, 
p=.55, ηp2=.02.  or F(1,76)=0.07, p=.93, ηp2=.00). There were no main effects for Age 
(F(1,76)=0.02, p=.89, ηp2=.00) or Condition (F(1,76)=0.59, p=.56, ηp2=.02) or Age x Condition 
(F(1,76)=1.29, p=.28, ηp2=.03).  
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general ideation condition (ΔM=5.62, SE=2.31, p=.05). No other significant differences between 
the training conditions were found. 
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not a significant covariate for originality (F(2,104)=2.58, p=.11, ηp2=.02), it did form a significant 
covariate for fluency (F(2,104)=5.78, p=.02, ηp2=.05), flexibility (F(2,104)=8.78, p<.01, ηp2=.08) 
and unicity (F(2,104)=8.04, p=.01, ηp2=.07). In general this shows that individuals with high 
pretest ‘Tin Can’ scores also obtained high posttest ‘Brick’ scores. 
General ideation 
Repeated measures ANOVAs for OC fluency revealed no significant changes across 
sessions (Session effect: F(1,98)=1.69, p=.20, ηp2=.02). There was a main effect of Age 
(F(1,102)=5.71, p=.02, ηp2=.05 see Figure 5-5) where adults obtained higher OC fluency scores 
compared to adolescents. No significant differences in OC fluency progression were observed for 
the two age groups (Session x Age effect: F(2,102)=3.54, p=.06, ηp2=.03) or training conditions 
(Session x Condition effect: F(2,102)=2.20, p=.12, ηp2=.04) or Age x Condition (Session x Age x 
Condition effect: F(2,102)=0.15, p=.87, ηp2=.00). 
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Figure 5-5. Pretest to posttest progression for adults and adolescents on the general ideation measure of the combined 
Alternative Uses / Ordinary Characteristics task. Adults had higher mean OC fluency scores (number of ordinary 
characteristics listed) on average; however, no other main or interaction effects for session, age group or training 
condition were found in OC fluency performance. 
 
Rule Switching 
Performance on the rule switch (RS) task comprised measures of switch costs (mean repeat 
trial minus mean switch trial) for accuracy and reaction time. Participants trained with the RS task 
were expected to improve more than those trained in AU or OC.  
Switch costs decreased for accuracy from pretest to posttest (Session effect: F(1,76)=5.36, 
p=.02, ηp2=.07). A Session x Age interaction was found for accuracy (F(1,76)=9.40, p<.01, 
ηp2=.11), where adolescents decreased more in switch costs than adults (see Figure 5-6). No 
Session x Condition or Session x Condition x Age effects were found for accuracy (F(1,76)=0.61, 
p=.55, ηp2=.02.  or F(1,76)=0.07, p=.93, ηp2=.00). There were no main effects for Age 
(F(1,76)=0.02, p=.89, ηp2=.00) or Condition (F(1,76)=0.59, p=.56, ηp2=.02) or Age x Condition 
(F(1,76)=1.29, p=.28, ηp2=.03).  
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For reaction time, switch costs also decreased from pretest to posttest (Session effect: 
F(1,76)=10.97, p<.01, ηp2=.13). No Session x Age or Session x Age x Condition interactions were 
present (F(1,76)=1.42, p=.24, ηp2=.02 and F(1,76)=0.60, p=.55, ηp2=.02 respectively). No main 
effects for Age (F(1,76)=3.16, p=.09, ηp2=.04) or Condition (F(1,76)=1.45, p=.24, ηp2=.04) were 
present. A marginal Session x Condition interaction effect was present (F(1,76)=3.01, p=.06, 
ηp2=.07) and a significant Age x Condition interaction was present for reaction time 
(F(2,76)=5.76,  p<.01, ηp2=.13). Follow-up repeated measures analyses for reaction time were 
conducted per age group in order to further investigate the role of training condition. These post 
hoc comparisons with Bonferroni correction revealed no significant differences within age groups 
between training conditions.  
 
Figure 5-6. Reaction time switch costs (ms) from pretest to posttest for adults and adolescents per training condition. 
Switch costs were significantly lower on posttest than pretest. Adolescents decreased marginally more in switch costs 
than adults and individuals trained in rule switching decreased marginally more than those trained in creative ideation 
or general ideation. Post hoc comparisons of a significant Age x Condition effect did not reveal further differences. 
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Progression during training 
We used repeated measures ANOVAs with Age (adolescent, adult) as between-subjects 
factor and Session (1-8) as within-subjects factor to examine the participants’ progression during 
training. Homogeneity of variance between factors was examined with Levene’s test. Greenhouse-
Geisser correction for any violations of sphericity was applied when required. In some cases 
training data for one session was incomplete due to loss of Internet connection or early closing of 
the training software Internet browser (NAU=6, NOC=11, NRS=10); when this occurred the session 
score was computed based on the mean of the previous and next session. Participants for whom 
data from more than one consecutive session was incomplete were excluded from the analyses 
(NAU=2, NOC=2, NRS=2). 
Creative ideation training 
A depiction of the participant’s progression on the measures of originality and fluency, 
flexibility on the Alternative Uses (AU) training task is shown in Figure 5-7. Adults on average 
had higher scores on the originality measure (F(1,44)=9.01, p<.01, ηp2=.17), whereas as 
adolescents on average had marginally higher scores for flexibility (F(1,44)=3.93, p=.05, 
ηp2=.09). There were no differences between age groups on the fluency measure (F(1,44)=0.57, 
p=.46, ηp2=.01).  
Although there was no main effect for Session on originality (F(1,44)=0.12, p=.73, 
ηp2=.01), a significant quadratic Session effect emerged for flexibility (F(1,44)=29.92, p<.001, 
ηp2=.42) and a significant cubic Session effect was present for fluency (F(1,44)=5.55, p=.02, 
ηp2=.11). Session x Age interactions were not present for originality (F(1,44)=1.23, p=.30, 
ηp2=.42), fluency (F(1,44)=0.18, p=.88, ηp2=.00) or flexibility (F(1,44)=0.60, p=.65, ηp2=.01). In 
short, results indicate that although training does not affect originality, it does impact both fluency 
and flexibility in creative ideation, two critical antecedents of original thinking and insight 
performance. 
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Figure 5-7. Progression during Alternative Uses (experimental) training across sessions for adults and adolescents: 
(A) fluency (number of solutions), (B) originality (1=‘not original’ to 5=‘highly original’), (C) flexibility (number of 
categories used in solutions). There were no significant age group differences in fluency. Adults scored higher on 
originality throughout the training sessions. Adolescents displayed greater flexibility during the course of the training. 
 
General ideation training 
Fluency performance for adults and adolescents on the Ordinary Characteristics (OC) 
training task is shown in Figure 5-8. Analyses do not show a main effect for Age (F(1,39)=0.64, 
p=.46, ηp2=.01) nor a Session x Age interaction (F(1,39)=0.96, p=.54, ηp2=.02). Thus no 
discernible differences were present in adolescents and adults progression on the OC task during 
the training sessions. Training does not affect general ideation. 
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Figure 5-8. Progression in number of solutions (fluency) during Ordinary Characteristics (active control) training 
across sessions for adults and adolescents. No age differences in fluency of ordinary characteristics ideation were 
found. 
Rule Switch training 
Switch costs remained relatively steady across Sessions for both accuracy and reaction 
time (accuracy: F(1,39)=1.73, p=.10, ηp2=.04; reaction time: F(1,39)=1.67, p=.19, ηp2=.04), as can 
be seen in Figure 5-9. Adults and adolescents did not differ in average switch costs during training 
(accuracy: F(1,39)=1.35, p=.25, ηp2=.03; reaction time: F(1,39)=0.51, p=.48, ηp2=.01) throughout 
the training sessions. No interaction between Session and Age is present for accuracy 
(F(1,39)=0.67, p=.66, ηp2=.02) or reaction time (F(1,39)=.64, p=.54, ηp2=.02). As for training 
creative ideation, training does affect rule switching ability yet not differently for age groups. 
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Figure 5-9. Progression in reaction time switch costs (ms) during Rule Switch (active control) training across sessions 
for adults and adolescents. No age differences in reaction time switch costs were found. 
Discussion 
The aim of the current study was to examine the effects of creative ideation training in 
adolescents and adults. To this end, participants followed one of three training types; alternative 
uses generation (creative ideation condition), general ideation, or rule-switching. A set of tasks 
measuring both creative ideation and general cognitive functions were administered before and 
after two weeks of training. There were two main findings: (1) participants improved in creative 
ideation and rule-switching, and (2) adolescents benefitted more from training than adults, 
although this was independent of the type training provided. The results are organized along these 
findings. 
Initial developmental differences 
Before interpreting the effects of training, it is important to consider potential age 
differences prior to training. The prediction was that adults and adolescents would perform equally 
well on most creativity measures, but that adults would outperform the adolescent group on 
originality (Kleibeuker, De Dreu, & Crone, 2012; Wu et al., 2005). We anticipated additional 
differences for general ideation with better performance for adults compared to adolescents, based 
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on prior research (Kleibeuker, Koolschijn, Jolles, De Dreu, & Crone, 2013a) and its close relation 
to verbal fluency performance (Romine & Reynolds, 2005). No initial differences were expected 
for rule switch performance (Huizinga et al., 2006).  
Results for creative ideation in the four-minute Alternative Uses Task resembled previous 
findings in which adolescents performed at a mature level on most aspects of creativity, including 
fluency and flexibility. Also fitting earlier work, significant developmental differences were 
apparent on the measure of originality, with more original and unique solutions for adults 
compared to adolescents (see also Kleibeuker et al., 2013a). Different factors may account for 
these developmental differences. First, given their greater knowledgebase and more lifetime 
experience (e.g., Weisberg, 1999), adults have a greater chance of retrieving original and unique 
associations with presented objects. Second, individual lifestyles of adults generally involve larger 
inter-individual variance in experiences in comparison to adolescents. Consequently, adults are 
more likely to create relatively infrequent and unique associations and ideas. A third possible 
explanation for differences between age groups concerns developmental changes in flexible 
coordination between analytic and associative processing (Christoff, Gordon and Smith, 2009a, 
2009b; Martindale, 1999; Martindale and Hasenfus, 1978), which is associated with functioning of 
PFC regions that develop throughout adolescence and into adulthood (Kerns, 2006; Kerns, Cohen, 
MacDonald, Cho, Stenger and Carter, 2004). Both analytic and associative processing are believed 
to lead to numerous creative ideas (De Dreu et al., 2012; Kleibeuker et al., 2013c; Nijstad, et al., 
2010); however, the quality of generated ideas has been related to the ability to flexibly coordinate 
between analytic and associative processing. Thus, adolescent participants may not yet have fully 
developed the ability to successfully shift between the two types of processing (Smolucha and 
Smolucha, 1986; see also Runco, 2007). 
As predicted, we found developmental differences in fluency on general ideation. As with 
age related differences in creative ideation, and originality in particular, this effect could be 
explained by age related differences in experiences and knowledge base. A second explanation 
concerns the development of processes that are related to memory retrieval. These processes are 
associated with lateral PFC activations (e.g., Buckner et al., 1995) and other brain regions that 
develop relatively late and mature throughout adolescence (Fair et al., 2007; Giedd et al., 1999). 
Consistent with prior studies no age related differences were observed for performance on the rule 
switch task (Huizinga et al, 2005), suggesting that cognitive flexibility is already at adult level in 
middle adolescence.  
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Training effects 
The applied training paradigm revealed several interesting findings. Participants  improved 
in creative ideation and rule-switching. More specifically, the rule switch training group improved 
on the rule switch task, with larger performance increases relative to the other two training groups 
(e.g., Karbach & Kray, 2009). Training effects were also observed for creative ideation; however, 
contrary to what was observed for the rule switch training, these benefits were not specific to the 
creative ideation group. There were general increases, across training conditions, on originality 
and fluency on the multiple object alternative uses task. No significant improvements were 
observed for general ideation. 
 The general improvement in fluency and originality could be interpreted as follows. 
First, given that these effects were non-specific for training conditions, it is possible that the 
improvements simply reflect retesting effects instead of training effects. Indeed, some crucial 
aspects of the creative ideation task differed from the training paradigm such as duration (20s 
versus two minutes), way of answering (audio recording, typing), and task switches (alternative 
uses to ordinary characteristics versus only one task during training). The task might therefore test 
processes that are different from those applied during the creative ideation training sessions. 
However, the correlations between the alternative uses training task and the two alternative uses 
tasks administered during pretest and posttest suggest that the improvements for the alternative 
uses training group are at least to some degree related to their practice with the alternative uses 
task. Perhaps simply practicing with the alternative uses task was not enough to elicit a discernible 
effect and more extensive training informing people about the nature of creativity and strategies 
for creative thinking (e.g., Clapham, 1997; Scott et al., 2004; Speedie et al., 1971) or providing 
exposure to ideas of others (Dugosh and Paulus, 2005; Fink et al., 2010) would improve the 
impact of creative ideation training. This hypothesis can be studied in future research by 
examining the effect of different types of training programs with alternative uses tasks of varying 
lengths.A second explanation may be that practice generating ordinary characteristics or with the 
rule-switching task may benefit generating alternative uses (performance) through improvements 
of processes that support creative ideation. Improvements in cognitive flexibility as practiced in 
the rule-switching condition may benefit generating alternative uses as well as switching between 
tasks during the combined alternative uses and ordinary characteristics task. Indeed, cognitive 
flexibility is thought to be important for creative performance (e.g., Baas, De Dreu, & Nijstad, 
2008; Bott et al., 2014; De Dreu, Baas & Nijstad, 2008; Gilhooly, Fioratou, Anthony, & Wynn, 
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2007; Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011; Warren & Davis, 1969). Furthermore, originality and fluency in 
the generation of alternative uses could be enhanced by improving the ability to successively 
retrieve relevant semantic information from memory, i.e., general fluency as was the case during 
the ordinary characteristics task training. For example, creativity training in which participants 
were instructed to retrieve information about the parts that make up the object appeared to be 
effective (Warren & Davis, 1969). This role of our two active control tasks can be examined by 
administering the alternative uses and ordinary characteristics tasks separately. 
Developmental differences in training effects 
An important question in this study concerned whether training benefits would be larger 
for adolescents than adults. Interestingly, greater increases in originality and uniqueness were 
observed for adolescents compared to adults independent of training condition. These findings 
suggest that adolescence is a period of enhanced susceptibility for training effects. Indeed, prior 
research on cognitive training indicates that at least for certain higher cognitive functions, 
adolescents have greater potential for improvement than adults (Jolles & Crone, 2012). These 
developmental differences can be attributed to developmental changes in brain structure and 
function. Increasing specialization and integration of brain regions with age are argued to result in 
decreased plasticity of cognitive functions in adults compared to adolescents (Huttenlocher, 2003; 
Johnson, 2011; see also Jolles and Crone, 2012). Moreover, adolescence is a period associated 
with the reorganization of the PFC and related regulatory systems (Keating, 2004; Steinberg, 
2005). Given the strong associations between creative ideation, PFC and cognitive control 
functionality (e.g., Dietrich, 2004; Groborz & Necka, 2003; Keating, 2004), adolescence provides 
a favorable time window for progression in creative ideation.  
Another explanation concerns developmental differences in flexibility in learning. Recent 
rodent studies indicate that (young) adolescents, in comparison to adults, learn more flexibly; they 
are less prone to training induced perseverance and show greater flexibility in reversing learned 
associations (Johnson & Wilbrecht, 2011). Indeed, generating original ideas, especially through 
the flexibility pathway, is associated with flexible switching between (distant) associations and 
overcoming perseverance of cognitive biases or ‘functional fixedness’ (Baas et al., 2008; Nijstad 
et al., 2010). This latter explanation particularly concerns training effects within the same domain, 
but also likely operates on associations formed during practice with the ordinary characteristics 
task. According to the flexibility hypothesis, adolescents would not or at least be less susceptible 
to training induced automaticity and perseverance.  
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A second age related finding concerns different effects of training paradigm for adults and 
adolescents on divergent thinking fluency and flexibility. More specifically, the current results 
indicate that task switch training in adolescents has a larger effect on creative ideation flexibility 
than in adults. These results suggest that adolescents and adults employ different processes or 
strategies to generate alternative uses, with more reliance on cognitive flexibility functions for the 
adolescent age group. Thereby, these findings provide further support for the hypothesis that 
adolescence is a developmental stage of increased flexibility optimized for adaptive and 
explorative behavior during this life phase of instability (Crone & Dahl, 2012; Johnson & 
Wilbrecht, 2011). 
Limitations 
Some limitations of this study deserve mention and can be informative for future research. 
First, the absence of a control group without training made it difficult to distinguish between re-
test effects and training effects as well as examine the existence of transfer effects to posttests. 
Future studies should therefore incorporate a passive control group. Second, task choices may 
have obscured some of the training effects. The single object alternative uses task (Tin Can and 
Brick) differed in difficulty and coding scheme and could not be directly compared to examine 
pretest to posttest change. Future studies would mostly likely benefit from implementing a 
multiple object assessment at each time point, which may represent a purer measure of creative 
ideation as individual differences in the necessary knowledge of the different objects is spread out 
thus reducing measurement error. Third, the current study does not provide information about 
long-term effects of the training. Retesting after, for example, a six month period would provide 
additional information on the effects of the different training paradigms and plasticity in 
adolescents, which might be especially informative for educational purposes. Fourth, the results 
were not controlled for motivation differences. Adolescence has been argued to be a 
developmental stage where motivation effects are more prominent than adulthood (Steinberg, 
2005); therefore, incorporation of motivation questionnaires might provide insight into possible 
side effects of individual differences in motivation. Finally, this study focuses only on creative 
ideation in the verbal domain; in future studies other domains such as figural divergent thinking or 
visual insight should be investigated. 
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Conclusions and future directions 
In future research, it would be interesting to gain better understanding of the observed 
developmental differences in training effects also reflect underlying changes. It would be of 
particular interest to test whether the observed changes in creative thinking performance for the 
different types of training (alternative uses generation, ordinary characteristics retrieval, and rule-
switching) are the consequence of changes in similar or perhaps different underlying functions. As 
such, future research could focus on training-related neuronal changes using (f)MRI, especially in 
PFC regions, known to be related to creative thinking (Keating, 2004). Moreover, it would be 
interesting to focus on age related effectiveness of different training paradigms. In the current 
study, 13-15 year olds were compared to 22-30 year olds. Testing a larger range of ages, including 
pre-adolescents and late adolescents, would provide a more detailed perspective of development-
related limitations and opportunities in training of creative ideation. For the current study, our aim 
was to better understand the effects of practice only in adults and adolescents. An interesting 
addition could be informing people about the nature of creativity and strategies for creative 
thinking, or use an adaptive design, distinguishing between levels of task difficulty, both of which 
have been shown to be effective interventions (e.g., Clapham, 1997; Speedie, Treffinger, & 
Feldhusen, 1971), but knowledge about developmental differences in effectiveness is still lacking. 
Interestingly, the amount of feedback provided by the trainer had a substantial negative impact on 
the divergent thinking training effectiveness in earlier studies (Scott et. al, 2004). However, peer 
feedback in the form of idea sharing (Paulus and Nijstad, 2003) and exposure to ideas from others 
(Dugosh and Paulus, 2005; Fink et al., 2010) does appear to enhance creativity. Adolescents react 
differently to feedback from peers than adults (Albert, Chein, & Steinberg, 2013), thus an 
investigation into developmental differences in the effect of peer feedback could be another 
interesting addition to the creativity training literature.  
The results of the current study not only contribute to the fundamental knowledge of 
cognitive development, but also provide possible implications with regard to creativity education 
and training. Indeed, the present results imply that adolescence is an advantageous period to 
enhance ‘out of the box’ thinking and creative processes. Given the importance of creative 
thinking to individual life success and societal improvement (e.g., Ward et al., 1999), educators 
should take advantage of this sensitive period to improve divergent thinking skills.      
In conclusion, the results support earlier findings in showing that practice in creative 
ideation is successful within the same domain (Scott et al., 2004) and supports the hypothesis that 
116 117
Chapter 5    Training creative cognition in adolescents and adults 
A second age related finding concerns different effects of training paradigm for adults and 
adolescents on divergent thinking fluency and flexibility. More specifically, the current results 
indicate that task switch training in adolescents has a larger effect on creative ideation flexibility 
than in adults. These results suggest that adolescents and adults employ different processes or 
strategies to generate alternative uses, with more reliance on cognitive flexibility functions for the 
adolescent age group. Thereby, these findings provide further support for the hypothesis that 
adolescence is a developmental stage of increased flexibility optimized for adaptive and 
explorative behavior during this life phase of instability (Crone & Dahl, 2012; Johnson & 
Wilbrecht, 2011). 
Limitations 
Some limitations of this study deserve mention and can be informative for future research. 
First, the absence of a control group without training made it difficult to distinguish between re-
test effects and training effects as well as examine the existence of transfer effects to posttests. 
Future studies should therefore incorporate a passive control group. Second, task choices may 
have obscured some of the training effects. The single object alternative uses task (Tin Can and 
Brick) differed in difficulty and coding scheme and could not be directly compared to examine 
pretest to posttest change. Future studies would mostly likely benefit from implementing a 
multiple object assessment at each time point, which may represent a purer measure of creative 
ideation as individual differences in the necessary knowledge of the different objects is spread out 
thus reducing measurement error. Third, the current study does not provide information about 
long-term effects of the training. Retesting after, for example, a six month period would provide 
additional information on the effects of the different training paradigms and plasticity in 
adolescents, which might be especially informative for educational purposes. Fourth, the results 
were not controlled for motivation differences. Adolescence has been argued to be a 
developmental stage where motivation effects are more prominent than adulthood (Steinberg, 
2005); therefore, incorporation of motivation questionnaires might provide insight into possible 
side effects of individual differences in motivation. Finally, this study focuses only on creative 
ideation in the verbal domain; in future studies other domains such as figural divergent thinking or 
visual insight should be investigated. 
Chapter 5    Training creative cognition in adolescents and adults 
 
Conclusions and future directions 
In future research, it would be interesting to gain better understanding of the observed 
developmental differences in training effects also reflect underlying changes. It would be of 
particular interest to test whether the observed changes in creative thinking performance for the 
different types of training (alternative uses generation, ordinary characteristics retrieval, and rule-
switching) are the consequence of changes in similar or perhaps different underlying functions. As 
such, future research could focus on training-related neuronal changes using (f)MRI, especially in 
PFC regions, known to be related to creative thinking (Keating, 2004). Moreover, it would be 
interesting to focus on age related effectiveness of different training paradigms. In the current 
study, 13-15 year olds were compared to 22-30 year olds. Testing a larger range of ages, including 
pre-adolescents and late adolescents, would provide a more detailed perspective of development-
related limitations and opportunities in training of creative ideation. For the current study, our aim 
was to better understand the effects of practice only in adults and adolescents. An interesting 
addition could be informing people about the nature of creativity and strategies for creative 
thinking, or use an adaptive design, distinguishing between levels of task difficulty, both of which 
have been shown to be effective interventions (e.g., Clapham, 1997; Speedie, Treffinger, & 
Feldhusen, 1971), but knowledge about developmental differences in effectiveness is still lacking. 
Interestingly, the amount of feedback provided by the trainer had a substantial negative impact on 
the divergent thinking training effectiveness in earlier studies (Scott et. al, 2004). However, peer 
feedback in the form of idea sharing (Paulus and Nijstad, 2003) and exposure to ideas from others 
(Dugosh and Paulus, 2005; Fink et al., 2010) does appear to enhance creativity. Adolescents react 
differently to feedback from peers than adults (Albert, Chein, & Steinberg, 2013), thus an 
investigation into developmental differences in the effect of peer feedback could be another 
interesting addition to the creativity training literature.  
The results of the current study not only contribute to the fundamental knowledge of 
cognitive development, but also provide possible implications with regard to creativity education 
and training. Indeed, the present results imply that adolescence is an advantageous period to 
enhance ‘out of the box’ thinking and creative processes. Given the importance of creative 
thinking to individual life success and societal improvement (e.g., Ward et al., 1999), educators 
should take advantage of this sensitive period to improve divergent thinking skills.      
In conclusion, the results support earlier findings in showing that practice in creative 
ideation is successful within the same domain (Scott et al., 2004) and supports the hypothesis that 
117
Chapter 5    Training creative cognition in adolescents and adults 
adolescence is a developmental stage of increased flexibility optimized for adaptive and 
explorative behavior during this instable life stage (Crone & Dahl, 2012; Johnson & Wilbrecht, 
2011). 
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Abstract  
Prior research suggests that adolescence is a time of enhanced sensitivity for practice and 
learning. In this study we tested the neural correlates of divergent thinking training in 15-16-year-
old adolescents relative to an age-matched active control group. All participants performed an 
alternative uses task, a valid measure to test divergent thinking, while fMRI images were acquired 
before and after a training program. In between the two scanning sessions the experimental group 
completed 2 weeks of divergent thinking training (8 sessions) and the control group completed 2 
weeks of task switching training (8 session). A group x time interaction demonstrated better 
posttest divergent thinking performance for the experimental group relative to the control group. 
Generating alternative uses (experimental task condition) relative to generating ordinary 
characteristics of objects (control task condition) was associated with increased activation in the 
supramarginal gyrus (SMG), angular gyrus (AG) and middle temporal gyrus (MTG). Test-retest 
analyses showed that within-individuals-activation in these regions was stable over time in both 
groups. Changes in alternative uses fluency, however, were positively associated with changes in 
superior lateral PFC activation. Together, the results indicate that core brain regions for creativity 
(SMG, AG, MTG) are consistently recruited in adolescence and not sensitive to training, but that 
changes in performance are associated with changes in activation in lateral PFC. 
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Introduction 
Some parents may wonder why adolescents have difficulty planning their homework while 
at the same time they are experts in switching between social media devices, designing clothes or 
redecorating their rooms. Adolescence is the transition period between childhood and adulthood 
during which individuals gain their independence from their parents and rapidly adjust to new 
social contexts (Crone and Dahl, 2012). Even though cognitive control functions still increase 
between adolescence and adulthood (Luna et al., 2001), both animal (Johnson and Wilbrecht, 
2011) and human research (Kleibeuker, et al., 2013a) has shown that adolescence relative to 
adulthood is a period of increased potential for flexible thinking. That is, adolescence seems to be 
a period of increased flexibility that is well suited for novel insights and creative problem solving, 
which is beneficial in a period which asks for rapid adjustments to changing social demands and 
gaining independence (Crone and Dahl, 2012). 
Adolescence is also a period of life that is identified by a significant amount of time 
involved in training and education, both in- and outside school settings. As such, a better 
understanding of learning mechanisms and training effects is especially useful in this age period. 
Prior research indicates that the adolescent brain is indeed sensitive to the effects of training of 
different cognitive functions including working memory, and mathematical skills (Jolles et al., 
2010; Quin et al, 2004), showing increased activations patterns in prefrontal and parietal regions 
after training. These brain regions have previously been found to develop relatively late in 
adolescence (Gogtay, 2004; Sowell, 1999; see Crone and Ridderinkhof, 2010; Blakemore and 
Choudhury, 2006). A question that remains is how the adolescent brain adapts to training of 
cognitive functions that require flexible and divergent thinking rather than controlled and 
convergent thinking. 
Here, we test the benefits of training creativity in adolescents, by examining neural 
responses to problems that require divergent thinking, before and after two weeks of divergent 
thinking training.  
Divergent thinking is an important component of creativity and it involves the ability to 
think of novel solutions for encountered problems (Torrance, 1965). A well-known task to 
measure divergent thinking is the Alternative Uses Task (AUT) where individuals are asked to 
think of as many possible ways to use an object, such as an umbrella (e.g., ‘storage place for 
stuffed animals’). Solutions should be novel and appropriately useful (Guilford, 1967; Kim, 2008). 
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The answers can be categorized in terms of fluency (number of possible answers), flexibility 
(number of times individuals switch between different categories; i.e., storage, protection, 
decoration, etc.), and originality (uniqueness of answers). Prior studies revealed that adults and 
adolescents perform equally well on the AUT in terms of flexibility (Kleibeuker et al., 2013a), but 
adults outperform adolescents in baseline fluency (Kleibeuker, et al., 2013b) and originality 
(Kleibeuker, et al., 2013b; Stevenson, et al., 2014).  
Research has shown that divergent  thinking performance can be enhanced by two weeks 
of training, whereas longer time on training would have only  minimally positive effects on 
training outcomes (Scott, et al., 2004; Fink, et al., 2006). These findings have been demonstrated 
in adults (Kienitz et al., 2014), adolescents (Stevenson et al., 2014) and children (Scott, et al., 
2004), although transfer effects to other domains are debated (Kaufman and Baer, 2009). A 
developmental study demonstrated training benefits after two weeks of divergent thinking training 
for fluency and originality. Intriguingly, this study revealed larger changes for adolescents aged 
13-16 years than for adults for the domain of originality, which transferred to a new divergent 
thinking task (Stevenson et al., 2014). These findings led to the hypothesis that adolescence is an 
important time window for creativity development. A key question concerns which are the neural 
regions contributing to these training related changes in adolescence.  
Recently, several studies have examined the neural correlates of divergent thinking by 
examining neural activity while individuals perform the AUT (Abraham et al., 2012; Cousijn, et 
al., 2014a,b; Fink et al., 2006, 2009, 2010; Kleibeuker, et al., 2013b). These findings have 
consistently shown activity in a network of regions including the supramarginal gyrus (SMG), 
middle temporal gyrus (MTG), angular gyrus, and prefrontal cortex (PFC) (Abraham et al., 2012; 
Fink et al., 2009, 2010; Kleibeuker, et al., 2013b). Prior studies related activity in angular gyrus to 
insight (Aziz-Zadeh, et al., 2009; Bechtereva et al., 2004); and MTG to imagination of object use 
(Beauchamp and Martin, 2007; Johnson-Frey, et al., 2005; Lewis, 2006) and to executive semantic 
control processes including processes that enable context appropriate semantic retrieval (Whitney 
et al., 2011). The region that most strongly correlated with fluency performance of the AUT is the 
lateral PFC, such that higher fluency scores were associated with increased neural activation in the 
lateral PFC (Kleibeuker, et al., 2013b). Developmental comparisons between adolescents aged 15-
17 years and adults showed that adolescents recruited the same network as adults. However, adults 
had a relatively higher activation in the lateral PFC than adolescents which was accounted for by 
performance differences. Intriguingly, an AUT training study using EEG showed higher 
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synchronization in frontal alpha activity after two weeks of AUT training (Fink et al., 2006), but it 
is not yet known how this relates to neural activation changes in the different brain regions 
involved in divergent thinking. A recent fMRI study, in which participants were objected to an 
extensive verbal creativity training for three weeks, activations increased mainly in temporo-
parietal regions including bilateral SMG and left (posterior) MTG (Fink et al., 2015). These 
results were interpreted as suggesting that training increased semantic control that is necessary to 
effectively combine available semantic information to produce novelty.  A more commonly used 
approach to enhance creative performance in neuroimaging research involves cognitive 
stimulation by providing (moderately) creative ideas. Several studies have found this approach to 
be effective and training has been associated with functional changes of the (left) temporo-
parietal, including the left MTG and PFC regions (Fink et al., 2012; Wei et al., 2014). An 
important question addressed in the current thesis concerns how activity in these regions changes 
through creative thinking training in adolescence. This will allow us to have a better 
understanding of how training-related changes in adolescents take place. An important question 
concerns how activity in these regions changes through training in adolescence, which will allow 
us to have a better understanding of how training-related changes in adolescents take place.  
In this study we compared behavior and neural activity in 15-16-year-old adolescents while 
performing an AUT task in the scanner before and after two weeks of divergent thinking training, 
and we compared this to AUT activity in an active control group who performed a task switching 
training program (see also Stevenson et al., 2014). The control training was similar in terms of 
effort and time investment. The use of such an active control group diminishes possible 
confounding effects (see Klingberg, 2010 for a theoretical background). This design allowed us to 
test the following questions. First, given the small number of longitudinal studies on creativity 
(Claxton, et al., 2005; Scott et al., 2004), we tested whether neural activity was stable within 
individuals over time, which would inform us about whether creativity is a stable person specific 
ability or varies within persons over time. This was done by computing the intraclass coefficients 
for regions which are commonly active during the AUT, which include the SMG, MTG, angular 
gyrus and lateral PFC. This was found to be a valid method for determining test-retest stability in 
prior research (Van den Bulk, et al., 2013). Second, we tested whether neural activity was 
enhanced by training in these same regions. Finally, we tested the hypothesis that the lateral PFC 
is sensitive to individual differences in performance improvements, given that prior studies 
showed that this region is most sensitive to individual differences in AUT fluency (Kleibeuker, et 
al., 2013b).  




A total of 32 adolescents (18 male) aged 15 to 16 years participated in this study. 
Participants were recruited through local advertisements. All participants were healthy, right-
handed, and MRI compatible (i.e., no braces or metal implants). None of the participants reported 
a history of neurological or psychiatric disorders. 
The participants were randomly divided into two groups matched for gender; an 
Alternative Uses training group (AU-group) and a Rule Switch training group (RS-group). There 
was a small but significant difference in age between the two groups; the AU-group was a few 
months younger than the RS-group (MAU = 15.84, SD = .11; MRS = 16.2, SD = .14; t30= 2.40, p= 
0.02). To check for group differences in intelligence, IQ-scores were estimated based on two 
subtests from the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC; Wechsler 2004): Similarities 
and Digit Span. Groups did not significantly differ in IQ-scores (t30= 1.16, p= 0.26).   
All participants as well as their primary caregiver signed informed consent before 
participation. Participants were financially rewarded for their participation. The Medical Ethics 
Committee from the Leiden University Medical Center (LUMC) approved the study. 
Cognitive assessments during pretest and posttest 
Participants completed a battery of tests for which some of the results are presented 
elsewhere (Cousijn,et al., 2014). For this study, we examined performance on the two training 
tasks during the scan session and in between scan sessions. These tasks are described in detail 
below.  
Alternative Uses Test-scanner  
At pretest and posttest the participants performed an adapted version of the Alternative 
Uses Test (AUT; Guilford, 1967) inside the MRI scanner while neural activity was measured (see 
Kleibeuker, et al. 2013b for a detailed task description). This task measures divergent thinking in 
the verbal domain. The task consisted of two conditions: 1) the free-association-related 
Alternative Uses (AU) condition during which participants had to think of as many appropriate 
alternative and original uses of common objects as possible (i.e., use a shoe as a baseball bat); and 
2) the more general verbal-ability-related Object Characteristics (OC) condition during which 
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below.  
Alternative Uses Test-scanner  
At pretest and posttest the participants performed an adapted version of the Alternative 
Uses Test (AUT; Guilford, 1967) inside the MRI scanner while neural activity was measured (see 
Kleibeuker, et al. 2013b for a detailed task description). This task measures divergent thinking in 
the verbal domain. The task consisted of two conditions: 1) the free-association-related 
Alternative Uses (AU) condition during which participants had to think of as many appropriate 
alternative and original uses of common objects as possible (i.e., use a shoe as a baseball bat); and 
2) the more general verbal-ability-related Object Characteristics (OC) condition during which 
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participants had to think of as many ordinary characteristics of common objects as possible (i.e., a 
shoe fits on a foot). Each trial started with a 3 seconds instruction screen. Then, a written item was 
presented in the middle of the screen for 15 s with the text ‘OC’ or ‘AU’ on the top of the screen 
during OC and AU trials, respectively, to remind participants of the trial condition (see Figure 6-
1A). Immediately after the target screen, an evaluation screen appeared for 3 s. Participants 
indicated how many solutions they had found by pressing one of four buttons on a left/right 
button-box that was attached to their left/right leg respectively; the left middle finger for 0 or 1 
solution, the left index finger for 2 solutions, the right index finger for 3 solutions and the right 
middle finger for 4 or more solutions. Each trial was preceded by a fixation cross that was 
presented for a variable duration (1.1–7.7 s) to optimize the event. 
 
Figure 6-1. Examples of Alternative Uses (AU) and Ordinary Characteristics (OC) trials in the AU/OC scanner task 
 
The AUT-scanner consisted of 60 trials (30 alternative uses and 30 ordinary 
characteristics) divided over three blocks of 8.2 minutes, during which 30 unique words were 
presented (once in the AU and once in the OC condition). Two sets of 30 words were created, 
matched on word length, number of syllabi, and word frequency. Different word sets were used 
during the pretest and posttest. The order of the two word sets was counterbalanced across 
sessions. The total task time was 30 minutes.  
The task was programmed in E-Prime (version 2.0). Performances were measured for both 
the AU and OC condition by calculating the percentage of trials for which participants indicated 
that they generated 0 or 1 solution, 2 solutions, 3 solutions, and 4 or more solutions. In addition a 
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composite score was calculated for each condition (AU-score and OC-score). The composite score 
was the sum of a) the proportion of 0/1 solution times 1, b) the proportion of 2 solutions times 2, 
c) the proportion of 3 solutions times 3, and d) the proportion of 4 or more solutions times 4. 
Local Global Task (LGT) 
Rule switching was assessed behaviorally at pretest and posttest after scanning with the 
LGT (adapted from Huizinga, et al., 2006) that was used as the active control task in the control 
training condition. During the task, the target stimuli were large squares and rectangles (global 
figures) consisting of small squares or rectangles (local figures). Participants were instructed to 
focus on either the global or local aspect of the target shape (i.e., square or rectangle) given the 
presence of a global or local cue. The global cue consisted of a large square and rectangle 
presented on the left and right side of the target respectively. The local cue consisted of a small 
square and rectangle presented on the sides of the target. Participants pressed a right or left 
response button corresponding to the correct (global or local) shape of the target that coincided 
with the cue on the left or right side of the target. Each trial started with a 500ms presentation of 
the global or local cue, after which the target stimulus appeared. Participants had 3500ms to 
respond to the target stimulus (for details see Huizinga et al., 2006).  
The task consisted of a global and a local block (each 50 trials, presentation order 
counterbalanced over participants), followed by a switch block (160 trials). From the switch block 
trials, median response times (RTs) and proportion correct of local-global switch and control trials 
were computed.  
Training 
During the two weeks between the pretest and posttest the AU-group followed an 8-session 
AUT-training and the RS-group followed an 8-session Local-Global Task switching (LGT); both 
groups trained online from home.  
The AUT-training task resembled the AUT-scanner task; participants had to generate as 
many appropriate alternative and original uses of common objects as possible. Nine different 
objects were presented during each training session. The objects were different from the AUT-
scanner objects. Word length, number of syllabi, and word frequency were matched across 
sessions. Participants were given 2 minutes to enter their solutions for each object.  
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The LGT-training was similar to the LGT at pretest and posttest. Each training session 
consisted of 8 blocks of 40 trials with self-paced breaks in-between blocks. The blocks contained 
alternating global and local mini blocks of 4 trials.  
A training schedule was created with the participants and their primary caregivers. In case 
a training session was forgotten, a text-message was sent to the participant’s cell phone to suggest 
another date to catch up. If a second training session was missed, the participant was called to 
discuss a new schedule. Each training session lasted approximately 20 minutes.  
Four participants missed one AUT-training and two participants missed one LGT-training. 
All participants completed at least 7 training sessions. 
MRI data collection 
A 3T MRI scanner (Philips Intera, Best, The Netherlands) at Leiden University Medical 
Center with a standard whole-head coil was used for image acquisition. RS-fMRI data were 
acquired at the start of the pretest and posttest session. A total of 140 volumes were acquired 
resulting in a scan time of 5min. The results from the resting state scan have been reported 
elsewhere (Cousijn, Zanolie, et al., 2014). 
Next, participants completed three runs of the AU-OC task, each lasting 8.3 minutes, 
during which 226 volumes per run were acquired. Bold signal was measured with a T2* gradient-
echo EPI sequence (TR 2.2s, TE 30ms, 38 slices, slice thickness 2.75mm, FOV 220x220mm, in-
plane resolution 2.75x2.75mm,flip angle 80°, sequential slice acquisition). The first 2 volumes of 
each run were discarded in order to allow for equilibration of T1 saturation effects. Finally, a high 
resolution T1 structural scan was acquired for anatomical reference (T1 turbo field echo, TR 
9.8ms, TE 4.6ms, 140 slices, slice thickness 1.2mm, FOV 224x178mm, in-plane resolution 
0.88x0.88mm, flip angle 8°). Head motion was restricted by using foam inserts between the head 
and the head coil. Visual stimuli were projected onto a screen in the magnet bore that could be 
viewed through a mirror attached to the head coil. 
SPM8 software (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk) was used for image preprocessing and analyses. 
Images were corrected for slice-time differences, followed by rigid body motion correction. 
Functional volumes were spatially normalized to individual T1 scans and subsequently to T1 
templates based on MNI305 stereotaxic space (Cocosco, et al., 1997) using a 12-parameter affine 
transformation together with a nonlinear transformation involving cosine base functions. Data 
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were resampled to 3 mm cubic voxels. Functional volumes were smoothed using an 8mm full-
width half-maximum 3D Gaussian kernel. 
fMRI data analyses 
SPM8 software was used for image analyses. For each participant, the functional time 
series were modeled by a series of events convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response 
function (HRF). Trials were modeled separately based on condition (AU or OC), with the 
presentation as onset time and a duration of 15 seconds, and entered in a general linear model 
along with a basic set of cosine functions to high-pass filter the data, and a covariate for run 
effects. In addition, the instruction screen preceding the AU and OC trials and the evaluation 
screen after trials were modeled separately (each with a duration of 0 ms).  
The least square parameter estimates of height of best fitting canonical HRF for each 
condition were used in pairwise contrasts (OC - fixation; AU - fixation; AU - OC).  Resulting first 
level contrast images, computed on a subject-by-subject basis, were calculated for pretest (T1) and 
posttest (T2) data separately. Additional images were created for activation changes from T1 to T2 
for the contrast AU - OC using the ImCalc tool in SPM8. These calculations resulted in another 
set of first level contrast images ((AUT2-OCT2)-(AUT1-OCT1) which will be referred to as AU-
OCT2-T1). The first level contrast images were submitted to group analyses. At the group level, 
contrasts between conditions were computed by performing one-tailed t-tests on these contrasts, 
treating participants as a random effect, and two-sample t-tests to compare training groups. Whole 
brain fMRI analyses were FDR corrected for multiple comparisons at p< .05 (voxel level) 
(Genovese, et al., 2002) with at least 10 contiguous voxels. We further conducted whole-brain 
regression analyses on the contrast AU > OC and AU > OCT2-T1 to test for general brain-
behavior relations and relations between brain activation and behavioral changes, respectively. 
AU-scores at T1 were entered as covariate of interest to find regions showing general brain-
behavior relations. Difference-scores (AU-scoreT2-T1) were entered as covariate of interest to 
find regions showing relations between brain- and behavioral changes. We applied the threshold 
of p<.001 uncorrected with at least 10 contiguous voxels to overcome the relatively low power 
inherent to analyses of individual differences/ type II error. Results are reported in the MNI305 
stereotaxic space. Brain regions were determined based on the SPM anatomy toolbox v1.8 
(Eickhoff et al., 2005, 2006, 2007).  
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Region-of-interest (ROI) Analyses 
Region-of-interest (ROI) analyses were performed with MarsBaR toolbox in SPM8 (Brett, 
et al., 2002) for illustration purposes. The output ‘contrast estimates’ was used. Contrast estimates 
were derived for each condition relative to baseline (i.e., OC-baseline, AU-baseline). ROIs were 
derived from the contrast AU > OC at T1 and from the T2-T1 regression analysis with AUT T2-
T1 performance change scores as regressor. If the region spanned a large area, the region was 
masked using anatomical ROIs derived from the MarsBaR anatomical toolbox.  
Results 
Initial comparisons 
Initial comparisons comprised of tests for differences between training conditions on each 
of the pretest tasks using Analysis of Variance (ANOVAs) with Training as between-subjects 
factor. Descriptive statistics for all measures per training condition are shown in Table 6-1. None 
of the measures revealed differences between the two groups (all main effects and interaction 
effects: p’s > .05) showing that random assignment was successful and that there were no 
differences between the two groups prior to the training. 
 
Table 6-1. Descriptive statistics for the behavioural measures (AU/OC scanner task and local global task) by training 
group and testing session. 











         AU-score 2.13 (0.59) 2.09 (0.68) 2.19 (0.38) 1.84 (0.36) 
     OC-score 3.00 (0.46) 2.93 (0.52) 3.24 (0.32) 3.04 (0.50) 
Local Global Task 
         % correct Control 94.04 (3.06) 96.19 (2.16) 90.55 (8.64) 90.85 (7.08) 
     % correct Switch 94.41 (6.70) 94.67 (8.07) 89.95 (8.50) 90.85 (7.09) 
     RT ms Control  443.75 (96.67) 385.50 (57.09) 416.41 (79.15) 329.03 (49.80) 
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Pretest to posttest changes on training tasks 
AU/OC scanner task 
To examine the training effects on creative idea generation and ordinary characteristic 
retrieval, we conducted repeated measures ANOVAs with within-subject variables percentage of 
trials for each Number Solutions (0/1, 2, 3, 4+), Task Condition (AU, OC) and Time (T1, T2) and 
with Training Group (AU, RS) as between-subject variable (Huynh-Feldt estimates reported when 
sphericity was violated). Significant main effects of Number Solutions (F(2,60) = 9.05, p < .01, 
ηp2 = .23) and Task Condition (F(1,30) = 48.03, p < .001, ηp2 = .62) were found, qualified by a 
significant interaction effect between Number Solutions x Task Condition (F(2,60) = 50.15, p< 
.001, ηp2 = .63). This interaction demonstrated that participants generated more solutions for OC 
than AU trials There was also a Number Solutions x Time interaction (F(2,60) = 4.21, p = .02, ηp2 
= .12); a closer look revealed that the interaction represents an overall shift from T1 to T2 toward 
fewer solutions for both AU and OC trials (see Figure 6-2). No other Time or Training Group 
effects were found (main and interaction effects, all p’s > .05). 
Next, we conducted analyses on AU-composite scores to examine training effects on 
creative idea generation separately. As such, repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted on the 
AU-scores with Time (T1, T2) entered as within-subject variable and Training Group (AU, RS) as 
between-subject variable. A significant main effect of Time (F(1,30) = 6.31, p = .02, ηp2 = .17), and 
an interaction effect of Time x Training Group (F(1,30) = 4.14, p = .05, ηp2 = .12) were found. Post 
hoc analyses of the interaction effect show that performance in the RS group decreased from T1 to 
T2 (F(1,30) = 13.49, p < . 01, ηp2 = .47), whereas results for the AU group remained stable (F(1,30) 
= .09, p = .77, ηp2 = .01). 
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Figure 6-2. Performance on alternative uses trials for the Alternative Uses (AU) Training Group and Rule Switch (RS) 
Training Group at pretest and posttest. Analyses of composite scores indicated a drop in provision of alternative uses 
solutions for the RS Training Group and stable performance for the AU Training Group. 
 
LGT 
To test for training related effects on LGT accuracy (% correct) and reaction times, 
repeated measures ANOVAs were performed with Condition (Switch, Control) and Time (T1, T2) 
as within-subject variables and Training Group (AU, RS) as between-subject variable (see Table 
6-1 for descriptive statistics) for reaction times and accuracy.  
For reaction times, there were main effects for Time (F(1,30) = 30.3, p< .001, ηp2 = .50), 
showing a general decrease of RTs from T1 to T2, and for Condition (F(1,30) = 38.02, p< .001, 
ηp2 = .56), showing longer RTs for switch relative to control trials. In addition, there was a 
significant interaction effect of Time x Condition (F(1,30) = 8.23, p < .01, ηp2 = .22), showing 
larger decreases for switch than for control trials at T2 relative to T1. No main or interaction 
effects were present for Training Group (all p’s > .05). 
For accuracy, no significant effects were observed for Condition or Time and no 
interactions with Training Group were observed (all p’s > .05). 
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AU and LGT relations 
To test for possible relations between AU and LGT performance, bivariate correlation 
analyses were performed on AU fluency scores and LGT switch cost accuracy and RT 
performances at pre test. None of the correlations were significant (all p’s > .05). 
 fMRI results 
T1 analyses 
To extract the neural correlates of creative idea generation we conducted whole-brain 
voxel-wise t-tests on activation levels for the contrast alternative uses (AU) > ordinary 
characteristics (OC) across all participants (N = 32) at T1. Results revealed a number of regions 
including left supramarginal gyrus (SMG), left and right middle temporal gyrus (MTG), and left 
angular gyrus (AG) (FDR corrected, p < .05; see Figure 6-3; Table 6-2), which is in line with prior 
studies (Kleibeuker et al, 2013b; Fink et al., 2009, 2010).  The opposite contrast OC > AU showed 
increased activity for retrieval of characteristics relative to alternative uses for common objects in 
an extend network including bilateral frontal, parietal, temporal cortex regions (see Table 6-2).  
 
Figure 6-3. Neural regions showing activity for AU>OC at time point 1 (T1), averaged across all participants (N=32). 
This resulted in activation in left supramarginal gyrus (SMG), bilateral middle temporal gyrus (MTG) and left angular 
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effects were present for Training Group (all p’s > .05). 
For accuracy, no significant effects were observed for Condition or Time and no 
interactions with Training Group were observed (all p’s > .05). 
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AU and LGT relations 
To test for possible relations between AU and LGT performance, bivariate correlation 
analyses were performed on AU fluency scores and LGT switch cost accuracy and RT 
performances at pre test. None of the correlations were significant (all p’s > .05). 
 fMRI results 
T1 analyses 
To extract the neural correlates of creative idea generation we conducted whole-brain 
voxel-wise t-tests on activation levels for the contrast alternative uses (AU) > ordinary 
characteristics (OC) across all participants (N = 32) at T1. Results revealed a number of regions 
including left supramarginal gyrus (SMG), left and right middle temporal gyrus (MTG), and left 
angular gyrus (AG) (FDR corrected, p < .05; see Figure 6-3; Table 6-2), which is in line with prior 
studies (Kleibeuker et al, 2013b; Fink et al., 2009, 2010).  The opposite contrast OC > AU showed 
increased activity for retrieval of characteristics relative to alternative uses for common objects in 
an extend network including bilateral frontal, parietal, temporal cortex regions (see Table 6-2).  
 
Figure 6-3. Neural regions showing activity for AU>OC at time point 1 (T1), averaged across all participants (N=32). 
This resulted in activation in left supramarginal gyrus (SMG), bilateral middle temporal gyrus (MTG) and left angular 
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Table 6-2. Coordinates for the contrast AU>OC at T1 across participants (N=32), tresholded at FDR corrected p<.05, 
at least 10 contiguous voxels.  
Brain regions   L/R K Z-value MNI coordinates 
        peak voxel x y z 
middle temporal gyrus, precuneus, calcarine gyrus 
 
R 330 5.89 57 -66 15 
   
4.36 21 -48 9 
middle temporal gyrus, angular gyrus, middle occipital lobe 
 
L 373 5.72 -51 -66 3 
   
4.78 -42 -78 33 
 
   
4.21 -42 -69 27 
supramarginal gyrus 
 
L 157 5.22 -63 -27 36 
fusiform gyrus, precuneus, calcarine gyrus 
 
L 360 4.86 -24 -39 -15 
   
4.65 -9 -57 15 
   
4.45 -36 -36 -15 
medial superior frontal gyrus 
 
L 143 4.84 -3 63 18 
inferior frontal gyrus (p orbitalis) 
 
L 73 4.36 -30 30 -12 
   
4.06 -27 15 -15 
Precuneus 
 
L 19 4.16 -12 -54 57 
Cerebellum 
 
R 12 3.74 18 -36 -15 
superior frontal gyrus 
 
L 48 3.74 -24 -9 57 
   
3.66 -21 0 63 
medial cingulate cortex 
 
L 10 3.41 -12 -27 42 
Abbreviations: MNI = montrealneurologicalinstitute; L = lefthemisphere; R = right hemisphere. 
To test for group-differences in brain activation patterns during the AU/OC scanner task at 
pretest, we performed whole-brain two sample t-tests on the contrasts AU>OC. No significant 
results were observed for the contrasts AU>OC, reassuring that groups did not differ at T1. To 
determine brain regions that were related to AUT performance, we performed whole-brain 
regression analyses on the contrasts AU>OC at T1 with AU fluency, operationalized by the AU-
composite score at T1, entered as a covariate. No activations were found for the contrast AU>OC. 
There was however a negative correlation for AU-OC and AU fluency in the right IFG (peak 
coordinates x=42, y=39, z=-6), showing that individuals with better AU fluency activated this 
region relatively less during AU trials compared to OC trials. 
 Test-retest stability 
To determine whether the activations related to AU>OC remained relatively stable over 
time after AU and RS training, we performed test-retest reliability analyses on the ROIs derived 
from the T1 AU>OC contrast. To this end, we calculated intra-class-correlations (ICC3,2) for the 
two training groups (AU, RS) separately as well as for all participants together. Results are 
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presented in Table 6-3. Across all participants, ICC’s ranged from 0 to .66 with highest 
correlations for the right MTG/calcarine gyrus/precuneus (ICC = .66, p = .002), left AG (ICC = 
.65, p = .002), and left SMG (ICC = .64, p = .003). For the AU-training group, ICCs ranged from 
0 to .73 (l AG), and revealed fewer significant correlations than the RS training group. For the RS-
training group ICCs ranged from 0 to .81 (l precuneus/calcarine gyrus). 
 
 
Table 6-3. Intra Cluster Correlations for ROIs derived from the contrast AU > OC at T1 over all participants. 
 
  All participants    AU-training group   RS-training group 
    ICC significance   ICC significance   ICC significance 
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To test for group-differences in brain activation patterns during the AU/OC scanner task at 
pretest, we performed whole-brain two sample t-tests on the contrasts AU>OC. No significant 
results were observed for the contrasts AU>OC, reassuring that groups did not differ at T1. To 
determine brain regions that were related to AUT performance, we performed whole-brain 
regression analyses on the contrasts AU>OC at T1 with AU fluency, operationalized by the AU-
composite score at T1, entered as a covariate. No activations were found for the contrast AU>OC. 
There was however a negative correlation for AU-OC and AU fluency in the right IFG (peak 
coordinates x=42, y=39, z=-6), showing that individuals with better AU fluency activated this 
region relatively less during AU trials compared to OC trials. 
 Test-retest stability 
To determine whether the activations related to AU>OC remained relatively stable over 
time after AU and RS training, we performed test-retest reliability analyses on the ROIs derived 
from the T1 AU>OC contrast. To this end, we calculated intra-class-correlations (ICC3,2) for the 
two training groups (AU, RS) separately as well as for all participants together. Results are 
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presented in Table 6-3. Across all participants, ICC’s ranged from 0 to .66 with highest 
correlations for the right MTG/calcarine gyrus/precuneus (ICC = .66, p = .002), left AG (ICC = 
.65, p = .002), and left SMG (ICC = .64, p = .003). For the AU-training group, ICCs ranged from 
0 to .73 (l AG), and revealed fewer significant correlations than the RS training group. For the RS-
training group ICCs ranged from 0 to .81 (l precuneus/calcarine gyrus). 
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T2>T1 analyses 
Our analyses on brain activation training effects were twofold. First, whole-brain analyses 
were applied on the T2>T1 contrast images for the contrasts AU>OC and OC>AU. No significant 
results were observed for the contrasts AU>OC or for the opposite contrast OC>AU.  
Second, we analyzed possible training related effects within divergent thinking related 
brain regions. Therefore we applied repeated measures ANOVAs on ROIs from the contrast 
AU>OC at T1. This ROI approach was chosen in addition to the whole-brain analyses, because 
analyses at the ROI level have more power to detect smaller differences in the task-related brain 
regions. These analyses included Time (pretest, posttest) and Condition (AU, OC) as within-
subject variables and Training (AU, RS) as between-subjects variable. We focused on three ROIs: 
Left SMG, and left and right MTG/angular gyrus.  
The Time (2) x Condition (2) x Training Group (2) repeated measures ANOVA for the 
separate ROIs only showed a time effect at trend level for left MTG/angular gyrus cluster 
(coordinates: -51 -66 3; F(1,30) = 4.42, p = .058,  ηp2 = .13) as well as a trend level Time x 
Training Group interaction effect (F(1,30) = 3.30, p = .08,  ηp2 = .10). The interaction showed a 
larger increase of activation over time for the AU-training group relative to the RS-training group 
for both the AU and OC trials. Post hoc analyses on the two groups separately showed significant 
changes over time for the AU group (F(1,15) = 15.95, p = .001), but not for the RS group (F(1,15) 
= .027, p = .87). No Training effects or interactions were found for the other regions.  
T2>T1 analyses, relations with performance change 
Our final aim was to test for brain activation patterns that were related to changes in AUT 
performance over time. To this end, we conducted whole brain regression analyses on the 
contrasts AU>OCT2-T1 with AU difference scores (T2-T1). A significant positive relation was 
observed in the left cerebellum (peak coordinate: -30 -75 -21, 150 voxels) and left middle frontal 
gyrus (MFG; peak coordinate: -39 24 9, 14 voxels; see Figure 6-4a,b).  
Post hoc ROI analyses on the left MFG showed that the effect remained significant when 
controlling for Training Group, for activation at T1 (AU >OC), and for AU fluency scores at T1. 
These results indicate that the regression analyses outcomes are not due to individual differences 
at T1 or to group differences in training related changes. The independence of training group is 
also indicated by whole brain regression analyses for the two training groups separately (p uncorr 
Chapter 6    Training in the adolescent brain 
 
< .001; > 10 consecutive voxels). For both groups the performance regression results showed 
regions within the left MFG that overlapped with the region found in the analyses that included all 
participants (see Figure 6-4c; AU-training: peak voxel at -42 51 0; RS-training: peak voxel at -33 
54 12).     
 
Figure 6-4. (A) Regression analysis for AU>OC T2>T1 with AUT fluency T2>T1 as predictor, averaged across all 
participants (N=32). Threshold: p<.001, uncorrected for multiple comparisons, at least 10 contiguous voxels. The 
analysis resulted in two clusters in the PFC at x=24, y=30, z=54, voxel size = 11, T=3.99. (B) Data of ROI analyses 
for the cluster in the left MFG are presented with circles for AUT Training Group and triangles for RS Training 
Group for illustration purposes. (C) Results for the regression analyses across all participants (N = 32; red), for the AU 
training group (N = 16; yellow), and RS training group (N = 16; blue). 
 
 Additional tests for lateral PFC performance relations 
To test for commonalities with an earlier study on AUT neural responses using the same 
task in both adolescents and adults, bivariate correlation analyses were performed on a set of 
predefined ROIs in the lateral PFC. ROIs were derived from whole brain regression analyses on 
the contrast AU>OC with AU-score as covariate (see Kleibeuker et al., 2013b). Correlations were 
estimated between AU>OC changes from T1 to T2 and AU difference scores (AU-score at T2 
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 Additional tests for lateral PFC performance relations 
To test for commonalities with an earlier study on AUT neural responses using the same 
task in both adolescents and adults, bivariate correlation analyses were performed on a set of 
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minus AU-score at T1). We found a significant positive correlation between right middle frontal 
gyrus (coordinates: 42, 42, 21) and AU difference scores. These results support the importance of 
right lateral frontal functioning in creative idea generation. 
Discussion 
The aim of the study was to examine changes in neural activations related to divergent 
thinking practice in adolescents. To this end, 15-16-year-olds were scanned while performing an 
adapted version of the AUT (Guilford, 1956, 1967; Kleibeuker, et al., 2013b) before and after 
two-weeks of alternative uses training. Behavioral and neural changes were compared to an age-
matched active control group who practiced with a rule-switching task for the same training 
period. Behavioral results support the effectiveness of divergent thinking practice, showing better 
divergent thinking performance after training for the AU group compared to the control group. 
The fMRI results yielded three important findings: 1) activations of the creative ideation related 
network remained relatively stable over time, 2) were not sensitive to training manipulations; and 
3) right lateral frontal cortex activation changes were associated with changes in divergent 
thinking over time. The discussion is organized in line with these findings. 
Training effects of divergent thinking training 
The behavioural results showed a group x session interaction effect with better training 
outcomes for the AU training group. These results indicate that training creativity in adolescence 
is potentially beneficial. However, this conclusion needs some restraint given that the interaction 
effect was due to a performance decrease for the rule switch group, whereas performances for the 
alternative uses group remained stable over time. The behavioural outcomes could be interpreted 
as a negative effect of rule switch training on divergent thinking performance. However, the lack 
of significant correlations between AU scores and LGT performances from both the current and a 
previous study (Cousijn et al., 2014) is in contradiction with such an interpretation: If rule switch 
training affects divergent thinking negatively, one might expect to find negative correlations 
between rule switch performances and AU performances. A second possible explanation for the 
behavioural interaction effect is that the RS group lacked motivation to perform during the second 
session. However, if this was the case, one might have expected a similar negative effect for other 
test performances. Results of additional tests administered outside the scanner (results are 
described in Cousijn et al. 2014) do not support this explanation.  Alternatively, the results might 
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be influenced by secondary aspects such as the test environment. Indeed, MRI scanner 
environment has been related to changes in cognitive functioning showing both increases and 
decreases in cognitive control performances (Van Maanen, Forstmann, Keuken, Wagenmakers, 
Heathcote, in press). Results have been interpreted e.g., in terms of stress-induced increase in 
attentional control (Hommel, Fischer, Colzato, van den Wildenberg, &Cellini, 2012; see also 
Plessow, Fischer, Kirschbaum, & Goschke, 2011) or arousal (Koten, Langner, Wood, & Willmes, 
2013), and decreased attentional focus (Assecondi et al., 2010). Interesting, both these 
interpretations (increased arousal and decreased attentional focus) could account for better 
divergent thinking performance during a first scanner session relative to a second scanner session. 
Indeed, prior studies have revealed positive effects of moderate levels of arousal on creative 
fluency and originality (De Dreu, Baas, Nijstad, 2008; Byron et al., 2010), whereas attentional 
focus is negatively associated with creativity performances (e.g., Wiley and Jarosz, 2012, Ansburg 
and Hill, 2003). As such, it is reasonable that potential training related increases in creative 
thinking are hidden by negative session effects, and future research should focus on possible 
environmental effects in training studies.  
4.2 Stability of creative ideation network activations 
The stability (ICC) analyses showed that activations of the core network related to creative 
ideation, represented by regions that are more active during alternative uses generation than 
ordinary characteristics retrieval at T1, remain relatively stable over time. The network is 
dominated by parietal-temporal regions including bilateral MTG, left angular gyrus and left SMG, 
but also includes frontal regions, including left superior-, and inferior gyrus and bilateral cingulate 
cortex. Thus, the results are consistent with prior research that indicates critical involvement of 
both parieto-temporal (Fink et al., 2010,; see also Arden, et al., 2010 for an overview) and frontal 
brain regions in verbal creative thinking (e.g., Abraham et al., 2012; Carlsson, et al., 2000; 
Chávez-Eakle, et al., 2007; Howard-Jones, et al., 2005). Several studies have shown that the 
angular gyrus, SMG (posterior), and MTG are involved during semantic tasks (e.g., Binder, et al., 
2009; Jung-Beeman, 2005; Vigneau et al., 2006). In part, the semantic information processing 
might be focused specifically on tools. Indeed, the MTG and SMG have repeatedly been related to 
tool use and action knowledge, including semantic information of tools and imaginative tool use 
(Beauchamp and Martin, 2007; Johnson-Frey et al., 2005; Johnson-Frey, 2004; Lewis, 2006). 
Accordingly, processing of these types of information are likely profitable when thinking about 
alternative uses of objects. Recent experimental research also indicates a specific function for the 
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left posterior MTG together with the left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) in semantic processing. 
These regions have been related to executive mechanisms that direct semantic retrieval according 
to the task or context at hand (e.g., Jung-Beeman, 2005; Whitney, et al., 2012). Notably, especially 
the angular gyrus and SMG showed strong stability within individuals over time in both training 
groups, suggesting that this is a core network that is engaged for divergent thinking performance. 
The ICC values for left inferior frontal gyrus were not significant in both groups. These 
findings suggest that these frontal regions are less consistently active within individuals across 
sessions, which is consistent with the notion that these regions are sensitive to performance 
differences (Kleibeuker et al., 2013b). In prior studies, it was suggested that in semantic control 
processes the IFG regulates the cognitive control devoted toward semantic retrieval and this 
system may be more sensitive to fluctuations in effort and attention (Whitney et al., 2012). 
Finally, the left MTG showed significant ICCs for the Rule Switch training group but not 
for the Alternative Uses training group, whereas the left cingulate cortex showed significant ICCs 
for the Alternative Uses training group but not for the Rule Switch training group. The absence of 
left MTG stability for the Alternative Uses training group may indicate that this region is more 
malleable to training in this domain, whereas the absence of left cingulate cortex stability in the 
Rule Switch training group is consistent with several studies that reported that switching places 
demands on anterior cingulate cortex / pre-supplementary motor areas (e.g., Crone, et al., 2006; 
Nachev, et al., 2007), and training in this domain may generalize to different activation patterns in 
the AU task as well.  
Taken together, the within-individual consistency in neural activity across the two 
measurements was highest in those areas that are also most consistently reported in single session 
measurements, including the angular gyrus, SMG and (right) MTG, further confirming the 
relevance of this network for divergent thinking (Abraham et al., 2012; Bechtereva et al., 2004; 
Benedek et al., 2014; Fink et al., 2009, 2010, 2014; Kleibeuker, et al., 2013b).  
Effects of AU training on left MTG activity 
The comparison of neural activation before and after training indicates that wo weeks of 
alternative uses training increases activity in the left MTG after during idea generation. These 
findings are consistent with prior research on verbal creative thinking training. One possible 
interpretation is that the left MTG is important for demanding executive semantic processes, 
including  (Whitney, et al., 2012). The change in left MTG activity was found for both the 
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alternative uses and the ordinary characteristics trials, suggesting a general increase in a process 
that is demanded for both types of trials, which was enhanced by two weeks of AU training. The 
change in left MTG activity was not related to individual differences in performance change. It is 
possible that these relations are due to small sample sizes and that relations will be found in 
studies with larger samples. Yet, the absence of a performance relation is consistent with the 
hypothesis that the change represents a general ideation effect which is not specific to thinking of 
alternative uses.  
PFC activity and performance change 
In two separate comparisons performance correlations were found for regions within the 
PFC. These findings are consistent with an earlier study that showed that especially lateral PFC 
activity was associated with individual differences in alternative uses fluency (Kleibeuker et al., 
2013b). In the current study, change in activity in a region in the left middle lateral PFC, adjacent 
to (minimally overlapping) the region in Kleibeuker et al. 2013b, was related to a change in 
alternative uses fluency. Thus, those individuals increasing in fluency over time showed more 
activity in this region of lateral PFC over time, whereas those individuals decreasing in fluency 
over time showed less activity in lateral PFC over time. These change by change correlations have 
also been found in a prior study examining longitudinal changes in performance monitoring in 
children, adolescents and adults (Koolschijn, et al., 2011).  
Interestingly, in a prior study this region of lateral PFC was less active in adolescents than 
adults during divergent thinking as measured with the AUT, which was accounted for by 
differences in fluency performance (Kleibeuker et al., 2013b). Although the exact function of the 
lateral PFC in the applied paradigm and in divergent thinking in general is still under debate, it has 
been related to working memory, monitoring, and inhibition of common answers (Carlson et al., 
2000; Chavez et al., 2004; Chavez-Eakle et al., 2007; Martindale, 1999; Zabelina & Robinson, 
2010). It should be noted that divergent thinking benefits by Alternative Uses training were 
characterized by an absence of a decrease in fluency, whereas the Rule Switch training group 
showed a decrease in fluency over time. A possible explanation in terms of environmental factors 
has been described above (Assecondi et al., 2010; Hommel et al., 2012; Koten et al, 2013; van 
Maanen et al, in press) but more studies are necessary to better understand the dynamics of 
divergent thinking performance across multiple measurements.  
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Limitations 
This study had several limitations which should be addressed in future research. First, the 
study only included adolescents, and future studies should test if training effects are different for 
children and adults (e.g., Stevenson et al., 2014). Second, the study focused on practice, and future 
studies should use other training designs as well, such as using feedback including exposure to 
others’ ideas (Dugosh and Paulus, 2005; Fink et al., 2010; Paulus and Nijstad, 2003). Finally, this 
study examined effects over a relatively short time period of two weeks, measuring neural 
correlates before and after training. Future studies should examine long term effects of training as 
well, for example across several months (e.g., Bott et al., 2014; Scott et al., 2004), and incorporate 
more measurements across time to increase the understanding of the training process and account 
for possible session effects.  
Conclusion 
Taken together, this study was the first to show that over time, there is stability in the 
neural responses during divergent thinking, as indicated by moderate to high ICCs. This result 
shows that creativity can be reliably assessed and has some level of stability that is difficult to 
show based on behavioral findings alone. Individual differences in performance changes were 
most strongly related to changes in lateral PFC activity. These findings are interesting in relation 
to studies that have shown that especially executive control processes, which rely heavily on PFC, 
develop further during adolescence. Future studies should test the hypothesis that adolescence is a 
sensitive period for training related changes in neural activity by comparing  adolescents and 
adults, given that behavioral studies have suggested that training benefits in the domain of 
divergent thinking are larger for adolescents than for adults (Stevenson et al., 2014).  
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This thesis provides a comprehensive approach to unraveling how creative performance 
develops during adolescence, which neural mechanisms are involved during creative thinking, and 
how, if possible, creativity can be improved during this age period. A better understanding of 
these questions will enable us to improve models of neuro-cognitive development that reflect the 
complexity of the developing brain; to develop useful training paradigms for creativity; and to 
further inform studies on creativity training and development during adolescence.  
 In this thesis, I have built upon the creative cognition approach, which directly associates 
creativity with basic cognitive processes and functions (Ward, 2007; Nijstad et al., 2010; Sowden 
et al., 2014), and, consequently, implies that creativity training success depends on the trainability 
of these function.  
Prior research on creativity in adolescence is not only scarce, but also inconclusive, as 
presented by a wide variety of methods. Inconsistency of results makes it difficult, if not 
impossible, to create a uniform picture of the development of creativity in adolescents.  
The approach in this thesis, combines behavioral measures with brain activations, 
measured with fMRI, across domains and ages, in single test and longitudinal training-designs, in 
order to capture creative cognition development throughout adolescence. In addition, both age- 
and experience-related effects on creative thinking performance during functional brain develop-
ment were tested. The main findings and conclusions are presented in the following sections. The 
chapter closes with a number of critical considerations and recommendations for future studies. 
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Development of different creativity aspects throughout adolescence 
Chapter 2 describes an empirical study, focused on gaining insight into the developmental 
trajectories of creative thinking across adolescence. We were interested in identifying whether 
differences exist in the developmental patterns associated with creative processes. It is argued that 
creative thinking is an important skill facilitating the advancement toward adult functioning 
(Jaquish & Ripple, 1980); thus, adolescence is expected to involve important changes in creative 
capacities.  To address developmental changes for the broader domain of creative thinking, 
participants of four age groups (12/13 yrs, 15/16 yrs, 18/19 yrs, and 25-30 yrs) were subjected to 
an extensive battery of tests, gauging insight and divergent thinking in the visual and verbal 
domain. The results of this study support the distinctiveness of creative aspects and demonstrated 
different developmental patterns, as described below.  
Creative insight 
We observed that creative insight (both visual and verbal) continued to develop into late 
adolescence; creative insight refers to the ability to successfully restructure and unify complex or 
remote information, as required for insight success. Two explanations for prolonged development 
include: (1) an increasing knowledge base from which information can be retrieved; and (2) the 
development of the ability to manipulate and control information retrieval. This is in agreement 
with prior studies that demonstrate protracted developmental trajectories throughout adolescence 
for both knowledge and cognitive control such as working memory and executive functions 
(Huizinga et al., 2006; Luna et al., 2004). Noteworthy are the shapes of the developmental 
trajectories, which were best described by step-wise (visual) and curvilinear (verbal) models. In 
particular, the visual domain results are indicative of qualitative changes in underlying cognitive 
processes and related neural underpinnings. This is in agreement with a previous study by Uhlaas 
et al. (2009), who reported similar patterns for Gestalt perception development, as a result of a 
reorganization of functional neural networks. I recommend, therefore, that future studies on 
insight development should include research designs that allow us to examine underlying (neural) 
processes and information processing strategies, such as neurophysiological and latent-class 
analysis, or eye-tracking techniques.  
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Divergent thinking 
Divergent thinking tasks revealed developmental patterns that were quite different from 
insight tasks, and identified distinct developmental trajectories for the two studied domains (verbal 
and visuospatial).  
Verbal divergent thinking 
To test verbal divergent thinking, we implemented the Alternative Uses Test (AUT). 
Outcomes of the AUT suggest that the capacity to generate multiple ideas (fluency) from different 
conceptual categories (flexibility) is already developed in adolescence, but that the quality of 
solutions (originality) continues to develop. That is, no differences were observed between age 
groups for the number of invented uses and the number of conceptual categories of uses for a 
brick, but the two older age groups outperformed the two younger age groups on the uniqueness of 
invented applications for a brick. Two different factors suggested to underlie the age-related 
differences for originality include: 1) increasing knowledge from which associations can be made, 
including increasing intra individual differentiation of knowledge as late adolescents become more 
autonomous; and 2) development of cognitive processes that support the ability to flexibly 
coordinate between associative and analytic processing, as both types of processing result in 
multiple solutions; the quality of ideas, however, depends on the ability to flexibly switch between 
them (Christoff et al., 2009a, 2009b; De Dreu et al., 2010; Nijstad et al., 2012; Martindale, 1999), 
an ability that develops only in late adolescence (e.g., Kerns, 2006; Kerns et al., 2004).  Notably, 
the developmental pattern for divergent thinking originality was quite similar to those for the 
insight tasks, indicating that the underlying processes reveal similar developmental changes. It is, 
however, unlikely that the underlying mechanisms were identical as relations between 
performances disappeared when results were corrected for age. 
Visuo-spatial divergent thinking 
Visuospatial divergent thinking was assessed by applying the Creative Ability Test (CAT). 
This task requires participants to find as many matching figures as possible according to a set of 
pre-specified rules.  Success is relatively independent of knowledge, but requires generating and 
shifting between representations of the provided visual information, applying a set of rules, and 
monitoring behavior; cognitive functions that are commonly associated with prefrontal cortex 
(PFC) functioning and are still developing in adolescence (Huizinga et al., 2006). In accordance 
with these developmental changes of cognitive functions, task results showed marked increases 
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from early to middle adolescence. No differences were identified between the early adolescents 
and the two oldest age groups, indicating a relative advantage for middle adolescents for 
visuospatial divergent thinking. It has been suggested that these positive outcomes may be related 
to the relatively widely-focused, explorative behavior of this age group. This behavior has indeed 
been shown to be characteristic for adolescence (Dahl, 2011;Johnson & Wilbrecht, 2011). 
In summary, the results in Chapter 2 support the distinctiveness of creativity aspects and 
indicate both immaturities (insight, verbal divergent thinking originality) and creative potentials 
(visuospatial divergent thinking) during middle adolescence. Although the exact factors 
underlying the differences in developmental patterns are still unknown, possible explanations 
include 1) different degrees to which task success depends onknowledge (higher for insight and 
verbal divergent thinking than  for visuospatial divergent thinking); and 2) differences in the 
extent to which task success relies on; retrieving and manipulating  internally stored information 
(high for verbal idea generation; low for visuospatial divergent thinking); and exploring externally 
provided information (low for verbal idea generation; high for visuospatial divergent thinking). 
A further question arising from this study is how these results are related to the 
development of underlying brain functioning. In particular, how the different developmental 
changes relate to functioning of late developing PFC, since creative success of both verbal 
divergent thinking and visuo-spatial creative problem solving have been associated with PFC 
functioning (e.g., Chavez et al., 2004; Gibson et al., 2009; Goel and Vartanian, 2005). This 
question has been addressed in Chapters 3 & 4. 
Neurocognitive development of creative cognition from middle adolescence to 
adulthood 
The aim of the following two chapters (Chapters 3 & 4) was to expand insight into the 
differential developmental patterns of creative aspects and their underlying mechanisms. To this 
end, we applied fMRI during visuospatial creative problem solving (Chapter 3) and verbal creative 
idea generation (Chapter 4) in middle adolescents and adults. 
Prior neuroimaging studies have shown profound structural and functional changes during 
adolescence, mainly in the (lateral) PFC (Gogtay et al., 2004; Adleman et al., 2002; Crone et al., 
2006c). These changes are commonly associated with the development of executive functions, 
such as working memory, interference control and task-switching (see Bunge & Wright, 2007) ; 
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cognitive functions that have also been associated with creative success (De Dreu et al., 2012; 
Ward, 2007).  Prior studies on PFC related cognitive functions have shown both age related 
increases and decreases of PFC activations. These studies interpret positive changes as increased 
ability to recruit brain regions, and negative changes as increasing efficiency of brain regions. 
Recent studies of complex cognitive functions have revealed more complex developmental 
patterns with peak activations in adolescence (Crone et al., 2006; Dumontheil et al., 2010). Based 
on this, an important question considered in this thesis concerned the over-simplicity of the above-
mentioned interpretations of PFC development. Building on the findings in Chapter 2 
(visuospatial divergent thinking), together with previous reports of peak PFC activations during 
adolescence, I hypothesized, in Chapter 3, that adolescence is a period of enhanced PFC 
activations for exploration and adaptive purposes.  
To test this, adolescents (15-17 yrs) and adults (25-30 yrs) were subjected to both a 
matchstick problem task (MPT), while scanning neural activation with fMRI, and a visuo-spatial 
divergent thinking task (creative ability task; CAT) outside the scanner. Results indicate that 
creative problem solving is already developed in middle adolescents, showing no age differences 
in overall MPT performance. Interestingly, adolescents outperformed adults on experimental 
problems (seeking alternative solutions for the matchstick problem) indicating an advantage for 
this age group for problems that require exploration and shifting between representations. 
The brain imaging data underscored the importance of prefrontal brain regions in creative 
thinking. Results demonstrated increased activation in several left lateral PFC regions during 
successful creative problem solving across individuals. Additional individual difference analyses 
demonstrated a positive relation between creative problem solving performance and left inferior 
frontal gyrus (IFG) activations. Prior research suggests particular relevance of  this brain region 
for switching between representations (Crone et al., 2006; Hirshorn & Thompson-Schill, 2006).  
Activations in right dorso-lateral PFC (DLPFC) were associated with better visuospatial divergent 
thinking capacities (CAT performance). Thus, individuals with greater visuo-spatial thinking 
abilities have the tendency to recruit right DLPFC during creative problem solving more than 
individuals with poor visuo-spatial thinking abilities. This region is suggested to be involved in 
planning and manipulating internal representations as well as in working memory processes and 
monitoring behavior (Crone et al.,2006; Curtis & d’Esposito 2003; Jolles et al., 2011; Shallice, 
2004; Ruh et al., 2012; Ridderinkhof et al., 2011).   
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Interestingly, a direct comparison between age groups revealed increased activation in left 
(IFG) and right (DLPFC) during successful creative problem solving for adolescents compared to 
adults. These results indicate that middle adolescents, relative to adults, a) have the tendency to 
recruit important PFC regions that allow for a flexible and explorative manner of processing, and 
b) show activity patterns that are common to individuals with higher divergent thinking capacities. 
This study therefore supports the hypothesis that adolescence is not only a phase of immaturity but 
also a period of enhanced PFC activation for exploration and adaptive purposes (Crone & Dahl, 
2012). 
In Chapter 4, the neuro-developmental changes of verbal creative idea generation were 
investigated. In contrast to visuo-spatial creative problem solving, we hypothesized that verbal 
ideation would not be fully developed in middle adolescence, and that underperforming would be 
related to immature cognitive control processes and PFC functioning. As predicted, adults (25-30 
yrs) outperformed adolescents (15-17 yrs) on creative idea generation (tested through an adapted 
version of AUT, while scanning with fMRI); adults generated significantly more alternative uses 
than adolescents. The fMRI results for creative idea generation indicated involvement of a 
temporo-parietal network including the left angular gyrus (AG), the left supramarginal gyrus 
(SMG), and the bilateral middle temporal gyrus (MTG) in both adults and adolescents. In 
addition, we performed individual difference analyses and found a positive correlation between 
activations in left IFG/MFG and divergent thinking performance. These findings resemble 
previous findings (e.g., Fink et al, 2010; see also Arden et al. 2010; Dietrich & Kanso, 2010) and 
suggest the importance of semantic processing during creative ideation. Interestingly, when trials 
with only multiple solutions, a hallmark of divergent thinking, were analyzed, results included 
additional left IFG/ MFG activation. These results suggest that the ability to generate multiple 
creative ideas, or divergent thinking, involves cognitive control functioning, such as attentional 
inhibition and cognitive flexibility (see e.g., De Dreu et al., 2012; Vartanian, 2009; Zabelina & 
Robinson, 2010). Our findings, together with those of previous studies, highlight the importance 
of these lateral frontal regions and support the idea that temporo-parietal activations are related to 
creative idea generation in general, whereas PFC activity is discriminative for divergent thinking 
success (Carlsson et al., 2000; see Arden, 2010; Dietrich & Kanso, 2010). Notably, activations in 
these frontal regions were more pronounced in adults than adolescents. One possible explanation 
could be that adolescents are not yet able to activate these brain regions and associated cognitive 
processes to a mature level for the task at hand. It should, however, be noted that the age-related 
differences were not significant at whole brain level and future research should replicate the 
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developmental changes of lateral PFC activations to be clear about the role of PFC functioning in 
divergent thinking development.   
In summary, fMRI results support the idea that the lateral regions of the PFC function as 
‘the organ of creativity’, generating novelty and complexity (Fuster, 2002). Moreover, the fMRI 
results underscore the complexity of the functional development of lateral PFC as middle 
adolescents, relative to adults, showed both increased (Kleibeuker et al., 2012b) and decreased 
(Kleibeuker et al., 2012c) activations. In addition, these age-related differences were associated 
with better and worse creative task performances, respectively. It thus seems unlikely that the 
observed adolescent brain activation patterns simply represent immature brain functioning in 
terms of less efficiency or deficient recruitment of essential brain regions.  
Here we focused on prefrontal brain activations. It should, however, be noticed that other 
regions than PFC were involved in creative thinking, brain regions for which we did not have a 
priori hypotheses. Future research should explore their roles in creative thinking development to 
further our understanding of the mechanisms underlying creative performance across adolescence.  
Creative ideation training in adolescence 
To extend investigations into the development of creative ideation, two empirical studies 
examined the progression of creative thinking abilities within simple training paradigms. Various 
studies have already demonstrated the effectiveness of training paradigms in improving creativity 
in both adults (Glover, 1980; Bott et al., 2014; Kienitz et al., 2014) and children (Torrance, 1972; 
Cliatt et al., 1980). However, relatively little is known about how malleable creative thinking is in 
adolescence. Training studies in other higher cognitive skills include working memory (Klingberg, 
2010; Jolles et al., 2012), executive control (Karbach and Kray, 2009; Zinke et al., 2012), 
relational reasoning (Dumontheil et al., 2010), and algebraic equation solving (Qin et al., 2004) 
emphasize the training susceptibility regarding performance and brain function during 
adolescence. These studies have led to the hypothesis that adolescence is a period of enhanced 
sensitivity to training of high-level cognitive skills, compared to adults (see also Steinberg, 2005; 
Jolles & Crone, 2012).   
This hypothesis was tested in Chapter 5 for creative thinking training by applying a simple 
creative ideation training paradigm. The main aim of the study was to examine whether creative 
ideation could be improved by practicing alternative uses generation in adolescents (13-16 yrs) 
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and adults (23-30 yrs). In this study, participants followed one of three training types, (1) 
alternative uses generation (creative ideation; experimental condition), (2) object characteristic 
naming (general ideation; control condition), or (3) global local rule switching (rule-switching; 
control condition). Performances prior to training sessions resembled previous research and 
revealed that adolescents already performed at adult level on ideation fluency and flexibility, but 
that adults outperformed adolescents on originality measures. Post-training results demonstrated 
that participants in general (irrespective of age group and training condition) progressed on 
creative ideation originality and fluency. With regard to originality, adolescents progressed further 
after two weeks of training than adults, independent of the type of training. These results 
therefore, support the above-mentioned hypothesis and indicate greater training susceptibility for 
adolescents than for adults. In addition, these results support the idea that adolescence is a period 
of enhanced flexibility in cognition and learning (Crone & Dahl, 2012; Johnson & Wilbrecht, 
2010). A question stemming from these results is, what are the (brain) mechanisms underlying 
training success in adolescents, and to what extent are training effects related to the reorganization 
of the PFC and associated regulatory systems during adolescence (Keating, 2004; Steinberg, 
2005)? 
These questions were targeted in the final empirical chapter, Chapter 6. Here, the benefits 
of training creativity in adolescents were tested by examining neural responses to problems that 
require divergent thinking before and after two weeks of divergent thinking training. To this end, 
participants followed one of two training types: creative ideation or rule switching. All 
participants performed an adapted version of the alternative uses task, while fMRI images were 
acquired before and after the training program. Training outcomes for creative idea generation 
were better for the experimental group than for the control group: performances for active control 
group decreased over time, whereas performances for the creative ideation group remained stable. 
Although the decline in performance for the control group and stable pattern for the training group 
may seem counter intuitive, similar training patterns have previously been found for adults (Fink 
et al., 2015). The exact mechanisms behind these findings are, however, not yet understood and 
are target for future research. One hypothesis is that individuals were more conservative when 
testing for the second time.   
The fMRI results indicate that core brain regions for creative ideation (SMG, AG, MTG) 
are consistently recruited in adolescence and recruitment remains relatively stable after training. 
This study further supports the involvement of lateral PFC in creative ideation output, establishing 
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that performance changes, irrespective of training, were positively associated with activation 
changes in late developing IFG/MFG. This further indicates that lateral PFC activation is 
predictive for divergent thinking success, but that the involvement of the lateral PFC is not 
changed by creative thinking training. The exact functions of lateral PFC regions in creative 
thinking still need to be deciphered. Future research could distinguish different aspects of the 
creative process and examine the relation between lateral PFC regions and the brain networks that 
support these divergent thinking aspects.   
Conclusion and future directions 
In the current thesis, I aimed to gain insight into the capacities and potential of creative 
cognition in a life period that is associated with significant changes in cognitive functioning and 
increasing individuality. Adolescence is often seen as a ‘difficult’ transitional phase characterized 
by rebellious and risky behavior (Ayman-Nolley & Taira, 2000; Steinberg, 2007), yet it is also a 
natural time of learning and adjustment and provides opportunities for explorative behavior as 
individuals gain autonomy and develop their identity (Marcia, 1980). Recent developmental 
neuroimaging studies recognize the complexity of the adolescent brain as several studies have 
now reported different patterns of age related changes in brain functioning, particularly in (lateral) 
PFC structure and function. The results of the present dissertation complement and elaborate on 
our current understanding of adolescent (creative) cognition providing us with insight into both 
the potentials and limitations, associated with complex functioning of lateral prefrontal brain 
regions.   
It is, however, important to recognize the complexity of the creativity construct as it covers 
multiple facets across various domains. Here I focused only on a limited set of aspects, and, 
although these aspects have been recognized as essential and predictive for creativity success (e.g., 
Kim, 2010), some reservations should be made regarding the generalizability of the results. 
Moreover, in the current thesis, simple practice paradigms were used to gain insight into the 
trainability of creative thinking in adolescence. To better understand the potentials for creative 
success in general, future research should incorporate alternative training paradigms. Such 
paradigms could include informing individuals about the nature of creativity, or the use adaptive 
designs to distinguish between levels of difficulty, both of which have been shown to be effective 
interventions (e.g., Clapham, 1997; see also Scott et al., 2004). Another focus for future research 
concerns differentiating between creative thinking strategies, enabling to distinguish 
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developmental trajectories and training potentials for different pathways to creative success (e.g., 
flexible and persistence; see Nijstad et al., 2004).  
Nonetheless, the current findings provide important insights in the functionality of the 
adolescent brain when confronted with problems that desire out of the box thinking. In addition, 
these findings serve as a starting point for future research and provide several relevant 
implications. 
One of the main findings of the current thesis is the distinctiveness of developmental 
trajectories for the different creativity aspects, with a relative peak for middle adolescents’ visuo-
spatial divergent thinking and relative worse performances for verbal idea generation for the same 
age group. Interestingly, success for both types of creative was related to lateral PFC activations 
so that, relative to adults, middle adolescents showed both increased and decreased activations of 
these PFC regions. These findings can serve as starting point to develop models of neuro-
cognitive development that recognize the complexity of functional brain development during this 
transitional phase. In turn, such models could provide useful implications for educational purposes 
as a better understanding of how the adolescent brain processes information, and provides 
opportunities to adjust educational programs to optimize successful processing of learning 
material.  
 In our current knowledge society, in which creative abilities are valued more than ever 
before, an interesting question for future research is to what degree the observed increased (and 
decreased) performances for middle adolescents are age-related and associated with structural and 
functional brain development. More particularly, is it possible for adults to increase creative 
success (at certain aspects) when addressing problems in a way similar to middle adolescents? If 
so, knowledge about how the adolescent brain processes information could also be used to 
develop training paradigms for organizations that require their employees to think creatively.  
 A second important finding from the current thesis is that middle adolescents showed 
more progress after creative thinking training than adults. These findings complement previous 
reports of trainability of higher-level cognitive functions in adolescence (Jolles et al., 2012; Wu et 
al., 2010) and suggest that educators should make use of this sensitive period to encourage flexible 
thinking and enhance creative abilities. These results, however, also raise questions about long-
term consequences of creative thinking training: is improving divergent thinking skills during this 
sensitive period advantageous for creative outcomes later in life? To answer this question, 
longitudinal (brain imaging) studies are necessary to test whether a) divergent thinking training 
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during this phase leads to durability of adolescent (brain) flexibility, or b) whether training simply 
leads to accelerated development of involved brain networks, including lateral PFC regions, and, 
accordingly, increases brain efficiency but reduces flexibility (see e.g., Jolles & Crone, 2012; 
Crone & Dahl, 2012 for argumentation). Outcomes of such study designs are important for 
educational purposes: the aim of education programs fully exploit a student’s potential and create 
opportunities for success in future society.  
Several outcomes of the current thesis point toward the importance of knowledge in 
creative success. However, in today’s world, where information is available and easily accessible, 
it is not the knowledge itself, but the capacities to find and apply knowledge, that are recognized as 
discriminative for success. Schools and other educational institutes incorporate these capacities 
cand related skills, including ‘creativity’, into their programs as part of the so-called ‘21st century 
skills’. An important question arising, then, is to what extent do knowledge and the capacities to 
handle knowledge, support creative success? Insight into the role of these two separate aspects 
would be informative for education developers and, subsequently, could contribute to the 
optimization of individual and societal success (see Ward et al., 1999) in our ever changing 
knowledge society. 
In conclusion, the current thesis provides an extended overview of the (dis)abilities and 
potential of creative thinking in adolescence. The results support the hypothesis that the adolescent 
brain is not only associated with (cognitive) immaturities, but also allows for increased flexibility 
in cognition and learning. Such flexibility is advantageous in a period that requires adaptive and 
explorative behavior, and reveals a potential for creative success. The current results, therefore, 
provide interesting directions for future research and have implications for the field of 
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Creatief denken wordt gezien als één van de belangrijkste menselijke vaardigheden voor de 
21e eeuw en dat is niet zonder reden. In onze huidige kennismaatschappij is continue innovatie 
van cruciaal belang. Informatie bases groeien en veranderen in een hoog tempo. Als gevolg 
hiervan worden competenties als flexibiliteit, ‘out-of-the-box’ denken, divergent denken en 
oplossingen genereren, meer gewaardeerd dan ooit tevoren; creatief denken en de ontwikkeling 
van deze competentie is belangrijker dan ooit. De huidige wetenschappelijke kennis van creatieve 
cognitie is echter beperkt en eerder onderzoek naar de ontwikkeling van creatieve cognitie geeft 
geen consistent beeld.  
 Verandert de mogelijkheid om creatief te denken gedurende de ontwikkeling in de late 
kindertijd en adolescentie, en hoe verandert dit? Welke neurale mechanismen zijn betrokken bij 
(veranderingen in) creatieve prestaties, en hoe (indien mogelijk) kan creativiteit worden 
verbeterd?  
In dit proefschrift is getracht antwoorden te vinden op deze vragen. Onderzoek naar de 
creatieve ontwikkeling gedurende de adolescentie en jonge volwassenheid is schaars, terwijl 
adolescenten toch de innovators van de toekomst zijn. Uit studies in verwante onderzoeksvelden, 
zijn er aanwijzingen dat de adolescentie een cruciale periode is voor de ontwikkeling van 
belangrijke cognitieve vaardigheden (Casey, Jones & Hare, 2008; Steinberg, 2005) en dat deze 
ontwikkelingen zijn gerelateerd aan veranderingen in de structuur en functie van (met name 
prefrontale gebieden van) de hersenen van adolescenten (Luna, Padmanabhan & O'Hearn, 2010;. 
Shaw et al, 2008). Het doel van dit proefschrift is om een beter inzicht te krijgen in de (1) de 
ontwikkelingstrajecten van verschillende aspecten van creatief denken, (2) de ontwikkeling van de 
onderliggende neurale processen en (3) de mogelijkheid om creatief denken in de adolescentie 
door middel van training te verbeteren. Om dit bereiken is een aantal studies uitgevoerd waarin 
verschillende aspecten van creatief denken getoetst zijn. In deze studies is er gekeken naar gedrag 
en naar de activiteit in de hersenen middels fMRI. Daarnaast is er binnen de studies gekeken naar 
de verschillen tussen leeftijdsgroepen, maar ook naar de effecten van training op de prestaties 
binnen een groep. Deze combinatie van studies biedt de mogelijkheid om een beter inzicht te 
krijgen in zowel leeftijds- als ervaringsgerelateerde effecten op creatief denken, in een periode die 
gekenmerkt wordt door essentiële structurele en functionele veranderingen van (met name de 
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Creativiteit wordt in het algemeen aangeduid als het vermogen ideeën, inzichten en 
oplossingen te genereren, die zowel origineel als uitvoerbaar zijn (bijv. Amabile, 1996; Sternberg 
& Lubart, 1996). Als zodanig moeten creatieve uitkomsten nieuw en ongebruikelijk, maar ook 
potentieel nuttig en relevant, zijn; originele maar onuitvoerbaar ideeën worden doorgaans 
beschouwd als vreemd, terwijl de ideeën die haalbaar, maar niet origineel zijn, worden gezien als 
alledaags en oninteressant.  
Om de ontwikkeling van creativiteit te begrijpen, bouwt dit proefschrift voort op de 
‘creatieve cognitie benadering’, die creatief denken interpreteert als zijnde inherent aan normale 
menselijke cognitieve functies (Ward, Smith, & Finke, 1999). Deze cognitieve benadering 
benadrukt de afhankelijkheid van fundamentele cognitieve functies, zoals werkgeheugen en 
executieve controle (Nijstad, De Dreu, Rietzschel & Baas, 2010) en voorspelt dat creatieve 
cognitie ontwikkelt in relatie tot deze functies.  
Hoewel de exacte processen in de hersenen, die ten grondslag liggen aan creatieve 
prestaties nog ter discussie staan, is er een groeiende consensus onder wetenschappers uit de 
sociale en cognitieve (neuro) psychologie dat creatieve prestaties het resultaat zijn van (1) snelle, 
impliciete en associatieve verwerking en (2) opzettelijke, bewuste en logische verwerking van 
informatie (Chaiken & Trope, 1999). Deze algemene opvatting is verder ontwikkeld in het ‘Dual 
Pathway to Creativity Model’ (DPCM; De Dreu, Baas, Nijstad, 2008), waarin creatieve output 
wordt beschreven als het resultaat van (1) cognitieve flexibiliteit en (2) cognitieve persistentie. 
Cognitieve flexibiliteit maakt het mogelijk om bij het oplossen van problemen veel verschillende 
conceptuele categorieën aan te wenden, flexibel te schakelen tussen deze categorieën en een 
globale verwerkingsstijl met een brede focus toe te passen (Förster, Friedman & Lieberman, 
2009). Cognitieve persistentie wordt daarentegen geassocieerd met gerichte en systematische 
inspanning, diepgaande verkenning van een relatief klein aantal cognitieve categorieën en een 
lokale verwerkingsstijl met een smalle focus (De Dreu et al., 2008). Er wordt aangenomen dat 
creatieve prestaties het product zijn van beide types verwerking, waarbij de verhoudingen van de 
bijdragen van de twee types afhankelijk is van de taak en het individuele functioneren.  
In de afgelopen jaren hebben verschillende onderzoekers creatieve cognitie onderzocht met 
behulp van laesie studies en ‘neuro-imaging’ technieken, waaronder functionele Magnetische 
Resonantie Imaging (fMRI). Ondanks dat er verschillende resultaten zijn (Arden et al, 2010; 
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Dietrich & Kanso, 2010), is er consensus dat de laterale delen van de prefrontale cortex (PFC) 
betrokken zijn bij creativiteit. Dit frontale hersengebied wordt veelal geassocieerd met cognitieve 
controlefuncties en het coördineren van lagere orde (associatieve) hersengebieden (zie bijv. Miller 
& Cohen, 2001). Interessant is dat dit hersengebied nog aanzienlijk verandert tijdens de 
adolescentie (Mills & Tamnes, 2014). 
De adolescentie (leeftijd van ongeveer 10 tot 20 jaar) wordt gekenmerkt door een periode 
van transformaties naar onafhankelijkheid en volwassenheid. Succesvolle ontwikkeling naar 
volwassen functioneren wordt geassocieerd met creatief denken en daaraan gerelateerde functies, 
zoals exploratie en cognitieve flexibiliteit: Exploratief gedrag is essentieel om een eigen identiteit 
te ontwikkelen en adolescentie is een periode waarin leren en aanpassen centraal staan. Dit zijn 
vaardigheden die flexibiliteit in denken en gedrag vereisen. Adolescentie is dus een periode 
waarin belangrijke veranderingen in creatieve capaciteiten te verwachten zijn.  
Samenvattingen van de studies 
In hoofdstuk 2 is een uitgebreide gedragsstudie beschreven waarin de ontwikkeling van 
twee aspecten van het creatieve potentieel onderzocht zijn: Divergent denken en inzicht. In deze 
studie werden de proefpersonen, verdeeld over vier leeftijdsgroepen (12-13 jaar, 15-16 jaar, 18/19 
jaar en 25-30 jaar), onderworpen aan meerdere testen, met als doel een beter inzicht te krijgen in 
de ontwikkelingstrajecten van de verschillende aspecten van creatief denken (divergent denken en 
inzicht). Deze tests waren gericht op verschillende domeinen (visueel en verbaal).  
Divergent denken is het meest geteste aspect in creativiteitsonderzoek. Het wordt 
beschouwd als een belangrijk onderdeel van het creatieve proces en is voorspellend voor creatief 
succes (Kim, 2008). In ‘divergent denken taken’ wordt de proefpersoon gevraagd meerdere 
oplossingen voor een bepaald probleem te genereren. Bij dit type taken is er geen eenduidig 
correct antwoord (Guilford, 1967). Prestaties worden beschreven in termen van vloeiendheid 
(aantal antwoorden), flexibiliteit (aantal antwoord categorieën) en originaliteit. In hoofdstuk 2 is 
divergent denken onderzocht aan de hand van twee verschillende taken: de ‘Alternatieve 
toepassingen taak’ (Alternate Uses Task; AUT), die divergent denken in het verbale domein meet, 
en de ‘Creatieve Aanleg Test’ (CAT), die divergent denken in het visuospatiële domein meet. In 
de AUT wordt proefpersonen gevraagd zoveel mogelijk alternatieve toepassingen te bedenken 
voor een object, bijvoorbeeld voor een baksteen. De resultaten van de AUT geven aan dat het 
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het verbale domein te genereren al in de vroege adolescentie is ontwikkeld; er waren geen 
verschillen tussen de leeftijdsgroepen. De kwaliteit van deze oplossingen (originaliteit) is echter 
nog tot in de late adolescentie in ontwikkeling. Twee mogelijke verklaringen voor de gevonden 
verschillen in originaliteit van oplossingen zijn dat er (1) veranderingen zijn in verworven kennis, 
en / of (2) ontwikkelingen zijn van cognitieve processen, die flexibele coördinatie tussen 
associatieve en analytische verwerking ondersteunen (Christoff, Gordon , & Smith, 2009; De Dreu 
et al, 2010). Dit laatste is een vermogen dat zich ontwikkelt in de late adolescentie (Huizinga et al, 
2006).  
De resultaten voor creatieve prestaties op de ‘visuospatiële divergent denken taak’, de 
CAT, bieden een indirecte ondersteuning voor de eerste verklaring. Op deze taak scoorden mid-
adolescenten relatief beter in vergelijking tot jongere adolescenten en jonge volwassenen. Succes 
op de CAT is relatief onafhankelijk van kennis. De CAT vereist daarentegen cognitieve functies, 
die nog in ontwikkeling zijn in de vroege adolescentie (Huizinga et al., 2006) zoals; (a) het 
genereren van en het switchen tussen representaties van gepresenteerde visuele informatie, (b) het 
toepassen van een set van regels en (c) het monitoren van eigen gedrag. Deze functies worden 
vaak geassocieerd met de werking van de prefrontale cortex (PFC). 
Naast de ‘divergent denken taken’, werd een aantal ‘inzicht taken’ afgenomen. Deze taken 
hebben, in tegenstelling tot ‘divergent denken taken’, wel concrete correcte oplossingen. Om tot 
deze correcte antwoorden te komen is het nodig informatie te herstructureren en associaties te 
leggen tussen niet- of weinig-gerelateerde informatie (Förster, Friedman & Liberman, 2004). 
Creatief inzicht wordt daarbij gekenmerkt door (1) het hebben een ‘aha!’ ervaring bij het vinden 
van de juiste oplossing, (2) een impasse, een toestand van hoge onzekerheid over hoe verder te 
gaan, voorafgaand aan het vinden van de oplossing en (3) het niet of moeilijk kunnen herleiden 
hoe men tot de oplossing gekomen is.  
In de studie die staat beschreven in hoofdstuk 2 is een drietal ‘inzicht taken’ toegepast; de 
‘Gestalt Completion Task’ (GCT;. Eckstrom et al, 1976), de ‘Snowy Picture Task’ (SPT;. 
Eckstrom et al, 1976) en de ‘Remote Associates Task’ (RAT; Mednick, 1962). De eerste 2 taken 
(GCT en SPT) meten creatief inzicht in het visuele domein terwijl de RAT inzicht meet in het 
verbale domein. De resultaten op de drie taken geven aan dat creatief inzicht (zowel binnen het 
visuele als verbale domein) zich nog ontwikkelt tot in de late adolescentie. Opvallend was dat de 
ontwikkelingstrajecten stapsgewijze (visueel) en gecurvde (verbale) patronen lieten zien. Deze 
ontwikkelingspatronen, die voor de visuele inzichtstaken in het bijzonder, zijn indicatief voor 
  Nederlandse Samenvatting 
 
kwalitatieve veranderingen van de onderliggende cognitieve processen (zie ook Uhlaas et al., 
2009).  
Samenvattend impliceren de resultaten in hoofdstuk 2 dat er verschillende aspecten van 
creatief denken te onderscheiden zijn met afzonderlijke ontwikkelingspatronen. Daarbij geven de 
resultaten aan dat adolescentie een periode is van zowel creatieve ontwikkeling met onvolwassen 
prestaties (inzicht en verbaal divergent denken) als van creatieve mogelijkheden (visuospatieel 
divergent denken).   
In hoofdstuk 3 en 4 is de ontwikkeling van de neurale processen, die gerelateerd zijn aan 
creatief denken, onderzocht. Hoofdstuk 3 gaat in op de ontwikkeling van creatief probleem 
oplossen in het visuospatiële domein en hoofdstuk 4 beschrijft een onderzoek naar de 
ontwikkeling van verbale aspecten van creatief denken. 
In hoofdstuk 3 is gebruik gemaakt van de ‘Lucifer taak’ (Matchstick Problems Task; 
Guilford, 1967) om te onderzoeken welke hersengebieden betrokken zijn bij visuospatieel creatief 
probleem oplossen bij mid-adolescenten en jong volwassenen. Bij de ‘Lucifer taak’ moeten 
proefpersonen in gedachte de samenstelling van gepresenteerde lucifers veranderen naar een 
voorgeschreven doelplaatje. Om zo’n probleem op te lossen, moet een proefpersoon het mentale 
‘beeld’ van de uitgangssamenstelling los kunnen laten (Guilford, 1967). Eerdere neuro-
psychologische en ‘neuro-imaging’ onderzoeken, die de ‘Lucifer taak’ of vergelijkbare taken 
gebruiken, laten zien dat de laterale PFC betrokken is bij het oplossen van dergelijke creatieve 
problemen (Goel & Vartanian, 2005). 
In het onderzoek in hoofdstuk 3 moesten adolescenten (15-17 jaar) en volwassenen (25-30 
jaar) een ‘Lucifer taak’ uitvoeren terwijl hun hersenactiviteit gescand werd met behulp van fMRI. 
Daarnaast werden zij onderworpen aan de eerder gebruikte ‘visuospatiële divergent denken taak’ 
(Creative Ability Task; CAT) buiten de scanner (Kleibeuker et al, 2013b). Adolescenten scoorden 
beter dan volwassenen bij het oplossen van de opgaven van de ‘Lucifer taak’. Dit laat zien dat 
deze leeftijdsgroep in het voordeel is bij het oplossen van problemen waarvoor exploratief denken 
en het vermogen om te switchen tussen representaties nodig zijn. De ‘neuro-imaging’ resultaten 
geven aan dat de prefrontale hersengebieden betrokken zijn bij creatief denken. De resultaten laten 
verhoogde activatie in de linker laterale PFC gebieden zien tijdens het oplossen van de opgaven 
van de ‘Lucifer taak’. Een directe vergelijking tussen de beide leeftijdsgroepen laat hogere 
activatie in deze frontale gebieden zien bij adolescenten dan bij volwassenen. Daarnaast werd er 
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taak’ en activatie in de linker Gyrus Frontalis Inferior (Inferior Frontal Gyrus, IFG), een gebied 
dat in eerder onderzoek is gerelateerd aan het switchen tussen representaties (Crone et al., 2006; 
Hirshorn & Thompson-Schill, 2006). Bovendien is er een positieve relatie gevonden tussen 
activatie in de rechter dorsolaterale pre-frontale cortex (DLPFC) en prestaties op de CAT. 
Personen die beschikken over betere visuospatiële vaardigheden, gebruiken hun rechter DLPFC 
dus meer tijdens het oplossen van creatieve problemen dan mensen met een slechte visuospatiële 
vaardigheden. De uitkomsten uit dit onderzoek ondersteunen de hypothese dat de adolescentie niet 
alleen een fase van onvolwassenheid is, maar ook een periode van versterkte PFC-activatie voor 
exploratief denken en handelen (Crone & Dahl, 2012).  
In Hoofdstuk 4 is wederom de ‘Alternatieve Toepassingen Taak’ (Alternate Uses Test; 
AUT) gebruikt om verbaal divergent creatief denken te onderzoeken. Bij dit onderzoek is ook 
gekeken naar de hersenactiviteit met behulp van fMRI. Eerdere onderzoeken bij volwassenen 
vinden relatief consistente betrokkenheid van (links) temporo-pariëtale gebieden, waaronder de 
Gyrus Angularis (Angular Gyrus;AG) en Gyrus Supramarginalis (Supramarginal Gyrus; SMG). 
Dit zijn gebieden die in eerdere onderzoeken gerelateerd zijn aan semantische verwerking (Arden 
et al, 2010; Dietrich & Kanso, 2010). Daarnaast laat een aanzienlijk deel van deze studies 
positieve relaties zien tussen PFC-activatie en creatieve prestaties (bijv. Carlsson et al, 2000; 
Chavez-Eakle et al, 2007; Gibson, Folley, & Park, 2009).  
In het onderzoek in hoofdstuk 4 is gekeken naar de hersenactiviteit bij het genereren van 
creatieve ideeën bij zowel adolescenten (15-17 jaar) als volwassenen (25-30 jaar). Kijkend naar de 
uitkomsten van de gedragsstudie uit hoofdstuk 2 was het de verwachting dat de volwassen beter 
zouden scoren bij het genereren van creatieve ideeën dan de adolescenten. De volwassen groep 
kon ook significant meer alternatieve toepassingen bedenken voor alledaagse objecten (AUT) dan 
adolescenten. De fMRI resultaten zijn in lijn met eerdere studies en impliceren de betrokkenheid 
van temporo-parietal gebieden bij het genereren van creatieve ideeën. Interessant is dat problemen 
waarvoor meer dan één oplossing gevonden is (een kenmerk van divergent denken), leidden tot 
additionele activatie in de laterale PFC. Dit betekent waarschijnlijk dat het vermogen om meer 
ideeën te genereren (lees: divergent denken), ondersteunt wordt door cognitieve controlefuncties, 
zoals aandacht gerelateerde inhibitie en cognitieve flexibiliteit (zie bijv. De Dreu et al., 2012). 
Interessant is dat vergelijkingen tussen de leeftijdsgroepen aangeven dat er meer activatie van deze 
prefrontale gebieden te zien is bij volwassenen dan bij adolescenten. Een mogelijke uitleg voor de 
gevonden gedragsresultaten is dat adolescenten nog niet in staat zijn deze frontale gebieden 
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optimaal te activeren en dat als gevolg hiervan gerelateerde cognitieve controle processen nog niet 
op een volwassen niveau functioneren tijdens het generen van creatieve toepassingen van 
objecten. 
Dit in ogenschouw genomen, ondersteunen de fMRI resultaten in hoofdstuk 3 en 4 het 
idee dat de laterale delen van de PFC betrokken zijn bij het genereren van nieuwe en complexe 
ideeën en oplossingen. Daarnaast onderschrijven de resultaten de complexiteit van de 
ontwikkeling van de PFC gebieden in de adolescentie, gegeven dat adolescenten, afhankelijk van 
de taak, zowel meer als minder prestatie- gerelateerde-activatie laten zien in deze gebieden tijdens 
creatief denken.  
Om de ontwikkeling van creatief denken verder te onderzoeken is in de hoofdstukken 5 
en 6 onderzoek gedaan naar de effecten van simpele ‘creatief denken trainingen’ bij adolescenten.  
Training studies naar andere hogere cognitieve vaardigheden, zoals het werkgeheugen (Klingberg, 
2010;. Jolles et al, 2012), executieve controle functies (Karbach & Kray, 2009;. Zinke et al, 2012) 
en het oplossen van algebraïsche vergelijkingen (Qin et al. 2004), laten zien dat training een 
positieve invloed heeft op de prestaties en het functioneren van de hersenen tijdens de 
adolescentie.  
In hoofdstuk 5 is de uitgevoerde gedragstraining studie beschreven. Het belangrijkste doel 
van de studie is om te onderzoeken of creatief denken kan worden verbeterd door training. De 
studie is uitgevoerd bij adolescenten (13-16 jaar) en volwassenen (23-30 jaar) en er is getraind op 
het genereren van alternatieve toepassingen bij bestaande voorwerpen (AUT). Proefpersonen 
volgden gedurende twee weken één van de drie trainingsprogramma’s: (1) bedenken van 
alternatieve toepassingen voor een object (experimentele conditie), (2) benoemen van standaard 
eigenschappen van een object (controle conditie) of (3) het switchen tussen twee taken (global-
local rule-switching; controle conditie).  
De resultaten gaven aan dat proefpersonen in het algemeen (ongeacht leeftijd en 
trainingsconditie) beter werden in het genereren van creatieve ideeën. Adolescenten verbeterden 
echter meer dan volwassenen. Daarmee impliceren de resultaten dat adolescenten ontvankelijker 
zijn voor training dan volwassenen. Dit is consistent met de hypothese dat de adolescentie een 
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In hoofdstuk 6 zijn (divergent denken) trainingseffecten op neurale activiteit bij 
adolescenten onderzocht. Hiertoe voerden proefpersonen in de leeftijd 15/16 jaar voor én na een 
twee weken durende trainingsinterventie een aangepaste versie van de AUT uit in de scanner. 
Proefpersonen trainden (1) het genereren van alternatieve toepassingen (experimentele groep); of 
(2) het switchen tussen twee type taken (global-local rule switch task; controle groep). Deze 
trainingen waren vergelijkbaar met de trainingen uit hoofdstuk 5. Ook hier lieten de resultaten 
activatie van een temporo-parietal netwerk zien tijdens het genereren van creatieve ideeën. Test en 
hertest analyses geven aan dat de mate van activatie tijdens het generen van creatieve ideeën in 
deze gebieden relatief stabiel blijft over de tijd (voor en na training). De fMRI resultaten toonden 
daarnaast opnieuw de betrokkenheid aan van de laterale PFC bij creatieve prestaties. De  
veranderingen in de activatie van gebieden in de IFG en MFG zijn positief gerelateerd aan 
veranderingen in prestaties op de AUT (bedenken van alternatieve toepassingen voor objecten).  
Conclusie en toekomstig onderzoek 
Het doel van dit proefschrift was om meer inzicht te verkrijgen in de creatieve capaciteiten 
en potenties in de adolescentie en om te bepalen in welke mate deze gerelateerd zijn aan 
ontwikkelingen in de hersenen, met name in de laterale PFC. De resultaten onderschrijven de 
complexiteit van creatieve cognitie. Deze resultaten ondersteunen het idee dat bij creatieve 
prestaties, afhankelijk van het type taak en domein, verschillende cognitieve processen worden 
aangewend. Daar aan gerelateerd, heeft creatief denken een andere betekenis bij verschillende 
taken en domeinen. De studies in dit proefschrift richten zich met name op divergent denken en op 
inzicht. Ondanks dat divergent denken erkend wordt als essentieel en voorspellend voor creatieve 
prestaties (bijv. Kim, 2010;. Nijstad et al, 2010), kunnen de resultaten niet zonder meer worden 
gegeneraliseerd. Daarnaast is er in dit proefschrift gebruik gemaakt van eenvoudige training 
paradigma’s, om inzicht te verkrijgen in de trainbaarheid van creatief denken en prestaties in de 
adolescentie. Toekomstig onderzoek zou alternatieve training paradigma’s kunnen toepassen zoals 
(1) het informeren van proefpersonen over de cognitieve processen die gerelateerd zijn aan 
creatieve prestaties, en/of (2) adaptieve designs die onderscheid maken in moeilijkheidsgraden van 
problemen. Beide typen designs zijn in eerdere onderzoeken effectief gebleken (zie Clapman, 
1997; Scott et al., 2004). Een andere richting voor toekomstig onderzoek is het differentiëren in 
oplossingsstrategieën, bijvoorbeeld flexibele en persistente strategieën, om meer inzicht te krijgen 
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in de ontwikkeling en potenties van verschillende ‘cognitieve routes’ naar creatieve prestaties (zie 
Dual Pathway to Creativity Model; Nijstad et al., 2004).  
Ondanks beperkingen in generaliseerbaarheid bieden de huidige bevindingen belangrijke 
inzichten in het functioneren van de hersenen van adolescenten, wanneer deze geconfronteerd 
worden met problemen, die vereisen dat er out-of-the-box wordt gedacht. Interessant zijn daarbij 
de verschillende ontwikkelingspatronen voor creatieve prestaties en gerelateerde activatie van 
laterale PFC gebieden voor verschillende creativiteitsproblemen. Deze bevindingen kunnen dienen 
als uitgangspunt voor het ontwerpen van neuro-cognitieve ontwikkelingsmodellen, die de 
complexiteit van de functionele hersenontwikkeling in de adolescentie onderkent. Dergelijke 
modellen kunnen nuttig zijn voor diverse educatieve doeleinden. Ze vergroten het begrip van hoe 
de hersenen van adolescenten informatie verwerken. Dit creëert op zijn beurt weer kansen om 
educatieve programma’s aan te passen aan de cognitieve capaciteiten van adolescenten en zo 
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veranderingen in prestaties op de AUT (bedenken van alternatieve toepassingen voor objecten).  
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complexiteit van creatieve cognitie. Deze resultaten ondersteunen het idee dat bij creatieve 
prestaties, afhankelijk van het type taak en domein, verschillende cognitieve processen worden 
aangewend. Daar aan gerelateerd, heeft creatief denken een andere betekenis bij verschillende 
taken en domeinen. De studies in dit proefschrift richten zich met name op divergent denken en op 
inzicht. Ondanks dat divergent denken erkend wordt als essentieel en voorspellend voor creatieve 
prestaties (bijv. Kim, 2010;. Nijstad et al, 2010), kunnen de resultaten niet zonder meer worden 
gegeneraliseerd. Daarnaast is er in dit proefschrift gebruik gemaakt van eenvoudige training 
paradigma’s, om inzicht te verkrijgen in de trainbaarheid van creatief denken en prestaties in de 
adolescentie. Toekomstig onderzoek zou alternatieve training paradigma’s kunnen toepassen zoals 
(1) het informeren van proefpersonen over de cognitieve processen die gerelateerd zijn aan 
creatieve prestaties, en/of (2) adaptieve designs die onderscheid maken in moeilijkheidsgraden van 
problemen. Beide typen designs zijn in eerdere onderzoeken effectief gebleken (zie Clapman, 
1997; Scott et al., 2004). Een andere richting voor toekomstig onderzoek is het differentiëren in 
oplossingsstrategieën, bijvoorbeeld flexibele en persistente strategieën, om meer inzicht te krijgen 
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in de ontwikkeling en potenties van verschillende ‘cognitieve routes’ naar creatieve prestaties (zie 
Dual Pathway to Creativity Model; Nijstad et al., 2004).  
Ondanks beperkingen in generaliseerbaarheid bieden de huidige bevindingen belangrijke 
inzichten in het functioneren van de hersenen van adolescenten, wanneer deze geconfronteerd 
worden met problemen, die vereisen dat er out-of-the-box wordt gedacht. Interessant zijn daarbij 
de verschillende ontwikkelingspatronen voor creatieve prestaties en gerelateerde activatie van 
laterale PFC gebieden voor verschillende creativiteitsproblemen. Deze bevindingen kunnen dienen 
als uitgangspunt voor het ontwerpen van neuro-cognitieve ontwikkelingsmodellen, die de 
complexiteit van de functionele hersenontwikkeling in de adolescentie onderkent. Dergelijke 
modellen kunnen nuttig zijn voor diverse educatieve doeleinden. Ze vergroten het begrip van hoe 
de hersenen van adolescenten informatie verwerken. Dit creëert op zijn beurt weer kansen om 
educatieve programma’s aan te passen aan de cognitieve capaciteiten van adolescenten en zo 
lesmateriaal en onderwijs verder te verbeteren. 
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